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     In tracing the origins of the movement to desegregate the U.S. Army, most scholars pointed to 
President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 signed on July 26, 1948.  Other scholars highlighted 
the work done by the “President’s Committee on Equality and Opportunity in the Armed 
Services,” also known as the Fahy Committee, which was formed as a result of Order 9981. 
     However, when the United States was compelled to take military action following the surprise 
attack by North Korean forces on June 25, 1950, the U.S. Army units sent into action in Korea 
were mostly composed of segregated units such as the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  The 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment and other segregated units continued to be maintained by the U.S. Army 
despite the efforts of the president, prominent civilians, military leaders, and the Fahy 
Committee, to desegregate the armed forces.  A reason espoused by scholars for why the U.S. 
Army was ultimately integrated was due to manpower shortages created by combat in Korea and 
the removal of quota restrictions on the enlistment of African American soldiers during the war. 
     All three theories have their strengths and cannot be discounted entirely.  This study argues 
that the racial animosity by a large segment of senior military officers, such as Lieutenant 
General Edward Almond, and their attempts to portray African American soldiers and African 
American units as incompetent actually backfired and instead of providing the justification for 
continued segregation, actually gave men like General Ridgway the excuse to force the 
integration of the Army in Korea.    The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in particular was singled out, 
often without cause, for incompetence.  Using interviews from the Army Center of Military 





actually showed incredible courage and determination against both the enemy forces they faced 
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     On Armistice Day, November, 11, 1950, Master Sergeant Waymond R. Ransom, an African 
American member of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon, attached to the 
Headquarters Company, 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, 25
th
 Infantry Division, stood by the side of a 
road near Yenchon, Korea talking with one of his squad leaders.  Moments earlier, a mine had 
detonated in the road, killing one American and injuring several others.  As the injured were 
being led to an aid station, a number of Korean civilians armed with Russian weapons and 
wearing arm bands that bore the inscription, “Seoul Police Reserve Battalion” marched down the 
same road. 
     During the confusion following the land mine’s explosion, Sergeant Ransom’s squad leader 
yelled: “Hey, them people was leaving town as we were coming yesterday.  Those six girls right 
there were leaving town as we were coming into town yesterday.” As Sergeant Ransom was to 
relate thirty-eight years later, right after the “Seoul Police Reserve Battalion” marched out of 
sight a big burst of fire erupted from down the same road.   
     Meanwhile, a lieutenant in charge of one of the rifle companies in the vicinity was talking 
with Sergeant Ransom’s lieutenant.  Sergeant Ransom recalled that the two lieutenants were the 
“only two white folks in the area.”  The rifle company lieutenant advised Ransom’s lieutenant; 
“Give me one of your jeeps.  Then you all dash down there with a lot of firing.”  Sergeant 
Ransom’s lieutenant gave the order to the men standing nearby, including Sergeant Ransom, and 
then jumped into the jeep and sped off. 
     What Sergeant Ransom’s lieutenant did not know was that the night before Sergeant Ransom 
and another sergeant had decided “that the next fire fight if certain things happened it would be 
2 
 
his last,” or in-other-words, Sergeant Ransom’s lieutenant would become the victim of what has 
often been referred to as “fragging” – the purposeful killing of an officer, usually within the 
context of combat so that it appears to be just another casualty of war.  When Sergeant Ransom 
and the other men from Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon rushed down the 
road towards the sound of gunfire they came across the jeep that had moments before contained 
their lieutenant.  The driver was dead and the lieutenant was nowhere to be found (later 
confirmed Killed In Action – KIA).  Around them a gun battle raged involving approximately 
one thousand North Korean soldiers who were the rear and flank component of the armed 
Korean civilians that Sergeant Ransom had moments before watched march past.  
     Sergeant Ransom reacted instinctively, his military training kicking in.  Sergeant Ransom 
ordered his men to return fire and he moved to attack the enemy.  According to Sergeant 
Ransom’s Distinguished Service Cross citation: “Sergeant Ransom moved to an exposed 
position and advanced while delivering a steady stream of effective counter fire into the enemy 
strongpoint.  Although wounded several times, he continued to move toward the hostile 
positions.”
1
   
     The battle quickly turned chaotic and deadly.  Sergeant Ransom witnessed the enemy fire take 
down several of his men.  One of his squad leaders, Marion Rivers, a West Indian from New 
York yelled to Sergeant Ransom that he had been shot in the body and needed help.  Sergeant 
Ransom years later recalled the plea from Rivers and sorrowfully explained, “There’s nothing I 
can do; I gave him a grenade.”  Sergeant Ransom did not elaborate whether the grenade provided 
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to Rivers was to assist him in fending off the enemy onslaught or just a quick and painless means 
for Rivers to end his life. 
     Sergeant Ransom explained what happened next: 
          One (enemy soldier) took me with two rounds through my left knee just as my left knee  
          comes down.  So I went over.  This (North Korean) officer came up.  I got back up on the  
          right leg and threw a butt stroke at him.  He ducked so I go over again, and when I hit the  
          ground again he jumped on top of me.  He had a pistol on a lanyard in his hand and was  
          hitting me on the head with the pistol.  I got the (pistol) away from him.  He said  
          something.  So I got up on the one good leg again.  He said something to the burp gunner  
          and he shot me again.  I shifted half sideways, and he hit me with several rounds.  I rolled  
          over and played dead.  They stomped me around some and took my field jacket and my  
          billfold and cap.  Then they left me.  After a while … I think they shot anybody they saw  
          was still moving.  After a while two more come up and start taking my boots off.  The  
          boots don’t come off so easy so they hold me upside down.  This doesn’t feel too good.   
          One said he’s alive or words to that effect.  I think that it’s time for bayonets so I say to get  
          it over with.  They think I’m asking for water.  So I start cussing them out in Japanese, and  
          they hit me with rifle butts.  I play dead again, and they take the boots and leave.  I roll  
          over on my stomach into some weeds so that they couldn’t see my breath because it is  
          cold.  The next thing, about 10 or 11 (American soldiers), the relief force comes up.
2
 
Sergeant Ransom was taken away for medical care and his part of the Korean War came to a 
close. 
     Sergeant Ransom’s experience was illustrative of several important factors operating during 
the Korean War.  First, Sergeant Ransom was an African American that was still fighting within 
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 Interview with Waymond Ransom, August 5, 1988, Box 7, Oral Interview Notes for Black Soldier White Army: 
The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (BSWA), Center of Military History (CMH). 
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a segregated unit – the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment – two years after President Truman’s Executive 
Order 9981 was supposed to have ended segregation within the Armed Forces.  Second, Sergeant 
Ransom, while fighting alongside other African Americans, was being led by white officers, 
specifically, a white officer that Sergeant Ransom and his fellow soldiers disliked enough to 
contemplate “fragging.”  Finally, Sergeant Ransom, despite facing the entrenched prejudice of a 
military establishment that was reluctant to end segregation, continued to fight with 
“extraordinary heroism” – as exemplified in his Distinguished Service Cross citation.   
     The story of African Americans in the Korean War is complicated.  It is the story of African 
Americans facing continued segregation and racial prejudice while at the same time finally 
getting the opportunity to prove their worth in combat that had not typically been the case in 
earlier conflicts.  Unlike, for example, World War II, where African Americans were largely 
shielded from combat roles, the Korean War was the first war of the Twentieth Century during 
which black soldiers were used in combat roles in all branches of the armed services.  And most 
important, The Korean War was the catalyst that brought about the realization of Truman’s 
Presidential Order to end segregation in the armed forces.  But in order for the Army to finally 
accept integration it required the sacrifices of men such as Sergeant Ransom and ironically, it 
required that the men of the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment had to face the prejudices of several 
prominent and senior white officers who used every setback and perceived failing of the 24
th
 to 
paint all African American soldiers as cowards and unfit fighting men.  Some of these senior 
officers would hold onto their racial biases till the day they died – long after the rest of the 
military acknowledged the reality that white or black – the color of one’s skin has nothing to do 
with their ability as a soldier.  
5 
 
     In tracing the origin of the movement to desegregate the U.S. Army many scholars have 
pointed to President Truman’s Executive Order 9981 signed on July 26, 1948.  Other scholars 
have highlighted the work done by the “President’s Committee on Equality and Opportunity in 
the Armed Services” also known as the Fahy Committee, which was formed as a result of Order 
9981 to see to it that the Armed Services implemented the President’s vision.
3
 
     Two years later, however, when the United States was compelled to take military action in 
Korea with the attack by North Korean forces on June 25, 1950, the U.S. Army forces fielded to 
the Korean peninsula were mostly composed of segregated units, such as the all-black 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment - this despite the efforts of the President, prominent civilian military leaders, 
and the Fahy Committee.  The third reason espoused by scholars for why the U.S. Army was 
ultimately integrated was the manpower shortages created by combat in Korea and the removal 
of quota restrictions on the enlistment of African American soldiers during the war. 
     All three theories have their strengths and cannot be discounted as irrelevant.  This study 
argues that the racial animosity by a large segment of senior military officers, such as Lieutenant 
General Edward Almond, and their attempts to portray African American soldiers and African 
American units as incompetent actually backfired – instead of providing the justification for 
continued segregation – actually gave men like General Matthew B. Ridgway the excuse to force 
                                                          
3
 The issue among scholars of whether President Truman’s Order 9981 or the subsequent Fahy Committee that was 
created as a result of Order 9981 was the more important factor is somewhat similar to the question of which came 
first, the chicken or the egg.  Early scholars, such as Lee Nichols, Richard Dalfuime, and Richard Stillman tend to 
give the lion’s share of credit to the work of the Fahy Committee as being the crucial factor in the breakdown of 
segregation in the U.S. Army.  These individuals also happened to be some of the early scholars on the topic of 
desegregation.  Coinciding with the rise in popularity and acceptance of President Truman by historians there 
appeared to be a trend among recent scholarship to give more praise to President Truman and his decisiveness in 
signing Order 9981.  Sherie Mershon and Steve Schlossman in Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. 
Armed Forces, published in 1998, were both far more generous to President Truman’s foresight in signing Order 
9981 than previous scholars.  James Rawn Jr. in The Double V: How Wars, Protest, and Harry Truman 
Desegregated America’s Military, published in 2013, as one might presume from the title, was also an advocate that 
President Truman was the leading change agent for desegregation.     
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the integration of the Army in Korea.  The claim of cowardice and incompetence had 
traditionally been the rallying cry for continued segregation of black soldiers: but with the need 
for replacements in white units and because of the so-called failure of black units – after three 
years of resisting integration the resistance of the senior Army command finally broke down.  Of 
all the African American units in Korea, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in particular was singled out, 
often without cause, for incompetence.  Using interviews from the Army Center of Military 
History study, Black Soldier White Army, as well as documentation from the Eisenhower 
Presidential Library, Truman Presidential Library, and the Lieutenant General Edward Almond 
collection at the Military Heritage Institute, this study will show that the men of the Fighting 24
th
 
actually showed incredible courage and determination against a military leadership that 
demoralized and belittled them as soldiers. 
Desegregation and African Americans in the Military: A Historiography 
     Before the Armed Services integrated, before American society faced the desegregation of 
schools and government service, what little scholarship there was geared towards African 
Americans was typically superficial or was permeated with the racial bias of the time.  In regard 
to the history of the African American as a soldier, most scholarship came from historians and 
authors associated with the United States Army. 
     The United States Army War College in 1926 at the direction of the War Department 
sponsored a study entitled: “The Use of Negro Manpower in War.”  This study, like several 
before and after, was designed to get at the heart of the question the War Department asked; 
“what do we do with the Negro soldier?”  The reason the War Department asked this question 
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can be found under the section titled “The problem presented” in the Army War College study.  
The question, or “problem,” was the U.S. Constitution. 
     The Army War College study made the assessment at the outset: “Under the Constitution the 
negro has the rights of citizenship.  He forms a considerable part of the population of the United 
States.  It is evidence that he must bear his share of the burden of war.”
4
  However, “his share of 
the burden” did not imply that the U.S. Army was going to use African American soldiers the 
same as white soldiers and the Army War College study had a reason for that as well.  Under the 
section titled “Opinion of the War College” – the study concluded: “In the process of evolution 
the American negro has not progressed as far as the other sub-species of the human family.  As a 
race he has not developed leadership qualities.  His mental inferiority and the inherent 
weaknesses of his character are factors that must be considered with great care in the preparation 
of any plans for his employment in war.”
5
   
     Without question, the Army War College study was a product of its time.  The U.S. Army in 
1926 was a long way from the post-integration period of the 1950s and 1960s and as 
“scholarship” to be considered in a historiography the material bears the significant caveat of the 
racial attitudes at the time it was created.  The importance of the Army War College study and 
other similar government documents to the historiography and on this study is less to what extent 
they influenced later scholarship (which they mostly did not), but rather on the fact that the 
senior officers that commanded African American soldiers in Korea as integration started 
making a toe-hold in the Army – received their education regarding African Americans as 
soldiers by these same documents.  
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 John J. Fulmer, U.S. Army War College: The Use of Negro Manpower in War (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army, 
1926), 1. 
5
 Ibid., 2. 
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     Officers leading African American soldiers in Korea were reminded that the soldiers under 
their charge were fighting in order to uphold their Constitutional “share of the burden of war.”  
Perhaps these officers would also remember the attachment to the Army War College study 
titled: “Analysis of the physical, mental, moral and psychological qualities and characteristics of 
the negro as a sub-species of the human family” that informed the future leaders of the Army in 
1926 that “the negroes racial experience as a slave has bred in him a peculiar form of mind … 
(making him) by nature sub-servient (sp).”  The article went on to elaborate that based on their 
scientific understanding the “Negro … instinctively regards the white man as his superior.  He is 
willing to give way to the white man as a general rule and he does this unthinkingly.  His period 
of service as a slave and his mental caliber cause him to accept unhesitatingly as proper and 
natural, work that would disgust the white.”
6
  It was this “subservience” to the “white man” that 
led the Army to call for an officer corps in black units composed mostly of white officers.  
     Although by the time of the Korean War the Army War College study was nearly twenty-five 
years old, the conclusion of that study had numerous supporters among senior Army leaders in 
Korea, such as Lieutenant General Edward Almond, who fervently believed the 1926 reports 
conclusion that “in physical courage it must be admitted that the American negro falls well back 
of the white man and possibly behind all other races.”
7
  Another characteristic of the 1926 Army 
War College study and several other studies prepared by the Army between World War I and 
World War II was that African American officers posed their own unique problems.   
     The study informed future Army officers that; “they (African American officers) cliqued 
together and sought at all times to protect members of their own race, no matter whether they 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 6. 
7
 Ibid., 7. 
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were right or wrong … their principal idea was not that they were in the service to fight for their 
country, but that they were there for the advancement of their racial interests.”  According to the 
Army study, African American officers were not to be looked upon by their white counterparts 
as an ally in leading black soldiers; on the contrary, they should be looked upon as impediment 
to the good order of the unit.  As basis for this conclusion, the Army study provided the 
observation of an unnamed 92
nd
 Division Commanding General in World War I who stated: 
“The mass of colored troops distrusted their colored officers – to them the colored officer was 




     With the advent of World War II, the Army attempted to tone down some of their more blunt 
assessments of African American soldiers.  A good example is the Army Service Forces Manual 
titled “Leadership and the Negro Soldier” that was published in 1944.  The Army did not attempt 
to portray the African American as a “sub-species” of the human family in this manual and 
actually went at great lengths to praise black soldiers in a chapter titled “The Negro Solider in 
American History.”  More importantly, the Army appeared to give some recognition to the 
problem of racial prejudice among the leadership in the Army.  But as with the 1926 study, the 
main goal of the Army Services manual was “focused directly and solely on the problem of the 
most effective military use of colored troops.”  However, the “most effective military use of 
colored troops” did not mean they would be integrated.  On the contrary, the Army stated in no 
uncertain terms; “It is essential that there be a clear understanding that the Army has no authority 
or intention to participate in social reform as such but does view the problem as a matter of 







  From World War II to the beginning of the Korean War, “efficient 
troop utilization” in reference to African American soldiers would be through a segregated 
system. 
     Comparing the 1926 Army War College Study and the 1944 Army Service Forces Manual, 
one is immediately struck by the vast difference in tone.  This is not necessarily attributable to an 
enlightening of racial views by the Army but has to do with the intended audience and the goals 
of each document.  While the 1926 study was classified as “Secret” and was only meant for 
distribution to officers attending the Army War College and other select senior officers of a 
peace-time Army, the 1944 manual was meant for junior officers recently drafted into the U.S. 
“citizen” Army fighting a global war.  In 1944, the Army needed the manpower of the country’s 
African American community and it was in their best interest to address some of the issues faced 
by black soldiers.   
     Under the section titled “Carry-Over of Civilian Attitudes” the manual made a point to 
address what would appear obvious to the average black soldier in 1944; “In civilian life every 
Negro, at one time or another, has either been told, or has read, or has been made to feel that he 
is considered inferior by the majority of white people.”
10
  Yet, the manual wanted the junior 
officers to understand that despite the continued bias towards black soldiers by society as a 
whole, the current use of black soldiers in segregated units was regarded as appropriate by a 
“sizeable minority” of black soldiers and a clear “majority” of white soldiers.  For the black 
soldier who disagreed with segregation the manual noted; “Those who think white and Negro 
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 Leadership and the Negro Soldier: Army Service Forces Manual (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Army Services 
Forces, 1944), iv. 
10
 Ibid., 12. 
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soldiers should be in the same outfits are more often better educated and from the North,” as if 
that distinction should have special meaning.
11
 
     Despite the attempts of the 1944 manual to justify the continued use of segregated units in the 
Army; its structure, verbiage, and content was geared towards acknowledging the potential of 
African American troops.  The Chapter titled “The Negro Soldier in American History” touted 
the military accomplishments of black soldiers while leaving out the criticism that often had been 
the backbone of previous government sponsored histories.  Even the notorious Brownsville, 
Texas uprising was conveniently left out of the chapter – once the clarion call to prevent blacks 
from serving in combat units. 
     The first true “scholarship” to come out regarding integration of the Army appeared in 1954 
with the publication of Breakthrough on the Color Front – the same year that the Army 
“officially” declared that all units and commands of the Army were integrated.  The author, Lee 
Nichols, had been a journalist for the United Press during the Korean War and witnessed 
firsthand the move towards integration during the conflict.  As a journalist, Nichols was able to 
gain access to several prominent politicians and officers who had knowledge of the behind-the-
scenes efforts to move integration forward.  Nichols also had access to several government 
documents and studies to include the classified “Project Clear” which was a sociological survey 
of racial attitudes by Army soldiers and officers during the Korean War.   
     As a first attempt at telling the story of integration, Nichols work deserves praise.  
Unfortunately, because of the very “recent” nature of some the subject being described and 
classification of government documents used, the references are sporadic or non-existent.  
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Nichols acknowledged as much in the preface: “Since they are official records … I have not 
always felt it necessary to name the source … and in many cases (they) were given to me on a 
confidential basis.”
12
  Despite the scarcity of references, Nichols told a compelling story of an 
Army slow to come to terms with the need to integrate troops.  Nichols observed for some in the 
Army it was “also a story of bitter resistance, tradition – crusted ‘brass in braid,’ some of whom 
had to be retired to make room for new ways, of stubborn politicians who would not see that old 
methods had outlived their usefulness.”
13
  As several later scholars pointed out, one of the 
concepts that Nichols observed in the Army’s move towards desegregation had to do with the 
“un-bunching” of African American soldiers in order to increase their effectiveness. 
     Nichols actually claimed to have received the concept of “un-bunching” from a “hard-boiled 
southern general.”  The general described it thus: “In civilian life they [Negroes] are bunched.  
They’ve got to be unbunched.”
14
  The underlying inference of the comment was that when 
African American soldiers were put together (as in segregated units) they became less effective 
as soldiers – a concept that fit in well during the Korean War with the constant attempts to 
portray units like the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as failures.  The unnamed “southern general” might 
have also drawn from his previous Army education to come up with the concept that African 
American’s when placed together became unruly.  In the 1926 Army War College study under 
the section of “Psychology” the study warned the white Army officers that “a curious feature of 
the negro’s psychology is his susceptibility to the influence of crowd psychology.  We have 
some painful experiences along this line in the army, notably the Brownsville riot.”
15
  Again, 
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citing the Brownsville riot was the Army’s fallback position on claiming that Africa American 
soldiers could not be trusted.  This will be explored further in Chapter I. 
     Breakthrough on the Color Front was also remarkable for exposing the significant push-back 
the Fahy Committee received from senior Army officers.  The Executive Secretary of the Fahy 
Committee, E.W. Kenworthy, informed the author that “the committee sparred almost 
continuously with Army officers who try to mislead it about the handling of Negroes.”  Secretary 
Kenworthy said he had an “Army representative” who proved particularly intractable.  The 
“Army representative” would call up Secretary Kenworthy and tell him “well, you saw through 
that gimmick, but we’ll think up another one that will stop you.”
16
  The obstacles to the Fahy 
Committee by senior Army officers and civilian leaders will be explored further in Chapter I. 
     Nichols in Breakthrough on the Color Front also acknowledged that what finally broke down 
the resistance to integration in the Army was the Korean War.  According to Nichols, “military 
leaders, including General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 
1953, said the war hastened Army integration by at least ten years.”
17
  Nichols did not clarify 
why the Korean War caused the Army to suddenly relent on integration – that would be left to 
later scholarship to address. 
Race and the Military: The Vietnam Era Historiography 
     In the late 1960s just as the Vietnam War was starting to intensify the topic of racial attitudes 
and the history of African Americans in the military again received notice; first with the 
publication of the Army’s official history United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: 
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The Employment of Negro Troops in 1966, then Richard Stillman’s Integration of the Negro in 
The U.S. Armed Forces in 1968, and finally Richard Dalfiume’s Desegregation of the U.S. 
Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953 that was published in 1969.  While the Army 
history was only concerned with the history of African American soldiers during World War II, 
this was the first in-depth accounting by the Army to detail the actions of black soldiers in 
combat units since the Army integrated.  The author, Ulysses Lee, was chosen for the project due 
to his background as a Professor of English and former member of the Office of the Chief of 
Military History from 1946 to 1952.  Lee was also a former Army officer who was considered to 
be the “military history specialists on Negroes in the Army.”
18
   
     Lee discussed briefly the history of African American’s as soldiers in the years prior to and 
during World War I as a way of background.  His analysis of the inter-war years was more 
detailed.  Lee wanted to show that the Army prior to World War II was attempting to formulate a 
plan for the use of African American troops that would be more successful than the strategy 
employed during World War I – a strategy that relegated the majority of black soldiers to manual 
labor and rear-line services as opposed to combat roles.  According to Lee, the largest obstacle to 
full utilization of black soldiers was “how best to build efficient military units from a portion of 
the population which, in general, had had little experience in the skills and responsibilities that 
go with efficient military administration and leadership and which, under existing peacetime 
conditions, had little opportunity to develop them.”
19
  While technically true, the main reason 
why black soldiers were relegated to a support role was the strong racial views of Army officers 
in the years between World War I and World War II.   
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     Most likely, it was the racial prejudices of Army officers that explained why “during the 
1920’s the subject of the future employment of Negro troops came to be considered so sensitive 
that it was felt that it was not in the best interest of the service to disseminate information 
concerning it to widely.”
20
  The lengths that the Army was willing to go were recorded by Lee:   
          The policy of cloaking plans for the use and designation of Negro units in secrecy went so  
          far in the late twenties that Negro units, as such, virtually disappeared from all except the  
          war Department’s own plans.  After 1928, corps area commanders were not permitted to  
          show on their mobilization plans those units which were to receive Negro troops.  These  
          instructions were not rescinded until 1938, when corps area commanders and chiefs of  
          arms and services were directed to indicate “appropriately” the Negro units in their plans.
21
 
     Lee also acknowledged the 1926 Army War College Study which he described as one of 
several “brief summaries” that were prepared during the interwar years to provide “field grade” 
officers with “a representative summary example of the personality problem which commanders 
expected to meet in the employment of Negro troops.”  To his credit, Lee was direct in 
describing the insensitivity of these earlier Army “studies.”
22
  Moving from the inter-war years, 
Lee next focused on events during World War II – the main focus of The Employment of Negro 
Troops.  One of the chapters, chapter VII, in The Employment of Negro Troops was devoted to 
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 Lee provided this sample from the 1926 study: “As an individual the Negro is docile, tractable, lighthearted, 
carefree and good-natured.  If unjustly treated he is likely to become surly and stubborn, though this is usually a 
temporary phase.  He is careless, shiftless, irresponsible and secretive.  He resents censure and is best handled with 
praise and by ridicule.  He is unmoral, untruthful and his sense of right doing is relatively inferior.  Crimes and 
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charges.  On the other hand the Negro is cheerful, loyal and usually uncomplaining if reasonably well fed.  He has a 
musical nature and a marked sense of rhythm.  His art is primitive.  He is religious.  With proper direction in mass, 
Negroes are industrious.  They are emotional and can be stirred to a high state of enthusiasm.  Their emotions are 
unstable and their reactions uncertain.  Bad leadership in particular is easily communicated to them.” Ibid., 45.  
Besides being grossly stereotypical, racist, and in some cases contradictory with itself – the important point of this 
statement was that it was created by and for the “field grade” officers that would lead soldiers (in some cases 
African American soldiers) in combat in World War II and Korea. 
16 
 
the officers for African American soldiers.  Lee made the astute observation at the beginning of 
the chapter that, “A great deal depended upon the wisdom and approach of a commander.  The 
officers of a given unit reflected the approach taken by the commander of that unit, and 
sometimes, by the commander of the post on which the unit was located or of the higher unit to 
which the organization was assigned or attached.”
23
  In most institutions, the role of a leader is 
crucial to the effectiveness of the institution as a whole, but this is especially true in a military 
organization. 
     Lee discussed the issue of leadership by describing a series of “reputed” events that took 
place at Fort Huachuca in Arizona under the command of then Major General Edward Almond – 
the commanding general of the African American 92
nd
 Division during World War II.  Lee’s 
focus in discussing the “alleged” events in Arizona were designed to show “the effect of the 
belief that actions of commanders stemmed from racial notions” and in this case it dealt with 
rumors “fostered if not founded in the distrust which the men of the division felt toward their 
commander.”  In 1943, stories about General Almond had reached the FBI and the White House, 
resulting in Mrs. Roosevelt forwarding a letter to the War Department with one of the 
accusations she received regarding General Almond.  In the letter, General Almond was reputed 
to have told a meeting of division mess sergeants and supply officers that “Nigger” soldiers will 
not eat spinach or celery and that generally speaking Almond liked to use the word “Nigger” in 
everyday conversation.  Another story was that after a jeep turned over and injured an African 
American serviceman, General Almond only quipped “Did it hurt my truck?”
24
  The War 
Department dutifully sent out an inspection team under African American Brigadier General 
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Benjamin O. Davis who reported back that the rumors could not corroborated.  Whether the 
alleged incidents took place cannot be proved, however, as will be discussed in a later chapter, 
General Almond was one of several senior Army officers in World War II and Korea that held a 
strong bias towards African American soldiers.  Overall, Lee’s The Employment of Negro Troops 
was a well written narrative of the actions of African American soldiers in World War II and it 
went a long way toward rectifying the earlier government “studies” that belittled the actions of 
black soldiers.   
     Richard Stillman in Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces approached the topic 
of integration not from the standpoint of a historian but as a student of political science.  In the 
introduction Stillman explained “As a student of politics, I am interested not in value judgments 
or moral questions but rather in the political forces that brought about what eventually happened 
to Negroes in uniform.”
25
   
     According to Stillman, the “political” reality for African American soldiers and the military 
was that the “Negro and the military organization always have been interdependent, from the 
smoke-filled battlefield to the smoke-filled Pentagon conference room.”
26
  This can best be 
interpreted as African American soldiers used service in the armed forces to further the fight of 
equality in both the military and in civilian life and the military used the African American 
soldier to meet the demands of war.  The assertion that some in the African American 
community looked at military service as a means of furthering their rights as civilians was true, 
African American leaders such as William E. DuBois said as much in various public statements, 
however, prior to World War II and Korea the military gained far more from the use of African 
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American personnel than African American’s received in equality in either the military or 
civilian life.  Stillman made the assertion, “From the Revolutionary War until 1940, the 
relationship between the Negro and the military had been inconsistent.  When the military 
needed men, Negroes served.  When it did not, Negroes were rejected.”
27
  This hardly strikes the 
reader as an “interdependent” relationship and sounds more one-sided towards the military. 
     After discussing the political machinations of President Truman on race issues, Stillman 
turned his focus to the Fahy Committee’s attempts to enforce Presidential Order 9981.
 28
  Just as 
Lee Nichols had related in Breakthrough on the Color Front, the largest obstacle the Fahy 
Committee faced came from the Army brass.  Stillman also laid part of the blame at the feet of 
the civilian military secretaries.  “The Army’s situation, from 1947 until early 1949, was the 
result of Secretary Kenneth C. Royall’s submission to the conservative fears of his generals,” he 
charged.
29
  According to Stillman, it was not until the Korean War when the Army officers 
finally realized that “segregation is an irrational force that prevents efficient allocation of human 
resources” that integration was approved.
30
  Stillman was right to call segregation an “irrational 
force” but his argument that the Army suddenly realized this during the Korean War and did an 
about-face is too simplistic.  Part of Stillman’s problem was his attempt to synthesis all human 
actions as caused by “political” calculations – this might work for the political scientist but in 
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human history causation tends to be far more complicated.  In the case of integration, there were 
multiple factors at play in the Army’s decision. 
     In 1969, Richard M. Dalfuime, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, published 
Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953.  Dalfiume’s study 
was unique because he focused on the military’s attempt to impose “separate-but-equal” during 
World War II.  According to Dalfuime, World War II was a transitional period for African 
American soldiers because of the increased emphasis on allowing black soldiers to experience 
combat and to enter services and units that previously black soldiers had not been allowed in – 
such as the Army Air Force and Marine Corps.  Despite their attempts to provide “separate-but-
equal” the military always fell short because “the thinking behind military policy was focused on 
the separate to such an extent that efficiency, supposedly the major goal of the military, was 
always subordinated to the goal of segregation.”
31
  This led to some unintended consequences 
that only placed further burdens on the military structure when segregation “was carried to 
ridiculous extremes.”  As an example, Dalfuime cited the experience of a lone black officer 
stationed at Camp Wheeler, Georgia.  As the only black officer on base, he was provided with 
his own two-story bachelor officer’s quarters where he stayed by himself and in the mess area an 
entire section had to be “fenced off” for him to take his meals.
32
 
     During World War II, the Army attempted to address some of the inefficiencies related to 
African American soldiers by appointing Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to head the 
“Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies.”  As a result of their inquiries, “reports coming 
in to the committee disclosed that Army policies to ensure equal treatment of Negroes were not 
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generally known or followed by commanders in the field.”  Instead of attempting to address the 
non-compliance by senior Army officers the committee appeared to spend most of their time 
disparaging the “Negro” press.  McCloy himself was reported to have complained, “This 
discrimination now has gotten such momentum in the Negro press that one demand granted leads 
only to another, and you do not bury any issue permanently by concession.”
33
  In the face of this 
opposition by African American newspapers, Dalfuime argued that the Army resorted to 
maintaining the status-quo – a survival and coping mechanism the Army initially employed in 
the Korean War as well.  
     Dalfuime, as Lee Nichols had acknowledged previously in Breakthrough on the Color Front, 
realized that integration happened in the Army because of the Korean War.  “There is no doubt 
that the Korean War pushed the Army to complete integration much sooner than would have 
been the case without a war,” but Dalfuime also stated: “this occurred only because of the 
foundation laid down by the Fahy Committee.”
34
  Almost as an afterthought, Dalfuime made a 
very important observation about one other factor that influenced the transition to an integrated 
Army during the Korean War – the elimination of quotas on the recruitment of African 
Americans into the Army.  Dalfuime noted, “Negro enlistments had been 8.2. percent of the total 
in March, 1950; without the quota they shot up to 22 per cent of the total in April.”
35
  
     The influx of African American soldiers posed a problem for Army commanders trying to 
maintain segregated units.  It meant that the extra troops would have to be placed in African 
American units (already in some cases over-strength), while many white units were desperately 
short on personnel.  This was a problem that sometimes became self-correcting when regiment 
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and battalion officers of under-strength white units took it upon themselves to get replacements 
no matter what their skin color.  Dalfuime cited an unnamed commanding officer of the Ninth 
Infantry Regiment that had two white units and one black unit who viewed the problem thus: 
“We would have been doing ourselves a disservice to permit [Negro] soldiers to lie around in 
rear areas at the expense of still further weakening our [white] rifle companies.”
36
  The Ninth 
Infantry Regiment commanding officer put the extra troops where they were needed, not where 
they were supposed to be placed based on the policy of segregation.  Of course, not everyone in 
the Army command structure saw the solution pragmatically.  “The Army General Staff and 
General Mark Clark, Commander of the Army Field Forces,” Dalfiume noted, “took the position 
that the integration in Korea had not been proven a definite success and continued to argue that 
the best way to reduce the overstrength in Negro units was to reimpose the racial quota.”
37
  
General Clark was overruled by Secretary Frank Pace, representing another example when the 
civilian leadership had to force the Army leadership to accept integration. 
     As the Vietnam War wound down, two further studies examining African Americans and race 
relations in the military were published: Jack D. Foner’s Blacks and the Military in American 
History and Johnny Butler’s Unsanctioned Institutional Racism in the U.S. Army.  While Foner’s 
work was passionate, it was mostly a re-hash of previously published history on African 
American’s in the armed services.   
     In 1974, when Blacks and the Military in American History was published, Jack Foner was a 
professor at Colby College in Waterville, Maine.  Having established one of the first black 
studies programs in the country, Foner’s personal history played a role in his approach to his 
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study.  Foner had been backlisted from higher education for almost 30 years after he was called 
in front of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Educational System of the State of 
New York in 1941 for a supposed “communist” association and for his out-spoken stance on 
civil rights for African Americans.
38
   
     Foner was sympathetic to the plight of African American soldiers in a segregated Army and 
was successful in demonstrating that some black soldiers did not passively accept the military’s 
racially biased directives.  As an example, he cited an incident in Indiana where a hundred black 
flying officers were arrested after refusing to sign a document that committed them to not 
attempt to enter a white officer’s club, and another incident when a black officer resigned his 
commission, stating: “I am unable to adjust myself to the handicap of being a Negro officer in 
the United States Army … prolonged observation reveals that inconsistencies over and above a 
reasonable amount are rampant.  Sins of omission, sins of commission, humiliations, insults – 
injustices, all – are mounted one upon another until one’s zest is chilled and spirit broken.”
39
  
This was an important theme to bring out and sometimes one overlooked in mainstream 
scholarship.  In the history of African Americans in the military it is easy to get drawn into 
viewing everything through the prism of victimhood (which African Americans had reason to 
claim), but at the same time the story of blacks in the military is also a story of individuals taking 
a stand for their beliefs and taking action to redress racism – a topic that will be explored further 
in Chapter II. 
     This was also one of the first works to explore the role of African Americans and racial bias 
in the Vietnam War.  Foner observed that “the Vietnam period has been characterized by black 
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servicemen’s recognition that, when discrimination in its more blatant forms ended, it was 
replaced, just as in society as a whole, by a new racism … more subtle, although no less 
immoral, then the more overt examples of bigotry.”
40
 
     Unsanctioned Institutional Racism in the U.S. Army originally began as a doctoral dissertation 
by Johnny Butler in the field of Sociology.  As the title makes clear, this work was more focused 
on the “Institution” of the U.S. Army and less on the individual actors within the Army that put 
in place and executed Army policies and directives.  Also, Butler was quick to point out that his 
focus was on the “unsanctioned” institutional racism as opposed to “sanctioned” institutional 
racism – as were seen in Jim Crow Laws.  Butler stated, “Jim Crow Laws are classic examples of 
sanctioned institutional racism.  On the other hand, unsanctioned institutional racism is when 
policies which sanction the differential treatment of certain races have been removed, but 
differential treatment is still realized.”
41
  This approach may make sense from a sociological 
standpoint, but from a historical perspective it fails to capture the essence of what the Army did 
and did not do in regards to race relations. 
     In fact, the U.S. Army, despite the efforts of some senior officers, went to great lengths after 
President Truman’s Order 9981 to attempt to remove “institutional” racism from the Army.  
Butler stated in reference to institutional racism “racist behavior or attitudes of individuals do not 
necessarily account for racial inequalities in institutions.”  The history of the integration process 
in the Army up to and during the Korean War is rife with the “institution” (Army) ordering 
commanders to provide “equal treatment” but individual officers ignoring these directives – the 
opposite of Butler’s definition of “institutional” racism – sanctioned or otherwise. 
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     Giving Butler the benefit of the doubt, the majority of Unsanctioned Institutional Racism in 
the U.S. Army was focused less on the Army prior to and during the Korean War and more on the 
U.S. Army during the Vietnam War.  Butler acknowledged as much, “our concern is not the 
processes which served to integrate blacks into the Army, but the unequal treatment of blacks in 
a professedly integrated and equalitarian Army.”
42
  Ultimately, the main question Butler wanted 
to answer was “just how equal is the black enlisted man in uniform; is there discrepancies 
between official policy, which in reality began nearly thirty years ago, and perceived reality?”
43
  
The answer in 1974, according to Butler, was that, despite the gains made by the Army, African 
Americans were not equally distributed in higher enlisted ranks or by specialty – with a 
disproportionate amount of black soldiers in the lower enlisted ranks and non-technical 
assignments.  Also, there was a difference between white and black soldiers in promotion rates 
with black soldiers having a “systematically” slower promotion rate.
44
  These observations were 
not in dispute, but Butler’s assertion that they stemmed from unsanctioned institutional racism in 
the U.S. Army was not as convincing. 
Post-Vietnam to Current Historiography 
     The next scholarly work to deal with African Americans and race in the military was Richard 
O. Hope’s Racial Strife in the U.S. Military: Toward the Elimination of Discrimination, 
published in 1979.  Hope provided an abbreviated history of black soldiers – drawing from most 
of the literature already discussed.  Hope’s main premise for his work was to discuss his 
experience working with the Department of Defense on a program titled “Defense Race 
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Relations Institute” (also known by the acronym happy military as DRRI).
45
  The goal of the 
program was to use “change agents” in educating servicemen and women on the history of 
minorities in the military and to tackle head-on racial biases by individual soldiers.  Hope had a 
perfect opportunity to explore the Army’s use of “affirmative action” and other educational 
programs to thwart lingering racism among service members but instead spent most of the time 
detailing the stresses of working for the DDRI as a “change agent.” 
     In 1985, the Center of Military History published Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 
as part of its Defense Studies Series.  As with many of the published series from the Center of 
Military History, the project was a collaborative effort under the direction of Morris J. 
MacGregor.  Because the goal of the Defense Studies Series was to examine the history and role 
of the Office of Secretary of Defense, Integration of the Armed Forces is a top-down perspective 
study.  MacGregor examined the post-World War II efforts to restructure the Army with added 
emphasis on the utilization of African American troops.  To his credit, MacGregor was blunt in 
assessing the lack of progress in several of the Army’s early attempts to reform – including the 
efforts of the Gillem Board. 
     Discussing the selection of men to serve on the Gillem Board, MacGregor commented that 
“none of the board members was particularly prepared for the new assignment.”  General Gillem 
himself seemed an odd selection to head-up the board.  General Gillem was a Tennessean who 
had commanded the XIII Corps in Europe during World War II (which oversaw several black 
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units), and other than his assistance in writing one of the War College studies on the use of black 
troops (likely the 1926 study previously discussed) General Gillem’s selection was owed “to the 
fact that he was a three-star general, available at the moment.”
46
  The Gillem Board for the most 
part appeared to have just gone through the motions – calling witnesses with knowledge of how 
best to handle African American troops (witnesses like General Almond).  This method was only 
marginally better than the one used during World War II when the McCloy Committee sent out 
questionnaires to senior Army officers – a practice that Truman Gibson, a civilian spokesman for 
African American issues, openly ridiculed as impractical.
47
 
     MacGregor pointed out that the Gillem Board at least resulted in several recommendations 
that were encompassed in War Department Circular 124 – announced on April 27, 1946.  One of 
the recommendations of Circular 124 was that the various armed services would set up a “staff 
group on racial affairs.”  One of the opponents to even this half-hearted move to address racial 
inequalities in the armed services was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant 
General Willard S. Paul.  General Paul announced that he would not establish the requisite “staff 
group” and used as his excuse manpower shortages and “the small volume of work envisaged.”
48
  
Apparently, General Paul did not see any racial problems to address in the current system.  
MacGregor admitted that because of the intransigent nature of the senior officers in the Army 
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     One of the recommendations of the Gillem board that was put into effect by the time the 
Korean War started was reducing the size of all-black units.  During World War II, there were 
entire divisions, such as the 92
nd
 Division, that were composed of African American soldiers.  In 
1950, at the start the Korean War, the all-black divisions had been scrapped in favor of all-black 
regiments, such as the 24
th
 Infantry.  Of course, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was not new to post-
World War II, but had seen action extending back to the Indian Wars in the late 1800s.  
However, MacGregor argued that because of the perceived failure of even these smaller 
segregated units, such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea, this “struck another blow at the 
Army’s race policy.”  MacGregor commented, “reduce the size of the black units, the Gillem 
Board had reasoned and you will reduce inefficiency and discrimination.”  MacGregor 





   
     Unfortunately, MacGregor’s assertion that the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was a failure was based 
on the appraisal of the unit by several senior Army officers whose opinions probably had much 
to do with the racial make-up of the 24
th
, and the “official” Army History of the Korean War, 
written by Roy Appleman that concluded the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment could not be counted on in 
                                                          
49
 MacGregor also said the Gillem board was doomed to failure because of the institutional attachment to 
segregation.  MacGregor stated, “Segregation was at the heart of the race problem.  Justified as a means of 
preventing racial trouble, segregation only intensified it by concentrating the less able and poorly motivated.  
Segregation increased the problems of all commanders concerned and undermined the prestige of black officers.  It 
exacerbated the feeling of the nation’s largest minority toward the Army and multiplied demands for change.  In the 
end Circular 124 was abandoned because the Army found it impossible to fight another war under a policy of racial 
quotas and units.  But if the quota had not defeated the policy, other problems attendant on segregation would 
probably have been sufficient to the task.” Ibid., 206. 
50
 Ibid., 440. 
28 
 
the face of the enemy.
51
  As will be shown in later chapters, the perceived success or failure of 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment had much to do with the timing of the critique and who was making 
the critique.  One minute the 24
th
 was praised, the next minute it was an utter failure as a military 
unit. 
     In the 1980s, there was only one significant work published on African Americans in the 
military, Bernard C. Nalty’s Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military.  
Nalty’s work was designed as an overall history of African Americans in the military and did not 
really uncover any new ground – other than to bring the history of African American’s in the 
military up to the 1980s.  Nalty also continued to allow the Appleman narrative that the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment was a failure in the Korean War to stand.  While noting that some white units 
had their weak moments in the face of the enemy, Nalty stated “among the troops who 
performed badly were the black soldiers of the24th Infantry … in one skirmish, for example, 
almost an entire company melted away, leaving the commander, most of his noncommissioned 
officers, and a few riflemen to man the unit’s foxholes.”
52
  Nalty, who had also worked as a 
period as a historian for the U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Air Force did not want 
to rock the “proverbial” boat when it came to the Army’s official history. 
     The scarcity of scholarship in the 1980s was replaced by a flood of new works in the 1990s.  
This was linked to a renewed interest in African American studies – including those relating to 
the military.  The topic also gained renewed attention by the Army’s rising officer corps with 
two papers on the topic coming from a student at the Army War College and a student at the 
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Army Command and General Staff College.  Colonel Raymond B. Ansel submitted to the Army 
War College, From Segregation to Desegregation: Blacks in the U.S. Army 1703-1954,  as his 
thesis in 1990; and Major Otis M. Darden submitted The Integration of Afro-Americans into the 
Army Mainstream (1948-1954) as his thesis in 1993 at the Army Command and General Staff 
College.  Colonel Ansel’s thesis relied heavily on previous scholarship but was noteworthy for 
his discussion of the effects of Project Clear – the secret survey conducted during the Korean 
War to ascertain the impressions of troops to integration.
53
  Major Darden’s thesis was more 
targeted than Colonel Ansel’s and the focus of his research was the question, “Did Truman’s 
Order 9981 actually desegregate the Army?”  His conclusion was that the order “did not, in and 
of itself, integrate the Army, it did start the process that ultimately led to desegregation.”
54
 
     One of the more unique works to be published in the 1990s was Lyle Rishell’s With a Black 
Platoon in Combat: A Year in Korea.  Rishell had served as a white platoon leader of Able 
Company, 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea.  His first hand-account provides insight into the 
interactions he experienced with his African American troops and also attacks the Appleman 
assertion that the 24
th
 was a failure.
55
  Rishell wasn’t the only 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran to 
write personal accounts, refuting the narrative of the 24
th
 as a failure.  Charles M. Bussey was an 
African American officer in the Engineer Battalion attached to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment who 
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wrote Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in the Korean War in 2002.
56
  While his account 
regarding a battle outside Yechon, Korea is still hotly contested, Bussey, like Rishell provided a 
perspective on the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment lacking in other works regarding the Korean War and 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment. 
     The most relevant scholarship of the 1990s to this dissertation was embodied in, the 
publication of Black Soldier White Army: The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea – a study 
conducted under the direction of the Center of Military History (CMH).  This work was largely 
the result of political pressure brought on the Army by veterans of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
who fiercely believed that the previous Army account of their unit by Appleman was a disservice 
to African Americans who had fought in Korea and to African Americans in general.
57
  The 
CMH denied that they were going to “re-write” Appleman’s account.  General Roscoe Robinson 
Jr., an advisor on the CMH study, claimed the goal was to write an unbiased history of the 24
th
 
                                                          
56
 Charles M. Bussey, Firefight at Yechon: Courage and Racism in the Korean War (Lincoln, Nebraska: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2002).  For a perspective of African American veteran accounts of not only the Korean War but 
other 20
th
 Century wars see Yvonne Latty, We Were There: Voices of African American Veterans, from World War 
II to the War in Iraq (New York: Harpers Collins, 2004). 
57
 The veterans of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were sensitive to the way the 24
th
 was portrayed in Roy Appleman’s 
“official” Army history series of the Korean War.  In Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, 
Appleman didn’t pull any punches in his analysis of the performance of the 24
th
 Infantry, noting that “the story of 
the 24
th
 Infantry in the Eighth Army attack on 24-28 November is largely one of disorder, ineptness, breakdown of 
communications, units getting lost in bad terrain, heavy personnel and equipment losses, and a cause of concern to 
friendly units on its flanks.” Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 142.  Veterans of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were quick to point out 
that many of Appleman’s conclusions regarding the 24
th
’s fighting record were based on reports by white officers 
that had their own biases of African American troops.  David Carlisle, an African American West Point graduate 
who fought alongside the 24
th
 Infantry with the black 77
th
 Engineer Combat Company (same unit as Charles Bussey) 
said the reason that the white officers criticized the 24
th
 and in his opinion why Appleman didn’t refute those 
criticisms was “as simple as this – because the troops were black.  It’s the product of racists – tending historians 
goaded on by racists senior army commanders.” Los Angeles Times “Army: Blacks Look Back at Record in Korea,” 
November 15, 1989. 
31 
 
Infantry Regiment and “it is not – as certain concerned individuals and media representatives 
have erroneously suggested – to rewrite Appleman’s South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.”
58
   
     Colonel John A. Cash, the lead author of the CMH study, attempted to cool the inflamed 
passions of the 24
th
 veterans by assuring them that the new CMH study would be a “from the 
bottom up” approach instead of Appleman’s “from the top down” effort.
59
  The focus by the 
authors of Black Soldier White Army on interviewing as many enlisted personnel as possible was 
one of the remarkable benefits of this CMH study because it provided not only depth to their 
study but a wealth of personal impressions that could be used in future historical studies – 
including the one you are reading.  Because the interview material created by Black Soldier 
White Army is an integral part of this study, the conclusions and arguments in Black Soldier 
White Army will be analyzed further in later chapters. 
     One of the first to utilize the interview material collected by the CMH for Black Soldier White 
Army was popular historian Gerald Astor, who released his own study titled: The Right to Fight: 
A History of African Americans in the Military in 1998.  Astor originally attempted to conduct 
most of his own interviews with veterans as he had done previously on a study on World War II.  
In his World War II study Astor found “veterans were quite willing to share their experiences” 
for the most part.  However, for The Right to Fight, Astor realized that with the additional 
component of “race” entering the picture when attempting to interview veterans of the Korean 
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War he “encountered considerable reluctance.”
60
  The Right to Fight was an overall history of 
African Americans in the military from the Revolutionary War to modern day, following more or 
less the same pattern as Strength for the Fight.  The chapter dealing with the Korean War, 
primarily because the source material came from the CMH study, sounds very similar to Black 
Soldier White Army.  
     The study, Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces, was published 
in 1998 and was focused on the process of desegregation post-World War II in the armed 
services.  Authors Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman admitted in the introduction that this 
work was based primarily on secondary sources and published collections of primary sources as 
opposed to new research or interviews with veterans.  What was unique was the underlying 
impetus for their work.  The book was originally a sponsored study by the Defense research 
Institute of the RAND Corporation on behalf of the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the 
Clinton Administration to provide information and analysis relevant to the development of 
policies towards openly homosexual military personnel.  According to the authors, “Our work 
focused on investigating historical analogies between the military’s treatment of homosexuals 
and its treatment of racial minorities, especially blacks.”
61
   
     After completing the original research for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the authors 
decided to put their research together in a study of desegregation and not “formally discuss the 
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analogies between homosexuals and racial minorities that prompted the original RAND 
project.”
62
  In their analysis of the Korean War and desegregation, the authors cited not only 
personnel shortages but also “racial tensions” as causing a change in opinion by senior officers 
towards integration.
63
  The “racial tensions” cited were more directed at dissatisfaction by 
African American soldiers to segregation as opposed to resistance to integration by white troops.  
Regarding the acceptance by white soldiers to integration, the authors referred to the results of 
Project Clear.  “Project Clear did not influence the desegregation process that was already 
underway in the Far East in 1951, but the research findings did assist Army officials in planning 
for worldwide desegregation of the Army and persuading reluctant commanders to cooperate.”
64
 
     Foxholes and Color Lines is a useful anthology of the military’s efforts to desegregate 
because it also follows the efforts of the Army in the 1960s to ensure the armed services 
continued to fight discrimination involving military personnel, both on and off military 
installations.  In discussing the efforts of the Gesell Committee, chaired by Gerhard Gesell in the 
early 1960s, the authors noted the committee “recognized that the lack of action (by the armed 
services in addressing racial issues off base) was deeply rooted in the organizational culture of 
the military, and the prevailing belief among military officers that community affairs lay outside 
their professional competency and responsibility” and that “there were no incentives for officers 
to devote time and effort to ameliorating off-base discrimination against black service 
personnel.”
65
  The Gesell Report recommendations were meant to address the reluctance by 
officers to tackle off-base discrimination and were ultimately implemented over serious 
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opposition by the officer corps and some politicians.  This will be discussed further in Chapter 
IV in regard to General Edward Almond’s post-retirement efforts to fight integration. 
     In 2001 Gail Buckley published American Patriots: The Story of Blacks in the Military from 
the Revolution to Desert Strom and Robert B. Edgerton released Hidden Heroism: Black Soldiers 
in America’s Wars.  Both anthologies were designed to provide a comprehensive history of 
African Americans in the military.  Buckley used individual stories of African American soldiers 
to give the reader a list of “black heroes.” For instance, Buckley devoted most of the last chapter 
to chronicle the life and service of the exceptionally talented first African American Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell.
66
   
     For Hidden Heroism, Robert Edgerton stated that he drew upon his own military service in 
the Air Force during the Korean War as his introduction “to a racially integrated world that I had 
not previously experienced” as a white man.  Edgerton’s work is one of the most thorough 
anthologies analyzing the use of blacks as soldiers and their treatment in society both in the north 
and the south in Antebellum America.  In an argument that could have been voiced by senior 
Army leaders in the early twentieth century, Edgerton quoted Confederate General Clement H. 
Stevens who responded to the suggestion that the Confederacy turn to African Americans as 
soldiers by asserting, “The justification of slavery in the South is the inferiority of the Negro.  If 
we make him a soldier, we concede the whole question.”
67
 
     Again in 2013, the topic of desegregation of the military was addressed with the publication 
of James Rawn Jr.’s The Double V: How Wars, Protest, and Harry Truman Desegregated 
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America’s Military.  Rawn saw the African American community as being very much involved 
in forcing the military to change.  Rawn followed the careers of influential African Americans 
such as Emmett Scott – former secretary to Booker T. Washington – who was pulled into 
government service as an advisor to Secretary of War Newton Baker on “Negro” issues around 
the time of World War I, to judge William H. Hastie who filled a similar position to Scott’s 
during World War II.  Rawn also addressed the movement of African American’s to the north 
during World War I and the inter-war period who found “along with better jobs … (they also) 
gained political power” with the power of the vote.
68
 
     The newfound political power of the African American community – referred to at the time 
by politicians as the “Negro vote” made an impression on the Democratic Party and the Franklin 
Roosevelt Administration.  It was under political pressure (and the threat of a black protest 
march on Washington D.C.) that President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802: Prohibition 
of Discrimination in the Defense Industry on June 25, 1941.
69
  Rawn argued that because of this 
new political power by the African American community during World War II the black 
newspaper the Pittsburgh Courier christened the idea of the “Double V campaign” in February 
1942.  The “Double V campaign” meant that “Black Americans and their allies of all races 
would fight for victory overseas and a victory at home.”
70
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     As one could expect from the title, the political power of the African American community 
was also influential for President Harry Truman.  Unfortunately, Rawn tended to follow previous 
scholarship on describing President Truman’s conversion from being considered a “safe” 
segregationist to a “radical” civil rights president.
71
  The biggest drawback to Rawn’s The 
Double V was that his narrative of events went from President Truman signing Order 9981 to 
General Ridgway’s order to desegregate forces in Korea in the summer of 1951 in a mere four 
pages – overlooking the biggest part of the story and the part of the story on which this study 
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Riots, Wars, and Committees: The Road to Integration 
     African American soldiers have fought in virtually every military conflict from the 
Revolution to modern day.
72
  The history of the African American soldier went through a 
transformation period in post-Civil War America that mirrored the country’s growing bias 
against the black race in general as “Jim Crow” (segregation) laws took hold in the South.  For 
example, whereas in the Civil War and immediate post-Civil War period African Americans 
served onboard U.S. Naval vessels side-by-side with their white shipmates, by the beginning of 
the 20th century and the dispatch of Theodore Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet,” African 
Americans were only allowed to serve as a mess-men or valets.   
     Any examination of the integration of African Americans into the United States Army during 
the Korean War must begin with a look at the Army at the beginning of the century.  The young 
officers in the Army during the early years of the century were the same officers who ultimately 
fought for or against integration later in their military careers.  The history of African Americans 
in World War I, particularly the official Army report of a tarnished record, was also used to set 
the tone for the inter-war years.  Senior officers in the Army used that record as justification for 
continued segregation in World War II and the early part of the Korean War. 
     In the summer of 1906, in the dusty border community of Brownsville, Texas, what has 
alternatively been described as an “affair,” “incident,” and “riot” was used for the next forty 
years as the casus belli for distrust between the white officers in the Army and the African 
American soldier.  During the summer of 1906 racial tensions were already high between 
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members of the predominantly white Brownsville community and members of the all-black 25
th
 
Infantry Regiment (Buffalo Soldiers) when a disturbance kicked up on the evening of August 13.  
The clash resulted in the shooting of a white bartender and the wounding of a police officer.  
Immediately, the white citizens of Brownsville turned to blame the entire affair on the black 
soldiers at nearby Fort Brown.  The problem was that the evidence of any involvement by the 
black troops of the 25
th
 Infantry Regiment hinged on a handful of questionable “eye witnesses” 
and a smattering of shell casings. 
     In an election year and reflecting the country’s rising racial tensions the incident in 
Brownsville, Texas, went almost immediately to the top of the military chain-of-command, 
President Theodore Roosevelt.
73
  The War Department reacted swiftly and the white 
commanding officer of the 25
th
, Major Charles W. Penrose, was instructed to begin an inquiry.  
Major Penrose realized in short order that the official story provided by the citizens of 
Brownsville had inherent flaws.  For instance, on the night in question, August 13, 1906, Major 
Penrose had received warnings of potential racial strife between citizens and his troops and as a 
precaution Major Penrose had placed his men under curfew.  Somehow, “allegedly” fifteen (not 
the 20-30 reported by the citizens of Brownsville) of his men had “found a key to the barracks 
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and gone on their murderous rampage downtown.”
74
  The problem with this account was that 
while the “murderous rampage” was supposedly still raging Major Penrose had conducted a “call 
to arms” and “found all soldiers present or accounted for.”  Edmund Morris in his biography of 
Theodore Roosevelt noted somewhat sarcastically that “the culprits must have sprinted back as 
soon as they heard the bugle and snuck into line in time to holler ‘Present’ when the roster was 
read.”
75
  As to hard evidence, the best Major Penrose could come up with was “seventy or more 
Army-rifle shell casings” which matched some “clean” rifles belonging to the 25
th 
that were 
presented to him by citizens of Brownsville.  Brigadier General William S. McCaskey attempted 
to warn the War Department not to jump to a hasty conclusion by informing them that the 
“Citizens of Brownsville entertain race hatred to an extreme degree … provocation given the 
soldiers not taken into account.”
76
  This warning was ignored by the War Department.   
     Rather than back away from Major Penrose’s version of events, the War Department doubled 
down and sent Major Augustus P. Blocksom to conduct interviews of the men of the 25
th
 in order 
to obtain an admission of guilt by one or more of the black troops.  Major Blocksom discovered 
to his chagrin that none of the men of the 25
th
 were willing to admit any guilt or name a guilty 
party.  The disgruntled officer made the personal observation in his official report that “the 
colored soldier is much more aggressive in his attitude on the social equality question than he 
used to be.”  To the U.S. Army in 1906, Major Blocksom’s personal expression was seen as a 
warning to the War Department that the men of the 25
th
 could cause further race problems to the 
Army command. 
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     The War Department and ultimately President Theodore Roosevelt were most interested in 
Major Blocksom’s conclusion.  He argued that if the soldiers of the 25
th
 did not break ranks and 
talk, they should all “be dismissed from the service and debarred from reenlistment in the Army, 
Navy and Marine Corps.”
77
  This radical step would have the added benefit of removing a 
potentially burdensome group of racially “aggressive” black soldiers.   
     President Roosevelt approved of Major Blocksom’s proposal, according to Morris because it 
played into TR’s gentlemen code.  Roosevelt found it unthinkable that the responsible (guilty) 
soldiers in the 25
th
 would be able to resist doing the honorable thing and confess if faced with the 
expulsion of all their comrades in arms.  Unfortunately, what Roosevelt did not consider, or was 
unable to consider, was that perhaps the reason no one was willing to confess was because there 
were no guilty members in the 25
th
 and the whole affair was concocted by the citizens of 
Brownsville.  Before he made his decision Roosevelt instructed the War Department to make one 
more attempt to get the men of the 25
th
 to confess. 
     The War Department turned to General Ernest A. Garlington, an Army officer who 
presumably understood the “Negro” by his associations with them growing up in Greenville, 
South Carolina.  General Garlington had no more luck than had Major Blocksom.  General 
Garlington only found “a wooden, stolid look” from the men of the 25
th
 that he interviewed and 
each soldier “positively denied any knowledge” of the incident in Brownsville.  General 
Garlington chalked up the reticence of the soldiers of the 25
th
 to a racial coping mechanism.  He 
wrote; “The secretive nature of the race, where crimes to members of their color are charged, is 
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  The men of the 25
th
 were protecting the guilty parties because of allegiance to 
their race was the only logical conclusion the South Carolinian could draw from the wall of 
silence.   
     Based on General Garlington’s report and the scant evidence it contained President Roosevelt 
approved the mass dishonorable discharging of 167 black soldiers.  One of the soldiers had 
served 27 years and at least twenty five had served more than 10 years.  Included in the mass 
dishonorable discharge were six recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor and thirteen 
who had received citations for bravery in the Spanish-American War.
79
  Fully aware of the 
potential political fallout from Special Order 266, President Roosevelt signed the order on 
November 5, 1906, but did not release the order until after the mid-term elections.
80
  
     The complete lack of attention paid to the officers of the 25
th
 Infantry Regiment was the most 
glaring omission of the Army’s handling of the Brownsville affair.  Of the white officers of the 
25
th
 Infantry Regiment only one would face a court martial for the “Affray at Brownsville” as it 
was labeled by the court martial.  That officer was Captain Edgar Augustus Macklin.  Captain 
Macklin was found not-guilty of “neglect of duty, to the prejudice of good order and military 
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discipline, in violation of the sixty-second article of war.”
81
  In a prelude to what would happen 
with the 92
nd
 Division in World War II and the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in the Korean War, the 
officer’s received a pass on responsibility for the (supposed) failures of the unit.   
     President Roosevelt had his doubts about the responsibility and accountability of the officers 
of the 25
th 
Infantry Regiment.  After re-reading Major Blocksom’s report and another study 
conducted by a retired Union Army general, the president wrote in a confidential letter to his 
Secretary of War, William Howard Taft, that he was “uncertain whether or not the officers of the 
three colored companies … are or are not blamable.”
82
  Edmund Morris in Theodore Rex 
provided a more candid explanation for why President Roosevelt made the decision he did 
without considering the officers of the 25
th
 through a conversation between President Roosevelt 
and his friend and novelist, Owen Wister:  
          Mr. Wister: When you turned those niggers out of the army at Brownsville, why didn’t   
          you order a court of enquiry for the commissioned officers?  . 
          President Roosevelt: Because I listened to the War Department, and I shouldn’t.  Of   
          course, I can’t know all about everything. 
          Mr. Wister: And so, the best you can do is stop, look, and listen – and then jump. 
          President Roosevelt: Yes.  And then jump.  And hope I’ve jumped right.
83
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     For a man who placed great weight on personal responsibility President Roosevelt put the 
blame on making a hasty, ill-informed decision that did not take into account the actions or 
responsibility of the 25
th
 Infantry Regiment’s officers, on someone else, the War Department.  
President Roosevelt was also a man who once he made the “jump” did not back away from his 
decision.  In a special message to the Senate on December 19, 1906, Roosevelt doubled down on 
his support of the Blocksom report and likened the men of the 25
th
 to “mutineers and murders” 
who should be thankful the penalty was not death.  Roosevelt opined, “A blacker (crime) never 
stained the annals of our Army.”
84
 
     The Senate Committee on Military Affairs conducted their own investigation into the 
Brownsville affair and found on a vote of nine to four that President Roosevelt was justified in 
his dismissal without honor of all 167 members of the 25
th
 Infantry Regiment.  The vote was 
pure political theater and had nothing to do with the weight of the evidence.  For instance, the 
spent shell casings retrieved from the scene by the citizens of Brownsville were shown to have 
“definitely been fired by Springfield rifles belonging to the Twenty-fifth,” however, “the actual 
firing had occurred during target practice at Fort Niobrara in Nebraska, long before the battalion 
was ordered to Texas.”  The appearance of these casings in Brownsville was found to be due to 
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budget issues.  As Morris recounted, instead of wasting the shell casings the used cartridges were 
transported with the unit to Texas and “stored in an open box on the porch of the barracks hut at 
Fort Brown, available for any soldier – or passing civilian – to help himself.”
85
  In 1906, the need 
of the War Department and Army to remove racially “aggressive” and obstinate African 
American soldiers from the ranks was more important than due process determination of fact. 
     The mishandling of the black soldiers of the 25
th
 Infantry Regiment was without question a 
travesty of justice.  The processing of the black troopers by the War Department after the 
Brownsville incident was also a blatant demonstration of the extent the military and Army were 
willing to go in order to maintain the racially inferior status of black soldiers.  Even the thought 
that the white, trigger-happy citizens of Brownsville in their excitable state on August 13, 1906, 
might have been responsible for the killing of their own barber and wounding of the police 
lieutenant was unthinkable.  Surely the black soldiers posted nearby had been responsible – they 
had to be responsible.  And once the idea was put forth, the Army and War Department eagerly 
threw their weight behind the effort to place the blame on the black soldiers.  For the next forty-
odd years, the legacy of the Brownsville incident in the Army was that without close, constant, 
leadership by white officers – black soldiers could become riotous.  As the 1926 Army War 
College study warned: “A curious feature of the negro’s psychology is his susceptibility to the 
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influence of crowd psychology.  We have some painful experiences along this line in the army, 
notably the Brownsville riot.”
86
   
     Prior to and during World War I, the Army insisted that African American soldiers realize 
their place in society and not make trouble.  The legacy of Brownsville taught the Army 
leadership that for the good working order of the military the black soldier had to accept his 
(inferior) position in society.  It was for that reason that General Charles Ballou, commander of 
the 92
nd
 Division, issued Bulletin No. 35 to his African American troops at Camp Funston in 
Kansas in 1917.  The order directed “officers and men to refrain from going where they were not 
wanted regardless of their legal rights.”  This order was sparked by an incident in Manhattan, 
Kansas involving a black sergeant who attempted to enter a “white only” theater.  According to 
the Army and General Charles C. Ballou, the black sergeant was “guilty of the great wrong in 
doing anything no matter how legally correct, that will provoke racial animosity.”
87
  The black 
sergeant needed to realize his place in society. 
World War I 
     The performance of African Americans in World War I is a point of debate among military 
historians to this day.  Recruited into segregated units led by predominantly white officers, the 
“Negro” units in World War I were usually delegated to support roles such as transporting goods 
across France to the front lines or delegated out piecemeal to French units, out of the view of 
other white American soldiers.  According to Peter Nelson in A More Unbending Battle: The 
Harlem Hellfighters’ Struggle for Freedom in WWI and Equality at Home, “of the four hundred 
thousand African Americans who served in the war, only about 10 percent saw combat, while the 
                                                          
86
 Fulmer, The Use of Negro Manpower, 7. 
87
 Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History, 116. 
46 
 
rest were employed as stevedores, porters, cooks, waiters, and ditch diggers or in the 
construction and repair of cantonments, roads, and railroads, either abroad or at a military 
facilities at home."
88
  Before those African American soldiers entered military service though; 
the white and black communities first had to decide whether African Americans should be used 
in the war in Europe at all. 
     From the perspective of the Army the use of African Americans in the war effort would be 
beneficial because they could be employed as laborers, thus freeing more white Americans from 
manual labor and making them available as combat troops – a theme used by the Army in 
numerous manpower studies during the interwar years.  Another reason expressed for the 
drafting of blacks into the military, particularly by community leaders in the South was that this 
could be used as a means “to decrease significantly the number of young black men in their 
counties.”
89
  This was an important consideration for southern communities that were facing the 
exportation of a large numbers of young white men for the war effort, better to balance out the 
ratio of blacks versus whites left in a given community through a military draft. 
     For those in the African American community the question of whether to serve in the “white 
man’s war” was a subject of intense debate.  African American leader and editor for the 
magazine Crisis, William E. DuBois, wrote an article explaining why the African American 
community needed to answer the call for service.  The article in part stated:  
          We the colored race have no ordinary interest in the outcome.  That which the German  
          power represents today spells death to the aspirations of Negroes and all darker races for  
          equality, freedom and democracy.  Let us not hesitate.  Let us, while this war lasts, forget  
                                                          
88
 Nelson, A More Unbending Battle, 57. 
89
 Rawn, The Double V, 29. 
47 
 
          our special grievances and close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white fellow  
          citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy.  We make no ordinary  
          sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly, with our eyes lifted to the hills.
90
 
     Besides “fighting for democracy,” DuBois, ever the optimist at the time, was trying to 
convince the African American community that unselfish service to America in her time of need 
must be rewarded with greater opportunities for blacks upon return from service.  Although 
black troops returning from service after the Spanish-American War saw no improvement in 
their social condition, perhaps this time, in a war of global significance, argued Dubois and other 
black leaders, the results would be different.  DuBois’ optimism rubbed off on some in the black 
community.  For instance, many of the blacks who signed up for service expressed a belief that 
their service would be rewarded by white society upon their return.   
     A black captain commented while boarding a ship for France: “I am leaving today a wife and 
three children.  As great as the sacrifice is, I shall be satisfied never to see American again, if my 
wife and children will share greater opportunities and enjoy more liberty than I now enjoy.”
91
  
Another black officer explained to one of his enlisted troops why he was fighting in this war.  “If 
we can’t fight and die in this war just as bravely as white men, then we don’t deserve an equality 
with white men, and after the war we had better go back home and forget all about it.  But if we 
can make America really proud … then I am sure it will be the biggest step towards our 
equalization as citizens.”
92
  Not everyone in the African American community shared the vision 
of the two officers. 
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     One dissenter was A. Philip Randolph, who asked his fellow black citizens in the publication 
Messenger: “Since when has the subject (black) race come out of a war with its rights and 
privileges accorded for such a participation … Did not the Negro fight in the Revolutionary War, 
with Crispus Attucks dying first … and come out to be a miserable chattel slave in this country 
for nearly one hundred years?”
93
  The Army did not help matters when General Pershing had the 
all-black Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry Regiments and the Ninth and Tenth Calvary 
Regiments sent to Mexico, the Philippines, and Hawaii instead of Europe, or when the Army 
pronounced African American Colonel Charles Young medically unfit on the eve of war in a 
blatant attempt to prevent him from going to France and becoming the first black general.  
     While the battle waged across the pages of the various black newspapers across the county, 
the U.S. government made at least one astute decision.  Emmett J. Scott, former secretary to 
Booker T. Washington, was appointed to government service as a special assistant to Secretary 
of War Newton Baker, on “Negro” issues within the War Department.  Scott provided a sound 
and even-headed voice in the all-white War Department and his presence allowed the department 
to take into consideration the viewpoint of African Americans on some of the more contentious 
issues that crossed the secretary’s desk.  Of course, Scott’s appointment did not imply that the 
built-in racial attitudes of the white men of power miraculously disappeared; on the contrary, as 
James Rawn reported, War Department officials purposefully snubbed Scott by listing him in the 
United States Blue Book and Official Register as a “clerk” instead of his real position “special 
assistant.”
94
  His appointment was important, nonetheless, because it demonstrated that at least 
during a period of national crisis the opinion of the black community mattered.   
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     In his official capacity, Emmett Scott met regularly with Secretary Baker and, according to 
one scholar, his “advice often reached the desk of the President of the United States.”
95
  
Although his critics in the African American community claimed that Scott did not push hard 
enough, his appointment to such a position was a watershed moment that would lead to the 
appointment of Judge William H. Hastie to a similar position during World War II. 
     The biggest obstacle the African American men faced in the military at the beginning of 
World War I was the ingrained sense of racial superiority of the senior white officers that led 
them.  In a pattern seen again in World War II and the Korean War, these white officers damaged 
the crucial relationship a leader is supposed to have with subordinates through their words and 
actions.  A case in point was General Charles Ballou, the commander for the African American 
92
nd
 Division.  General Ballou’s reaction to the incident at Camp Funston involving the black 
soldier who attempted to enter a “whites only” theater was not necessarily meant to cause harm 
to his soldiers or disparage their race.  His order issued in Bulletin Number 35 was primarily 
designed to prevent the 92
nd
 from getting into a racial disturbance with the white community 
which could potentially harm its training and ability to be sent overseas.  Perhaps if General 
Ballou had merely warned his men to not start a racial incident regardless of their legal rights the 
order might not have sparked as much outrage, but General Ballou went further. 
     After warning the black troops to avoid race incidents “NO MATTER HOW LEGALLY 
CORRECT (bold used in original order)” they might be General Ballou continued, “The success 
of the Division with all that success implies is dependent upon the good will of the public.  That 
public is nine-tenths white.  White men made the Division, and they can break it just as easily if 





it becomes a trouble maker.”
96
  By using the phrase “white men made the Division, and they can 
break it just as easily,” General Ballou appeared to his men as just another white bigot.  The 
order sparked mass meetings calling for General Ballou’s resignation.  The Army saw the issue 
differently and felt General Ballou was perfectly in his right as a commander to make such an 
order.  But the damage had already been done.  Emmett J. Scott noted, “At no time during his 
incumbency as the head of the Division was General Ballou able to regain the confidence of the 
colored masses, with whom he had been immensely popular to prior to this episode.”
97
  Another 
white officer who also worried about his men causing a racial incident was Colonel William 
Hayward, commander of the New York Fifteenth National Guard that was federalized as the 
369
th
 Infantry Regiment under the 93
rd
 Division for World War I.   
     The 369
th
 Infantry Regiment was in many ways the exception to the rule for African 
American units when it came to their service in World War I, spending an incredible 191 days in 
the trenches during the war, more than any other American unit, white or black.
98
  And the 
369
th’
s exceptional record during the war was due in part to the caliber of white officers that 
made up its cadre of leaders, starting with Colonel Hayward.  Colonel Hayward and his other 
white officers were not career military officers from the South as was the case in most of the 
other African American units, but instead ambitious men from New York who wanted to make a 
name for themselves and for the black men they led.  So when the 369
th
 received orders to travel 
to Spartanburg, South Carolina in order to finish their training, Colonel Hayward knew that the 
unit’s first test would not come on the battlefield of France but on the racial battlefield.  
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     Historian Peter Nelson observed, “Hayward understood, as did his men, that a repeat of the 
events in Houston would destroy any chance they had of seeing action in France,” referring to 
the 1917 race riot in Houston that pitted members of the Twenty-fourth Infantry Regiment at 
Camp Logan against the white citizens of Houston, Texas.
99
  Instead of giving his men an 
ultimatum in the form of a military edict Colonel Hayward elicited the support of his men.  
     Colonel Hayward carefully explained the precarious nature of the unit if the men gave into 
race provocations by the white citizens in the nearby town and was able to get each and every 
soldier to essentially swear to turn the other cheek and not strike back.  Colonel Hayward also 
ensured that his officers maintained close contact with the soldiers in order to step in themselves 
if need be to deflect problems.  It was not long before the oath given to Colonel Hayward by his 
men was put to the test.  In one incident described by Nelson in A More Unbending Battle, two 
white men threw one of the black 369
th
 soldiers off a sidewalk and into a street for no reason.  A 
crowd gathered around the black soldier expecting a fight.  Instead of fighting back the soldier 
told the assailants, “I promised my colonel I wouldn’t strike back.”  Before the situation could 
turn ugly the black soldier received an unlikely ally, a white soldier from the Seventh Regiment 
who was also training nearby.  The white soldier stepped forward and said, “Well I didn’t 
promise my colonel I’d keep my hands off you bullies,” diffusing the situation.  The nearby 
white soldiers who had been training with the 369
th
 had already shown solidarity with their 
fellow soldiers, explaining, “The colored soldiers are all right.  They’re fighting for our country.  
They’re our buddies.”
100
  Unfortunately, this type of solidarity between white and black troops 
was rare during World War I. 
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     Having escaped any serious race issues during their time in South Carolina, the 369
th
 was sent 
off to France where it was immediately put to work building rail lines and other manual labor – 
consistent with the majority of black units.  Despite the pleadings of Colonel Hayward to anyone 
who would listen, including General Pershing, it appeared that the 369
th
 was destined for non-
combat duty in France until fate intervened in the form of a seriously depleted and demoralized 
French Army.   
     The French government wanted to use the incoming American units to fill the gaps in their 
rapidly depleted ranks but General Pershing demurred; Americans would serve under and with 
Americans.  Under continuing pressure, General Pershing decided to give the French several 
“minority” units that included African American units and a Puerto Rican unit.  One of the units 
released to duty with the French was the 369
th
. 
     In a letter to Colonel Reginald L. Foster, Colonel Hayward described the 369
th
’s experience 
of being assigned to the French: 
          There are no American troops anywhere near us, that I can find out, and we are “les  
          enfants perdus,” and glad of it.  Our great American general simply put the black orphan in  
          a basket, set it on the doorstep of the French, pulled the bell, and went away.  I said this to  
          a French colonel … and he said, “Weelcome leetle black babbie.”
101
   
     Hayward concluded his letter with the exclamation that the French were “wonderful – 
wonderful – wonderful!”  For the black soldiers of the 369
th
 the French WERE wonderful.  In 
stark contrast to their treatment by the white citizens of South Carolina, the French welcomed the 
black soldiers of the 369
th
 with open arms.  As several veterans of the 369
th
 would recall, the 
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white French soldiers would actually salute black officers and shake hands with them.  Colonel 
Hayward in a letter to Emmett Scott addressed the lingering question that he and Scott had 
wrestled with when they first received notice of the 369
th
 assignment to the French; “How will 
American Negro soldiers, including commissioned officers … get along in service with French 
soldiers and officers?”    
     Colonel Hayward enthusiastically proclaimed to Scott, “The French soldiers have not the 
slightest prejudice or feeling.  The poilus (reference to the French soldiers) and my boys are 
great chums, eat, dance, sing, march and fight together in absolute accord.”
102
  This cordiality 
toward African American soldiers by white French soldiers did not go unnoticed by the Army 
command.  Senior white Army officers were concerned that the French would “spoil” the black 
soldiers and make them agitate for greater rights once returned to the United States.  Again, the 
Army was worried about black troops not realizing their place in society. 
     In response to the close association between the white French and black American soldiers 
General Pershing authorized the release of a communique to the French Army command.  The 
directive was labeled “To the French Military Mission stationed with the American Army – 
Secret Information Concerning Black American Troops.”  The statement released to the French 
then went on to describe the nature of race relations in the United States: 
          It is important for French Officers who have been called upon to exercise command over  
          black American troops, or to live in close contact with them, to have an exact idea of the  
          position occupied by Negroes in the United States … Although a citizen of the United  
          States, the black man is regarded by the white American as an inferior being with whom  
          relations of business or service only are possible.  The black is constantly being censured  
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          for his want of intelligence and discretion … The vices of the Negro are a constant menace  
          to the American who has to repress them sternly.  We must prevent the rise of any  
          pronounced degree of intimacy between French officers and black officers … We must not  
          eat with them, must not shake hands or seek to talk or meet with them outside the  
          requirements of military service.  We must not commend too highly the black American  
          troops, particularly in the presence of Americans.
103
  
     The American Army command wanted essentially for the French to treat the African 
American soldiers the same way they treated black soldiers, as second-class and inferior human 
beings.  To the French Army’s considerable credit they completely ignored the American Army 
recommendations and treated the men of the 369
th
 the same as any other American military unit. 
     After their initial training and familiarization with the French weaponry the men of the 369
th
 
were placed on the line.  Their baptism by fire was not long in coming.  One of the first soldiers 
to prove himself in battle was Private Henry L. Johnson.  A Distinguished Service Cross citation 
recounted Private Johnson’s actions in May 1918:  
          While on a double sentry duty, Private Johnson and a fellow soldier were attacked by a  
          raiding party of Germans numbering almost twenty, wounding both.  When the Germans  
          were within fighting distance, he opened fire, shooting one of them and seriously  
         wounding two more.  The Germans continued to advance, and as they were about to be  
          captured Private Johnson drew his bolo knife from his belt and attacked the Germans in a  
          hand-to-hand encounter.  Even though having sustained three grenade and shotgun wounds  
          from the enemy, Private Johnson went to the rescue of his fellow soldier who was being  
          taken prisoner by the enemy.  He kept on fighting until the Germans were chased away.
104
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     Colonel Hayward wrote an after-action report and visited the site of the engagement 
personally to corroborate the account of the battle he had received from Private Johnson and the 
other soldier.  Fortuitously for the press conscious Colonel Hayward, the 369
th
 had several 
journalists visit the unit immediately after Private Johnson’s engagement.  One of the journalists, 
Irvin S. Cobb, was hardly the image of a sympathetic journalist for a black Army unit.  Cobb was 
a Southern “humorist” from Kentucky who wrote about the “reconstructed South” with typical 
racial stereotypes, but after reading Colonel Hayward’s report and visiting the battle site he was 
visibly impressed.  Cobb explained his impression of Private Johnson’s action to the 369
th
’s 
Major Arthur Little: 
          Cobb: How much special training for this trench fighting did Henry Johnson have before     
          he licked those twenty-four Germans? 
          Little: Same as the rest of the regiment, no more than three weeks.  In theory.  In practice,   
          taking away the time spent changing stations and the ordinary routine of our early days  
          with the French, I’d guess the special training our men have had would equal about a week  
          of what the draftees are getting in the cantonments back home. 
          Cobb: Seems to me, that if he’d had the normal training our men at home are getting   
          today, by tomorrow night Henry would have been storming Potsdam.
105
 
     Cobb turned his enthusiastic first impression into a story titled “The Battle of Henry Johnson” 
that was picked up by several newspapers including the New York World.  Cobb concluded his 
article with the bold statement “If ever proof were needed, which it is not, that the color of a 
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man’s skin has nothing to do with the color of his soul, this twain then and there offered it in 
abundance.”
106
  Cobb’s story turned Private Henry Johnson into the African American version of 
Sergeant York and a point of pride for the black community back in Harlem and across the 
country. 
     During the early months of American involvement in World War I the newspapers in the 
United States ran numerous reports detailing the bravery of African Americans.  One heading in 
the Boston Post declared “NO COLOR LINE THERE” and that “in the service of democracy 
there is no such distinction.”
107
  The praise heaped on Private Johnson and the flowery articles in 
the nation’s press gave some in the black community back in the United States hope that finally a 
change was on the horizon in race relations.  Under the surface, though, a different picture was 
coming out of the battlefields of France, a rumbling by white Army officers that the black soldier 
could not be counted on in a time of crisis.    Clearly, there was a [disconnect] between the 
glowing praise in the press and the ultimate verdict by the United States Army at the end of the 
war.  One of the white officers who went from a supporter to detractor on the performance of 
black troops was General Charles Clarence Ballou. 
     William E. DuBois traveled through France during World War I and observed firsthand the 
behavior of General Ballou and was not impressed with what he saw.  DuBois wrote: “It seems 
that instead of trying to increase morale of his division, it was General Ballou’s intention to 
discourage the men as much as possible.  His action in censuring (African American) officers in 
the presence of enlisted men was an act that tended toward breaking down the confidence that 
the men had in their officers.”  Dubois also reported, General Ballou referred to his unit as the 
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“rapist division” when speaking to other white officers and was “constantly casting aspersions on 
the work of the colored officers and permitted other officers to do the same in his presence.”
108
    
     The tone used by General Ballou appeared to rub off onto some of his staff.  His chief of staff, 
Lieutenant Colonel Allen Greer considered that “the average Negro is naturally cowardly … 
(and that) they have been dangerous to no one except themselves and women.”
109
  It also 
probably didn’t help matters that General Ballou and his commanding officer, General Robert L. 
Bullard, did not see eye to eye on Ballou’s leadership of the 92
nd
 Division.  According to Robert 
Edgerton in Hidden Heroism, partly as a way to embarrass General Ballou and partly to 
demoralize the black soldiers of the 92
nd
, General Bullard had Ballou “removed form command, 
returned to the United States, and reduced to his permanent rank of colonel.”
110
 
     Major General Robert L. Bullard, the first Infantry Division Commander (“Big Red One”) 
was another senior white officer who held a very low opinion of African American soldiers.  
Bullard wrote in his 1925 memoir that African Americans as soldiers were “hopelessly inferior 
(and) if you need combat soldiers, and especially if you need them in a hurry, don’t put your time 
upon Negroes.”
111
  Bullard also shared the common belief that African Americans were a threat 
to women.  Robert Edgerton described how Bullard and other white officers of the time 
described African Americans as “depraved” - a reference to the belief that given the opportunity 
black men would “repeatedly rape white women.”
112
  With this insurmountable negative 
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tradition to overcome, it is little surprising that at the conclusion of World War I the newspaper 
accounts of valor were replaced by the Army with accounts of cowardice and incompetence. 
     It is a fact that not all of the African American units that saw combat in World War I fought 
as well as the 369
th
 “Harlem Hellfighters” but this does not mean that those other units were 
failures or more importantly that their record should have been used to disparage all black 
troops.
113
  Much of the blame should have been placed at the feet of the officers.  When the 368
th
 
broke ranks and fled in the face of the enemy they were not alone.  Peter Nelson observed that 
other American, British, and French units had also at one point during the war panicked and 
deserted their posts, but “no one said it was because they were white.”
114
  However, after the 
368
th
 was relieved in disgrace on September 28
th
, two of the senior officers further demoralized 
the men by calling them “rank cowards.”
115
  While the officers of the 368
th
 called their men 
“cowards” the officers in the 369
th
 such as Colonel Hayward praised his men as “positively the 
most stoical and mysterious men I’ve ever known.  Nothing surprises them … do you wonder 
that I love them, every one, good, bad and indifferent?”
116
  Is it any wonder the record of the two 
units were so different? 
     In several instances the Army high command seemed to want to intentionally harm the 
relationship between officers and enlisted in the African American units, as was the case with the 
strange order to the French Army.  In another example, General Pershing for no discernable 
military reason decided in July 1917 to restructure the officers in the African American units, 
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.  General Pershing wanted the units to have all white or all black officers.  
For the 369
th
 this meant that the black field officers were replaced by white officers, a move that 
produced a protest by Colonel Hayward.  His protest was to no avail – the only black officer he 
was allowed to keep was James Reese Europe presumably because as the unit’s band leader he 
could not be spared.
117
  The sudden change in leadership in a unit would have a serious impact 
on the morale of the troops in any unit, but even more so in a segregated unit already struggling 
to overcome racial prejudices.  The black soldiers in the affected units had to contend with 
developing new relationships with a whole new cadre of officers while still wondering if the 
removal of their previous officers was racially motivated. 
     As the war drew to a close in the fall of 1918 the Army was already solidifying their opinion 
that black troops had been a failure in combat.  The units of the 92
nd
 Division were the target of 
the harshest criticism while the units of the 93
rd
 that had been assigned to the French were 
largely ignored, and for good reason.  Their record would not fit into the overall narrative the 
Army had designed.  In his study of the 369
th
 Nelson recounted that, “of the 369
th
 Regiment’s 
original two thousand men, over thirteen hundred had died or been wounded by the time the 
Battle of Meuse-Argonne was over, including fifty-five officers.  It was the highest casualty rate 
of any American regiment.”
118
  The African American soldiers in the 369
th
 were not cowards, 
and as a result, they were largely ignored by the Army command.    
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The Interwar Years 
     When black troops returned to the United States at the end of the war, many were filled with a 
new pride in themselves, their race, and their country.  The words of DuBois and other African 
American leaders rang in their ears, offering a promise of a change in race relations in America.  
The returning black soldiers were quickly disabused of the idea of a change once they landed 
back in the United States.  In one incident, a black soldier who had just returned to America and 
was waiting for a train to take him and his unit home walked up to a Military Police (MP) officer 
and asked where the nearest restroom was located.  In a flash the MP took out his baton and 
clubbed the poor soldier over the head and had him hauled off in handcuffs.  The soldiers’ white 
officer walked up to the MP to ask what had happened.  The MP stated, “The Niggers were 
feeling their oats a bit.”  According to the MP, he had been told by his commanders to “take it 
out of them quickly, just as soon as they arrived, so as not to have any trouble later on.”
119
  The 
service of returning African American veterans had changed nothing in the eyes of the Army and 
the majority of whites, particularly in the South. 
     James Rawn observed in his study; “The year after the war ended, white mobs lynched eleven 
black veterans.  Seventy-eight African Americans were lynched in 1919, including fourteen who 
were burned alive.  Race riots erupted in twenty-eight cities across the nation.”  For William E. 
Dubois, the racial violence was almost too much to fathom.  He wrote: “They cheat us and mock 
us; they kills us and slay us; they deride out misery.  When we plead for the naked protection of 
the law … they tell us to GO TO HELL!”
120
  African Americans had shed blood, sweat, and tears 
for their nation on the battlefields of France expecting that their sacrifice would be recognized by 
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the Army and the white majority in the United States; at the end of World War I this was not to 
be.         
     In the inter-war years between World War I and World War II, African American soldiers 
faced a second threat besides racism – demobilization.  The 1920s and 1930s for the Army were 
a period of downsizing and reorganization and more often than not, the black soldiers that had 
swelled the Army’s size during World War I were the first to be thrown out of the military.  One 
historian has written, “Approximately 404,000 blacks, accounting for 11 percent of all Army 
personnel, had served during World War I.  By 31 August 1939, 3,640 black enlistees – roughly 
1.5 percent of the total enlisted force – and five commissioned officers (three of whom were 
chaplains) were on active duty.”
121
  As well, during the inter-war years the Army codified many 
of their policies that would have a direct effect on African American soldiers during World War 
II.  An example was the findings of a study related to “Negro” artillery units.   
     The report concluded that “Negro” artillery units should only support “Negro” infantry units 
because “they should never be employed in close support of white infantry.  Any negro batteries 
in the vicinity would be blamed for all short rounds and the physical damage to the infantry, 
however slight, would be magnified by rumors and the consequent loss of infantry morale would 
be entirely disproportionate to the advantages gained by the addition of a few additional artillery 
units.”
122
  Conclusions such as those in the report on African American artillery units would 
ultimately be codified in one of several mobilization plans prepared by the War Department and 
Army. 
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     As noted in the introduction, the Army also conducted several “studies” through the Army 
War College that examined the “lessons learned” from the use of black troops in World War I.  
These studies should be acknowledged for what they were, little more than racial propaganda 
designed to institutionalize the theory that blacks were not equal to whites in combat.  In one 
study from the Army War College in 1939-1940, a story used to illustrate the common view of 
black officers (by current white Army officers) was so blatantly racists that it defies 
comprehension as to how it could end up in an “official” Army study – even one written in 1939.  
The story began with a (presumably white) staff officer who was stopped at a crossroads.  The 
officer asked which way one of the roads went and the sentry answered, “I don’t know sir.”   
     “Where does that road go?” the officer inquired.   
     “I don’t know, sir,” responded the sentry.   
     “Well, what are you here for?” 
     “I don’t know, sir.” 
     “Who put you here?” the officer asked. 
     “The captain, sir.” 
     “Where’s the captain?” 
     “The captain?  He’s right over here, sir, but he won’t help you none.  He’s a nigger too!”
123
 
     A theme common throughout all the inter-war studies was that blacks were inferior soldiers 
and that the use of segregated units was absolutely necessary in order to avoid damaging the 
white units in the field.  Another theme was that black troops should be used primarily as service 
components to white units and be led by white officers.  The only break from this blueprint that 
Lee Nichols found in his analysis of the inter-war years was a proposal by an “afar-seeing 
infantry Colonel, James K. Parsons.”  Parsons, perhaps realizing that the lesson of World War I 
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was not that black soldiers were inferior to white soldiers but that the institution of segregation 
created a yoke of inferiority for black troops that was difficult for them to overcome, suggested 
that “individual Negroes should be assigned in a ratio of about 2000 to a division, 300 to 
Regiment, 30 to a rifle company and one to a squad.”  Nichols noted that Colonel Parsons’ 
recommendation fit almost verbatim the reorganization plan instituted in Korea in 1952.
124
 
World War II 
     World War II was another pivotal conflict in the history of the African American soldier’s 
experience.  Despite inter-war studies which tended to recommend black soldiers not be used in 
combat, World War II offered African Americans the opportunity to take on more combat 
assignments than World War I.  The added opportunity to serve in combat meant black soldiers 
were able to once again demonstrate their ability and in several instances they demonstrated that 
black soldiers could stand toe-to-toe with white soldiers on the battlefield.  However, as was the 
case in World War I the white officer establishment presented the largest hurdle to blacks being 
accepted as capable combat troops.  For this reason, it is important to have a basic understanding 
of the experiences of African Americans in the Army during World War II, because in many 
ways the Korean War was a continuation of World War II prejudicial practices by white Army 
leadership regarding the use of African American soldiers.  World War II is also important 
because many of the white officers that led black soldiers in World War II continued to lead 
them (though usually in senior positions) in the Korean War. 
     Another tradition maintained during World War II that was also repeated again during the 
Korean War was the assignment of officers to African American units.  Due to the massive 
demobilization of the Army in the interwar years, and especially of black soldiers and officers, 
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by the outbreak of hostilities in World War II there was a lack of black officers.  As a result 
African American units were assigned predominantly white officers.  Mershon and Schlossman 
in their study noted; “Senior military officials generally advocated this situation, and the Army 
gave it an additional twist by informally but regularly specifying that white southerners should 
lead black units.”  The assignment of white southerners rested on the theory that “southerner’s 
best understood blacks and could thus exercise better leadership than either black or white 
northerners” and will be explored further in Chapter II.
 125
  
     When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 the United States military had 
already started a program to significantly increase the anemic troop numbers of the interwar 
years Army – this program included an increase in African American troops as well.  Upon 
inspection of the troop levels of both white and black soldiers at the end of 1941 the first detail 
that jumped out was the percentage of black soldiers attached to either the Quartermaster or 
Engineer Corps, what are typically referred to as support and service components of the Army.  
Ulysses Lee in the official Army history of African American troops in World War II observed 
that when the Army reached almost 200,000 African American troops in 1941-1942 that; “the 
proportions of Negroes in the Quartermaster and Engineer Corps increased to the point where it 
appeared possible that every non-technical unit in those branches would soon be Negro.”
126
  The 
fact that the Army was attempting to continue the tradition set in World War I of utilizing black 
soldiers primarily as manual labors did not go unnoticed by the African American community 
leaders and the press.  If the Army was going to change their ways it would do so only because 
of political pressure.   
     The disillusionment experienced by William E. DuBois and other black leaders in America at 
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the end of World War I – caused by the failed promise of a change in race relations – was at the 
forefront of thinking among black leaders and the African American press at the outbreak of 
World War II.  Once again, the African American community was going to have to answer the 
question of why they should fight for a country that still treated them as second-class citizens.  
     The African American press and leaders of what would later be termed the civil rights 
movement made a concerted effort during World War II to persuade the Roosevelt 
Administration to allow black soldiers to fulfill a greater role in the Armed Forces.  Even prior to 
the war, the military realized that prominent members of the African American press could exert 
unwelcome pressure.  For instance, John Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago Defender and 
founder of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, ran an article that “had encouraged 
blacks to protest military discrimination by becoming conscientious objectors.”
127
   
     Worse yet was the thought of outside influences utilizing the issue of racial inequality to 
weaken the American war effort.  Worrying to the government was, when a New York 
communist publication aimed at the African American audience ran an article titled “Negro 
Yanks Ain’t coming either – remember 1917.”
128
  For the politicians, including President 
Roosevelt, the fear was that the black population would try to sit this war out, or as historian 
Ulysses Lee observed, “unless some assurances were given Negroes that they would have an 
opportunity to participate in the defense of the nation, subversive influences would find a fertile 
field for fifth column activities among a disaffected Negro population.”
129
  The “service” that 
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African Americans were looking for was more than just as manual laborers loading and 
unloading ships, building roads, or cooking meals for other soldiers; they were looking for 
“service” in combat units. 
     The Roosevelt Administration made several changes in response to the advocates of greater 
opportunity for African Americans in the armed services.  One of the changes was the promotion 
of Benjamin Davis Sr., who became the first African American general and had been accidently 
“overlooked” during the last round of promotions.  The other was the appointment of William H. 
Hastie as civilian aide to the secretary of war.   
     The appointment of Davis as a Brigadier General provided some relief to the black 
community who still had fresh memories of the action by the War Department to medically retire 
Colonel Charles Young on the eve of World War I.  However, the appointment of Judge Hastie 
in Emmett Scott’s old position was viewed as a more important strategic victory.  As James 
Rawn observed, where “Scott in the decades after the war had come to be viewed by many of his 
fellow middle-class African Americans as a leader too willing to accommodate institutionalized 
racism and segregation,” Judge Hastie had a different agenda.
130
  Hastie released a statement 
upon his appointment; “I have always been consistently opposed to any policy of discrimination 
and segregation in the armed forces of this country.  I am assuming this post in the hope that I 
will be able to work toward integration of the colored man into the army and to facilitate his 
placement, training and promotion.”
131
  In taking this position, Hastie was setting himself on a 
collision course with his new boss Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and most of the senior 
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     Judge Hastie’s mention of integration was part of a turning point in the African American 
community.  During World War I, the black community desired greater equality in general, but 
contented themselves with black soldiers getting an equal opportunity to prove themselves in 
combat; this was not the case in World War II and the Korean War.  Integration, the full 
dispersion of African Americans into all types of military service, standing side-by-side with 
white soldiers, not as their leaders but as their equals; this was the new goal, and a goal that flew 
in the face of the accepted protocol of the military at the beginning of World War II.  For the 
Roosevelt Administration and the military establishment there was no equivocation on how they 
felt about integration.   
     In a White House press release from 1940, the Roosevelt Administration laid out its stance; 
“the policy of the War Department is not to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in 
the same regimental organizations.  This policy has been proven satisfactory over a long period 
of years, and to make changes now would produce situations destructive to morale and 
detrimental to the preparation for national defense.”
133
  The Roosevelt Administration during 
World War II was willing to significantly expand opportunities for African Americans, but did 
so, as Mershon and Schlossman observed, “Within the confines of the fundamental policy of 
racial segregation.”
134
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     There was one instance during World War II where military necessity trumped the War 
Department’s hard-fast rule against the integrating of white and black troops.  It occurred in the 
European Theater around the time of the “Battle of the Bulge” in December 1944.  In the fall of 
1944 as the German war machine was pushed back towards the boundaries of the “Fatherland,” 
fighting became intense and casualties mounted within the U.S. Army command.  The need for 
replacements became critical.  Ulysses Lee reported that the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) announced on December 8, 1944 that; “the theater estimated that 
there would be an overall deficiency of more than 29,000 riflemen by the end of the month.”
135
  
The situation was desperate for SHAEF and a breaking point that required even the most ardent 
of Army traditions to be put aside out of military necessity; even the idea of integration. 
     Lieutenant General John Clifford Hodges Lee (who went by the initials J.C.H. Lee and was 
sometimes derisively referred to as “Jesus Christ Himself” Lee or John “Court House” Lee 
because of his egotism), commander of Services of Supply (SOS) for the European Theater of 
Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA), came up with the idea of filling the deficit in 
riflemen with African American soldiers.  His initial order of December 26, 1944 called for 
volunteers for immediate assignment to combat infantry units, “without regard to color.”  Bullet 
point #2 of the original order read: 
          The Commanding General makes a special appeal to you.  It is planned to assign you  
          without regard to color or race to the units where assistance is most needed, and give you  
          the opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder to bring about victory.  Your comrades at  
          the front are anxious to share the glory of victory with you.  Your relatives and friends  
          everywhere have been urging you to be granted this privilege.  The Supreme Commander,  
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          your Commanding General, and other veteran officers who have served with you are  
          confident that many of you will take advantage of this opportunity and carry on in keeping  
          with the glorious record of our colored troops in our former wars.
136
 
     General J.C.H. Lee’s order was not well received by the Army command, or at SHAEF.  
General Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, was the first to warn 
Eisenhower of possible repercussions to Lee’s order.  In particular, General Smith believed the 
promise to assign black troops “without regard to color or race” was “a clear invitation to 
embarrassment to the War Department.”
137
  The order was revised and reissued without the clear 
promise of integrating black troops with white.  Despite the rewording of General Lee’s order, 
the result was the same; for the first time in World War II black soldiers fought with and next to 
white soldiers in small groups as opposed to the division and regiment strength they were used to 
under the segregated system.  This was a major shift in military race relations and had profound 
consequences.  It also had a dramatic effect on several skeptics, among them General 
Eisenhower.
138
   
     General Lee’s call to arms for black volunteers was overwhelmingly successful.  Ulysses Lee 
observed that “by February (1945), 4,652 Negro troops had volunteered, many of the 
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noncommissioned officers among them taking reductions in rank to do so.”
139
  More shocking to 
the “old Guard” of the senior Army leadership was how well the African American soldiers 
fought and how well they were received by their white compatriots.  An officer with the 104
th
 
Division who received black troops during a battle on the west bank of the Rhine near Cologne 
wrote: “Their combat record has been outstanding.  They have without exception proven 
themselves to be good soldiers.  Some are being recommended for the Bronze Star Medal.”
140
  
Ulysses Lee reported that another white commander declared; “the premise that no soldier, will 
hold black skin against a man if he can shoot his rifle and does not run away proved to be 
substantially true.  Most of the white men of the company soon became highly appreciative of 
the Negroes’ help and warmly applauded their more colorful individual and combat exploits.”
141
  
Despite the praise of these two officers, the Army leadership remained wary of black troops and 
considered them inferior troops.    
     Although there were several examples of biased officers who led African Americans in World 
War II, the most conspicuous, and because of his position as Tenth Corps Commander in Korea, 
the most important for the arguments advanced in this dissertation, was Major General Edward 
Almond.  In the official after action report of the 92
nd
 Infantry Division in World War II, 
Almond was quoted as saying, “I am now convinced that the great majority of Negroes cannot be 
made into good infantry soldiers or even satisfactory ones.”
142
  This was an opinion that Almond 
would carry with him through Korea and for the rest of his life.   
     During an interview in 1975 with his grandson, a student at the Army War College who 
conducted the interview as part of the Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Almond elaborated 
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on his thoughts about integrating black soldiers; “I would have agreed to the integration of 
combat units to the extent of utilizing Negro personnel in areas that did not require exposure and 
decision of individuals and bravery in offensive operations.”  Almond continued by expressing 
his belief that an Army unit in combat would be “jeopardized by integrating Negro elements.”  
Almond concluded by explaining that he did not want to exclude African Americans from 
military service, on the contrary; “The Negro is a useful individual; he is an American citizen, he 
should be employed in the defense of this nation,” just not in combat units because it would 
“expect him to exercise characteristics that are abnormal to his race.”
143
     
     As for Almond’s opinion of black officers, he once called all of the African American officers 
of the 92
nd
 ID together and informed them, “that he did not believe any black officer should be 
promoted beyond the rank of captain.”
144
  One gets the strong opinion when reading statements 
made by General Almond throughout his life that he would have preferred that the 92
nd
 ID had 
no African American officers.   
     General Almond was asked in 1974 why Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, acting as 
Deputy Inspector General of the Army, wrote in his report after a visit to Fort Huachuca in the 
summer of 1953 to inspect the 92
nd
 ID in training that there was “evidence of decline in morale 
and a growth of dissatisfaction” as evidenced by among other things the “stoning of officers 
riding through (an) enlisted area.”
145
  Almond responded by blaming the poor morale on the 
Army’s insistence of replacing the original 700 white officers assigned to the 92
nd
 ID to a mix of 
black and white officers. 
     Almond explained that, “from four different stations in the east we received an order form the 
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War Department that every thirty days, 30 Negro lieutenants would arrive or captains would 
arrive for replacements and 30 white lieutenants would be released.”  This turn-over in officers 
continued until the 92
nd
 ID went from 700 white officers to roughly 400 white officers and 300 
black officers.  Almond observed, “When these officers began to settle in their duties in the 
division, we perceptibly realized a change in the attitude of the enlisted men toward the authority 
and discipline that was required.”  What disturbed Almond the most about these new black 
officers was their civilian background; accustomed to white officers that had a similar 
background and training to his, he was appalled that one of the black officers “had grown up as a 
boot black.”
146
  The humble upbringing and limited education of the average black officer (or 
soldier) disqualified them as competent in the mind of General Almond.  He was unable to 
distinguish between the differences in opportunities for African Americans and the inherent 
ability of blacks to learn and adapt to military culture. 
     The greatest obstacle that General Almond seemed incapable of overcoming as the 92
nd
 ID 
commander was the ability to communicate with black troops.  Almond would prove time and 
again in World War II and in Korea that the words he choose when discussing or talking with 
black troops were awkward at best and insulting at worst.  As related in the introduction to this 
study, several incidents of miscommunication made it all the way to the White House while the 
92
nd
 ID was stationed at Fort Huachuca.  Another demonstration of poor communication skills 
was recorded in his welcoming address to the men of the 92
nd
 ID upon his taking command.  
Almond declared in no uncertain terms to the African American soldiers standing before him: “I 
did not send for you.  Your Negro newspapers, Negro politicians and white friends have insisted 





on you seeing combat and I shall see that you get combat and your share of the casualties.”
147
  
Perhaps Almond meant his words to sound as a type of “pep-talk,” but to the already skeptical 
black soldiers who heard him speak it came off as an ominous warning about their future.      
     Once the 92
nd
 ID landed in Italy in 1944, Almond was eager to get the men into combat.  In 
the view of some veterans and observers he was perhaps a little too eager.  An Italian partisan, 
Gino Dinelli, commented about what he observed of the African American soldiers and their 
white officers in the Italian campaign of World War II; “The Americans were sending their black 
troops straight into the front of the German lines, instead of to the side.  And there was no reason 
for it.  So the Americans sent these soldiers to die.”
148
   Almond appeared true to his word to see 
to it that the African American soldiers under his command got their “share of the casualties” 
and then some.   
     A possible motivating factor for the carelessness of Almond’s use of his troops was his desire 
to make a name for himself with his superiors.  Almond recalled that the Cinquale Canal attack 
of February 7, 1945 was “watched with intense interest by the commander of the 15
th
 Army 
Group, General Mark Clark and the Fifth Army commander, General Truscott;” an audience that 
Almond was eager to please.
149
  Throughout his career Almond was very protective of his 
reputation as a field commander, which was possibly one of the reasons that he melded so well 
with General MacArthur after World War II and during the Korean War.   
     In analyzing Almond’s leadership of the 92
nd
 ID there appears to be a strange dichotomy in 
his view of the black troops under his command.  On the one hand Almond appeared to have a 
strong desire for the 92
nd
 ID to succeed, if for no other reason than to improve his leadership 
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reputation, then later he went out of his way to criticize the black troops.  Despite his verbal faux 
pas’ at Fort Huachuca, Almond appeared at first to sincerely want his division to succeed as a 
combat unit.  When the 92
nd
 ID conducted field maneuvers in Louisiana in 1944 prior to 
deployment overseas General Almond received word that the War Department was considering 
breaking the 92
nd
 ID up into smaller components.  Almond pleaded with General McNair, 
“General, you can’t let me down on this purpose.  I promised these officers and I have tried too 
hard to do a good job and so have they and I promised them if they stood behind me, I would 
stand behind them.”
150
  It was only when the 92
nd
 ID did not live up to his expectations during 
combat in Italy that Almond seemed to turn on his men – and blame their failure on race.      
     After World War II an independent analysis was prepared for the Army of the 92
nd
 ID’s 
actions.  In the after-action review the report noted that the “white senior officers of the Ninety-
second Division had made errors of military judgment” and that during the Cinquale Canal attack 
in particular, the “attack had been poorly planned from that start – and that the shortcomings … 
had contributed heavily to the unit’s poor performance.”
151
  The key assertion of this report was 
that the officer’s had failed, not the African American soldiers.  Almond defended his officers, 
claiming that his own investigation of the failures of the Cinquale Canal attack showed that the 
problem was that the black soldiers refused to hold their positions, especially at night.  Almond 
asserted, “We found out that in every case, the excuse of the local commander (platoon, or 
company commander) was that they put the man in position and couldn’t depend on his staying 
there because they couldn’t see him in the dark.  When they went to find the place they had put 
him in, the man wasn’t there.”  Almond claimed to not be surprised by his findings because his 
time with the 92
nd
 ID had taught him that the problem with black troops was the 
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“undependability of the average soldier to operate to his maximum capacity, compared to his 
lassitude toward his performing a task assigned” and that “the general tendency of the Negro 
soldier is to avoid as much effort as possible.”  For any skeptics of Almond’s assessment he 
declared; “Those who doubt this have only to serve in the capacity of supervisor to such 
requirements to determine for themselves what the results will be.”
152
  
     Although General Almond and several other senior white officers would proclaim the 92
nd
 ID 
in Italy a failure for the period up to and through the Cinquale Canal attack, and before General 
Marshall made the Japanese-American Regiment known as the 442 Infantry Regiment available 
as an attachment to the 92
nd
 ID, an unbiased review of their performance paints a different 
picture.  As Mershon and Schlossman observed, despite the poor leadership they experienced, 
the men of the 92
nd 
ID “fought well against formidable German positions, taking 3,000 casualties 
and receiving 12,000 decorations.”
153
  Could the 92
nd
 ID have performed better?  Yes they could 
have, and mostly likely would have had the caliber of their senior officers been more like those 
of the 369
th
 Infantry Regiment – men such as Colonel Hayward, who instead of seeing 
“lassitude” when he observed his men saw brave warriors. 
     The fact of the matter is that General Almond and his views of African American troops 
during World War II was not an anomaly, his was an opinion shared by most senior officers in 
the Army and the other branches of the military.  Some of the harshest critics of African 
American’s actually came from the Navy and Marine Corps.  During a meeting at the White 
House on September 27, 1940, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox told President Roosevelt and 
the gathered civil-rights activists that African Americans would have to be content to serve in the 
Navy in the “steward’s position” (glorified butlers to officer’s and as mess cooks), and that “he 
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would resign in protest if he were asked to desegregate his organization.”
154
   
     Marine Corps Commandant Major General Thomas Holcomb was even more blunt in his 
views regarding African Americans in the Marine Corps: “If it were a question of having a 
Marine Corps of 5,000 whites or 250,000 Negroes, I would rather have the whites.”
155
  General 
Holcomb could not understand why African Americans were trying “to break into a club that 
doesn’t want them” and warned of consequences that “would likely be pernicious.”
156
  The Navy 
and Marine Corps senior officers were in lock step with their Army brethren when it came to 
integrating their services; they would resist.  
     In a pattern that would be seen again during the post-World War II years and during the first 
year of the Korean War, senior military and civilian officials offered numerous excuses and 
roadblocks with regard to any attempt to integrate African American service personnel or even to 
offer greater opportunities for assignment to combat.  In an effort to appease the African 
American community and to offer recommendations for pro-active measures for integrating 
black soldiers and sailors into their branches of the armed forces, President Roosevelt created the 
Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC).  According to Mershon and Schlossman: “On 
15 January 1942, Roosevelt, armed with the FEPC conclusions, told Secretary Knox to ask the 
General Board, the Navy’s internal policymaking body, for ideas on assigning blacks to duties 
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outside the Steward’s Branch … The General Board refused to obey the directive.”
157
  President 
Roosevelt, afraid of creating turmoil amongst his senior Navy officers during a time of war, in 
large part deferred to the Navy’s argument that further integration of African American sailors 
into the Navy would seriously impact “military efficiency and morale.”
158
  It would take a 
different administration and a different war to force the military to accept integration. 
     While the history of race relations during World War II was far from ideal for African 
American servicemen, this should not detract from the reality that World War II offered far more 
opportunities to African American soldiers than had been the case in World War I.  The story of 
the Tuskegee Airman, the 761
st
 Tank Battalion, and the 92
nd
 ID, and other all black fighting units 
are testimony to strides made during America’s “Good War.”
159
  And, as would also be seen 
again during the Korean War, in several instances military necessity offered the opportunity for 
black soldiers to show their mettle and fight alongside white soldiers.   
The Gillem Board 
     Although a number of senior officers in the armed services were antagonistic towards African 
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 The African American 761
st
 Tank Battalion fought well and was fortunate to have senior officers who 
appreciated having them under the command.  According to Ulysses Lee, when the 761
st
 Tank Battalion landed on 
Omaha Beach on October 10, 1944, the division commander, Major General Willard S. Paul told the black troops; “I 
am damned glad to have you with us.  We have been expecting you for a long time, and I am sure you are going to 
give a good account of yourselves.  I’ve got a big hill up there that I want you to take, and I believe that you are 
going to do a great job of it.”  Two days after General Paul’s speech the men of the 761
st
 were given a welcoming 
speech by “Old Blood and Guts” himself, General Patton.  Patton in his usual blunt style told the men; “Men, you’re 
the first Negro tankers to ever fight in the American Army.  I would never have asked for you if you weren’t good.  I 
have nothing but the best in my Army.  I don’t care what color you are, so long as you go up there and kill those 
Kraut sonsabitches.  Everyone has their eyes on you and is expecting great things from you.  Most of all, your race is 
looking forward to you.  Don’t let them down, don’t let me down!” Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, 661. 
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American servicemen, the military establishment as a whole was mindful of race relations, if for 
no other reason than to avoid racial incidents that could mar the war effort.  During World War 
II, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy was appointed to head up the “Advisory 
Committee on Negro Troop Policies” in order to follow up on President Roosevelt’s directives to 
allow equal treatment of African Americans.  McCloy was joined in his effort by some senior 
military commanders, including General Eisenhower at SHAEF.   
     In the European Theater one of the issues that caused considerable strife between certain 
white commanders and black troops was the off-duty activities of black soldiers, particularly if 
that search for entertainment involved white women.  According to Lee Nichols, when 
Eisenhower heard reports that black soldiers were being barred from certain liberty locations in 
France because of the fear of black soldiers meeting with white women, he quipped, “If Negroes 
were good enough to die in uniform they were good enough to be entertained in uniform.”  
Eisenhower went on to order all his subordinate commanders to not “attempt to curtail such 
association by official order or restriction.”
160
  Some of Eisenhower’s subordinate commanders 
appeared to take the directive from SHAEF to be in the form of a suggestion as opposed to an 
order.  In an episode related by Nichols in Breakthrough on the Color Front, he described the 
reaction from a white commander when he was inspected by General Lee and General Benjamin 
Davis as to compliance with General Eisenhower’s order. 
     General Davis explained what he and General Lee found when they questioned the white 
commander about reports that the commander was giving passes to town on different days to his 
white and black soldiers.  “I asked if he had read Ike’s directive,” said Davis. The white 
commander said “oh yes, we understand about those directives.”  General Lee asked, “You mean 
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you’re not taking the directives seriously?”  The commander replied knowingly, “we understand 
you have to issue those directives.”  Davis recalled, “We asked him how long it would take him 
to pack his trunk.  He was promptly relived, and so were many others who refused to obey.”
161
 
     At the end of World War II the military had anticipated that the utilization of African 
American soldiers would become an issue that the military would have to address.  From 
October 1945 to April 1946, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem was the chair of a board that 
was descriptively titled “Board for Utilization of Negro Manpower” but was more commonly 
referred to simply as the “Gillem Board.”  The Gillem Board started their inquiry with testimony 
from commanders of the 92
nd
 ID. 
     One of the first witnesses called by the board was Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger 
the corps commander who oversaw Major General Edward Almond and the 92
nd
 ID.  General 
Crittenberger praised Almond’s leadership and then began citing all the reasons why the black 
soldiers of the 92
nd
 ID did not measure up to white troops; they used twice as much ammunition 
and supplies, they would “melt away” at night, the white officer’s duties were twice as 
demanding because they had to “continually urge Negroes forward,” and they would abandon 
their tank support at night, as they reportedly did during the crossing of the Sengali River in 
Italy. The board summarized General Crtienberger’s testimony as: “(The) Negro has no sense of 
responsibility.  No sense of pride in making a good fight,” but there was the added caveat that 
“this pride may be instilled in them by passages of years, and understanding treatment.”
162
  A 
couple days later the board heard from Major General Edward Almond. 
     General Almond did not wait for a call from the Gillem Board to start his own assessment of 










 ID in Italy.  On his own initiative General Almond prepared a report to document the 
success and failures of the 92
nd
 ID which he then turned over to General Lucien Truscott.  
Almond appeared concerned that the reported failures of the 92
nd
 ID might attach themselves to 
him and tarnish his record.  The first thing Almond did when he met with the Gillem Board was 
to provide them with a copy of the report he had submitted to General Truscott. 
     General Almond summarized his findings for the board; “They (African American soldiers) 
seem concerned with racial aspirations to an extent which impedes their military mission.”  He 
also noted, “They do much good work when not in immediate danger, but freeze up under fire.”  
Almond also agreed with his boss, General Crittenberger, that to get at the heart of the problem 
of why the black soldier was inferior to the white soldier the board should consider the “pride” of 
the black race.  Almond observed, “There are instances of individual heroism, but there is no 
evidence of pride in making a good racial showing.”
163
  Almond’s testimony was followed up 
with several other officers from the 92
nd
 ID, including Colonel William J. McCaffrey who was 
with Almond again in Korea when Almond commanded the Tenth Corps. 
     During World War II McCaffrey served as a regimental commanding officer and as Almond’s 
chief of staff.  The bond between Almond and McCaffrey was strong and the two men remained 
friends the rest of their lives.  They appeared to see eye-to-eye on the issue of race.  McCaffrey 
informed the board that “Negro troops are deficient in combat” and appearing to almost follow 
the “official” line, their deficiency in combat was, “owing to lack of leadership ability and sense 
of personal pride.”  McCaffrey explained, “A Negro soldier does not feel disgraced because he 
slips away from his unit in combat.”
164
  Although there were countless examples within the 92
nd
 
ID where the men did not leave their fellow soldiers behind in the face of the enemy, both 
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General Almond and Colonel McCaffrey were comfortable in painting all black soldiers with the 
same racist brush. 
     Another officer selected to testify before the Gillem Board was Colonel Edward L. Rowny 
who was in charge of the 41
st
 Engineer Corps attached to the 92
nd
 ID in Italy.  Colonel Rowny 
was not as decisive in his analysis of black troops as was Almond and McCaffrey.  He began by 
asserting that the 41
st
 Engineer Corps “was the best outfit he ever served with,” but then went on 
to chronicle several problems he observed among his black troops.  For instance, he recounted 
that his black troops “did very poorly on pulling up minefields – some wouldn’t do it at all.”  Of 
course, clearing minefields is one of the most important responsibilities of an engineer unit, but it 
is also one of the most dangerous assignments for a soldier and one that I suspect was not fondly 
embraced by white soldiers.  The most startling revelation by Colonel Rowny was his assertion 
that “Negroes will try to kill white officers who are hard on them.”
165
  Colonel Rowny did not 
elaborate on why he stated that black soldiers would try to kill white officers or provide any 
evidence of such an occurrence within his Engineer Corps.  
     There was at least one white 92
nd
 ID officer who disagreed with the “official” assessment 
provided by the leadership to the Gillem Board, but he was not called as a witness.  Warman 
Welliver was with the 92
nd
 ID from October 1943 through July 1945 and ended his military 
career as a captain.  Captain Welliver wrote an article titled “Report on the Negro Soldier” that 
was published in the April 1946 issue of Harper’s Magazine.  The article reached the attention of 
Lieutenant General Alvan Gillem on April 16, 1946 attached to a letter from his friend Willard 
Simpkins.  Simpkins warned his friend that the article “will tell its own story” and that he wrote 
to Fred Allen, the editor of Harpers, drawing attention to the War Departments release of the 
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report titled “Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army” – the Gillem Board’s 
official report, as rebuttal to the article.
166
 
     Captain Welliver first blasted society for the segregation and discrimination that denied 
African Americans “the opportunity to become fully-developed citizens.”  Captain Welliver said 
that American society predisposed the black man “to acceptance of the white man’s arrogance 
and unfairness and forgetfulness of his professed ideals.”  Adding insult to injury, “the 
discrimination and segregation to which he has been subjected in civilian life are carried over to 
military life.”  Instead of integrating the black soldier with his white counterparts and treating 
him as an equal member of society; “He is placed in segregated units, his uniform is often no 
protection against illegal treatment at the hands of civilians, he is commanded by white officers 
whose dislike of him and of their job is too often obvious, he sometimes is denied pleasures and 
privileges enjoyed by white soldiers for the very real reason that serious trouble would develop if 
he were allowed to enjoy them.”  Captain Welliver pointed out to his readers that; “Colored 




     Captain Welliver saved most of his invective for the Army leadership.  He argued that the 
leadership of the 92
nd
 ID and other African American units were not selected for their desire to 
work with black troops.  He continued: “this has resulted in the presence in colored divisions of a 
certain number of officers, often of high rank, with violent and ungovernable prejudices, whose 
only concern has been to do a poor enough job to get out,” a thinly veiled reference to General 
Almond and Colonel McCaffrey.  The poor leadership selected for the black units was directly 
the fault of the War Department according to Captain Welliver: “It often seemed in the 92
nd
 that 
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the war department had chosen exactly the officers who would guarantee the division had the 
least possible chance for success.”  He also observed that “the division commander (Almond), 
the assistant division commander (McCaffrey), the artillery commander, and the assistant 
artillery commander were all Southerners with conventional Southern attitudes.”
168
  After 
reading the article by Captain Welliver, Lieutenant General Gillem was probably relieved he had 
not called the young officer to testify before the board. 
     Reviewing the list of witnesses called before the board and reading the notes written in the 
summaries of testimony one gets the perception that Gillem Board had an agenda going in and 
they wanted to make sure they stayed true to their mission – defend the military’s use of 
segregated units.  One example of the board’s bias was the biographical write-up for witness, 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dollard.  Lt. Col. Dollard appeared at first glance to be highly 
qualified to be called as a witness for the board.  His credentials included assignment to the 
Information and Education Division, former social scientist with the Carnegie Corporation of 
New York, and member of the American Council for Race Relations.  The summary of this 
testimony noted that the “witness had had no experience with command of troops.”  The 
conclusion to be inferred was that his opinions were inferior to those of commanders who had 
led black soldiers.  It was clear why the Gillem Board wanted to discredit Lt. Col. Dollard.  In 
his testimony he unequivocally asserted; “Efficiency of the Negro in the Army is dependent on 
some degree of integration.  Complete segregation is destructive of morale, self-confidence, and 
mutual confidence.”
169
  Integration was the last thing the board wanted to recommend. 
     The Gillem Board concluded their investigation in March, 1946 and released their results in a 
War Department report titled “Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army.”  That 
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report, as noted in the Introduction, also spurred the War Department to release Circular 124 in 
April, 1946.  The Gillem Board recommendations were not radical in any respect.  They almost 
universally followed the recommendations of previous committees, including those of Secretary 
McCloy.  As Steve C. Davis told Army interviewers forty years after the Gillem Board findings 
during the preparation of the Center of Military History study Black Soldier White Army, the 
Gillem Board recommended that “more should be done in training and that new slots be 
identified and individuals would be trained for these functions (especially critical MOS’s) and 
assigned to posts” but the major catch was that while African American soldiers would be 
encouraged to work with white units, the African American soldiers would still be organized, 
trained, and housed by their race.  The finding of the Gillem Board essentially “did nothing to 
further integration at all” but “said a lot about equal opportunity.”
170
  Also, although nothing was 
changed, a topic of discussion during the Gillem Board was the utilization and future of the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment “because of its visibility and size and because it was the last all-black 
regiment.”
171
  The Gillem Board recommendations were weak and did not move integration any 
further but rather pushed the issue of integration and the fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment down 
the road. 
President Truman’s Order 9981 
     In 1946 Sergeant Isaac Woodard had just been discharged from the Army after serving three 
years, including 15 months in the South Pacific during the war, when he boarded a bus on his 
way to North Carolina to see his family.  Sergeant Woodard was undoubtedly exited to return 
home and must have planned on making a good impression on his return home since he was 
wearing his pressed Army uniform, complete with Good Conduct Medal, World War II Victory 
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Medal, and Battle Star.  Unfortunately, at a stop in South Carolina the bus driver and Sergeant 
Woodard engaged in an argument about Woodard using the restroom.  At the next stop after the 
argument, in the little town of Batesburg, South Carolina, the bus driver summoned the police 
and demanded the arrest of the ex-serviceman.  The charge was drunkenness, even though 
Woodard did not drink.  In making the arrest, the lawmen beat the prisoner with a blackjack, and 
someone, either the sheriff or a policeman, thrust the end of a nightstick into Sergeant 
Woodard’s eyes.  Several days after the incident at an Army hospital where Sergeant Woodard 
was treated for amnesia as a result of the beating, doctors also discovered that his corneas were 
so badly damaged that he was permanently blind.
172
 
     Eventually after considerable public outrage, even in some parts of the South, and after the 
South Carolinian authorities refused to take any action, a federal trial was conducted against the 
lawman that made the arrest of Woodard.  The federal prosecution was feeble and did not make a 
convincing case even though the evidence was clearly in the prosecution’s favor.  Hindering the 
case was that the prosecution only called one witness, the bus driver.  The jury believed the 
officers’ story that Woodard was resisting arrest.  On hearing the news that the officer was 
acquitted by a jury, President Truman was taken aback.  Truman commented to a World War I 
friend, “when a mayor and a city Marshal can take a Negro sergeant off a bus in South Carolina, 
beat him and put out one of his eyes, and nothing is done about it by State authorities, then 
something is radically wrong with the system.”
173
 
     Partially as a result of the righteous indignation over the treatment of Sergeant Woodard, 
President Truman signed into law Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948.  The order that would 
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officially desegregate the armed services stated in part, “It is hereby declared to be the policy of 
the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed 
services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”  Or at least, that is how the 
official version of the story went regarding why President Truman ordered the desegregation of 
the armed forces.  The truth, as is often the case, is a little more complicated.  In 1948, President 
Truman was running for re-election and in the summer of 1948 it didn’t look at all promising for 
the former artillery officer/farmer/haberdashery owner/Senator.  No, in the summer of 1948 
President Truman’s chances for re-election were looking quite slim. 
     The “political” opportunity posed by drawing away the votes of millions of African 
Americans did not go unnoticed by the Republican Party.  Republican Hamilton Fish of New 
York – a veteran of the 93
rd
 in World War I – noted that African Americans should have “the 
same right as any other American to train, to serve, and to fight … in defense of the United 
States.”
174
  An advisor to President Truman, an African American named Truman Gibson, knew 
exactly what Congressman Fish’s proclamation meant.  “The Republicans clearly intended to 
make black participation in combat an issue in the coming presidential campaign,” he 
commented.
175
  President Truman was further bolstered in his decision to push through Order 
9981 when he received a memo from his Special Counsel, Clark M. Clifford that the South was 
“safely Democratic” and therefore “safely ignored.”
176
  This did not mean that President Truman 
did not take political risks of his own by getting out in front of the issue and ordering 
desegregation, quite to the contrary President Truman was taking a huge gamble with the already 
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fractured support of southern Democrats. 
     To answer the question, how President Truman, a product of a pro-slavery Missouri family 
could come to be one of the champions of desegregation in the Twentieth Century requires 
looking into President Truman’s upbringing and past.  Harry S. Truman was born in Jackson 
County, Missouri on May 8, 1884 to a family that had ties to the “bushwhackers” of the Civil 
War era.  The Trumans were a family that had memories of the bitter conflict that swept the 
country and particularly Jackson County in the early 1860s.  According to David McCullough in 
his biography of the 33
rd
 President of the United States, the young Harry Truman grew up in a 
community where African American residents resided in a section referred to as “Nigger Neck” 
and where black children went to separate schools (Young School) and black adults were not 
allowed in certain stores or the town library.
177
  McCullough observed that the young Harry 
Truman also would have heard words like “nigger” and “coon” by even “so-called polite 
society.”
178
  At the same time, Harry Truman grew up right alongside African Americans such as 
Caroline Simpson who lived in the Truman home with her husband and four children.
179
 
     In Harry Truman’s time and culture, it was perfectly normal and acceptable for him to write 
in a letter to Bess Wallace while courting her that “one man was as good as another … so long as 
he’s honest and decent and not a nigger or Chinaman,” and that his Uncle Will Young’s theory 
was that “the Lord made a white man of dust, a nigger from mud, and threw up what was left and 
it came down a Chinaman.”
180
  Despite Harry Truman’s racial baggage, he also was a fiery 
independent man who abhorred what he perceived as injustice.  Early in his political career after 
spending countless days on the byways and back roads of Missouri while campaigning, Harry 
                                                          
177




 Ibid., 45. 
180
 Ibid., 86. 
88 
 
Truman went out on a limb by Missouri political standards in an address to a nearly all-white 
audience in Sedalia, Missouri.  Harry Truman told the crowd in his somewhat squeaky voice: 
          I believe in the brotherhood of man; not merely the brotherhood of white men, but the      
          brotherhood of all men before the law.  If any class or race can be permanently set apart  
          from, or pushed down below the rest in political and civil rights, so may any other class or  
          race when it shall incur the displeasure of its more powerful associates, and we may say  
          farewell to the principles on which we count our safety … Negroes have been preyed upon  
          by all types of exploiters, from the installment salesman of clothing, pianos, and furniture  
          to the vendors of vice.  The majority of our Negro people find but cold comfort in shanties  
          and tenements.  Surely, as freemen, they are entitled to something better than this.
181
  
     As President of the United States, Truman continued to express his desire for more equality 
for African Americans.  In 1946 President Truman used his office to appoint a blue-ribbon 
commission on civil rights.  President Truman selected Charles E. Wilson, then head of General 
Electric to lead the commission.  McCullough observed that “It was an unprecedented step” and 
some of President Truman’s advisors feared that Truman had imperiled his political future and 
that  “his authorization of inquiry into the explosive issue of civil rights was nothing short of 
political suicide.”
182
  President Truman laid the groundwork for tackling the issue of ending 
segregation in the armed forces with a special message to Congress on Civil Rights that he sent 
on February 2, 1948.  The special message to Congress was focused on equal rights in general – 
based on his Civil Rights Commission, but included the caveat according to McCullough that 
President Truman “asked the Secretary of Defense to look into discrimination in the military 
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service and to see it was stopped as soon as possible.”
183
 
     With regard to the incident involving Sergeant Woodard, President Truman wrote a friend 
that “his own forebears were Confederates”  and he came from a part of Missouri where “Jim 
Crowism” still prevailed, “but my very stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, 
just back from overseas, were being dumped out of army trucks in Mississippi and beaten.  
Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this is 
bad.  I shall fight to end evils like this.”
184
  For better or worse, President Truman decided to 
throw his political weight behind desegregating the armed forces. 
 
The Fahy Committee and Military Backlash 
     Realizing that there would be significant push-back to his order desegregating the armed 
forces, President Truman handpicked a panel of men to head a committee called “President’s 
Committee on Equality and Opportunity in the Armed Service” also often referred to as the 
“Fahy Committee” after the chair of the committee.  When President Truman named Charles 
Fahy to run the committee he was selecting a hard-nosed attorney and former Solicitor General 
under President Roosevelt that was accustomed to pushing his goals.  Fahy had argued in front of 
the Supreme Court no less than 18 times.  Fahy was also apparently very persuasive in his 
arguments since the Supreme Court sustained his arguments 16 times and partially upheld the 
remaining two times.  With his record of winning an argument in the courtroom, as head of the 
President’s Committee it was then up to Fahy to win the desegregation argument with an openly 
hostile white military hierarchy. 
     President Truman’s Executive Order desegregating the military was largely ignored by 
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civilian officials and military officers at all levels.  Most of the bureaucrats and military leaders 
seemed to wonder just how far this “experiment” was going to be allowed to progress.  
According to Steve C. Davis who observed the activity at the Pentagon first hand during the late 
1940s –early 1950s, the “Fahy Committee report did not order racial integrations” and in fact the 
“thinking at the Army Staff level was how do we comply with this new situation while at the 
same time maintaining the status quo racially.”
185
  The civilian leaders of the Army were the first 
to get President Truman’s ear as they pushed back against the order.  At the time President 
Truman signed Order 9981, the man responsible for implementing the order in the Army was 
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall.  Secretary Royall was a former Secretary of War before 
that office was done away with by the military reorganization of 1947.  
     Always the politician, Secretary Royall opened his memorandum to the President with the 
soothing words, “At the outset I want to make it clear that in my opinion the policies which 
should be applied to the use of all Army personnel, regardless of race, are those policies which 
best promote a sound national defense.”  Then Secretary Royall moved to attacking President 
Truman’s Order by stating that “the Army is not an instrument for social evolution,” and quite 
frankly, “the history of the two wars has demonstrated that in general Negro troops have been 
less qualified than white troops for the performance of certain types of military service (such as) 
service with the infantry or with other units requiring troops to close with the enemy.”  Royall 
pointed out that his assessment of African American troops was “the real opinion of nearly all 
combat officers.”  However, as a sop to the President, Secretary Royall asserted rather 
condescendingly that black soldiers are “exceptionally and peculiarly qualified” for something 
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along the lines of “motor or ship transport service.”
186
 
     Robert Edgerton in Hidden Heroism observed that Kenneth Royall “vigorously reasserted the 
Army’s cherished belief that blacks had proven to be incompetent combat soldiers in both World 
Wars” to the point that he refused to push forward integration.  Edgerton wrote that  President 
Truman reacted swiftly to his secretary’s obstinacy, and “a few weeks later (Royall) was made to 
see the need to retire.”
187
  Royall was replaced as Secretary of the Army by Gordon Gray.
188
  
Gray’s success in implementing the integration was a slight improvement.  Under Secretary 
Gray’s tenure, the army replaced the quota system with a system that relied on nonracial 
physical, mental, and psychological standards.  Despite the forced changes, the authors of Black 
Soldier White Army remarked that; “even then, however, Secretary Gray could bring himself to 
bend only to a degree.  The Army would give the new system a fair trial, he told the president, 
but reserved the right to return to procedures based on race” if the new system turned out to be 
problematic.  President Truman told Secretary Gray reassuringly “I am sure that everything will 
work out as it should.”
189
  Getting Secretary Gray to fall in line with his order to desegregate was 
one thing, getting the military brass to fall in line was quite another for President Truman.  
     In a memorandum exchanged between Lt. General Edward Brooks and General J. Lawton 
Collins, the two men discussed what the elimination of the quota system would mean to the 
Army.  They observed “it is not realistic to assume that there should be no limit whatsoever to 
the percentage of Negroes in the military establishment during peacetime.”  The memorandum 
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also noted that if there was no cap to the percentage of African American servicemen allowed 
into the Army then there would be increasing pressure to assign African American servicemen 
based strictly on vacancies anywhere in the Army and that would be nothing less than “complete 
integration.”  The memorandum noted, “It is the opinion of the Army that integration of 
individual Negroes in white organizations should not and cannot be undertaken at this time.”
190
  
Following Isaac Newton’s first law of motion, “an object at rest tends to stay at rest” and human 
nature, President Truman and Secretary Gray’s best efforts did little to overcome the military 
establishment’s resistance to integrate.  The modest progress under Secretary Gray’s leadership 
was also tempered by the fact that he lasted less than a year as Secretary of the Army before 
deciding to move into a position as director of the newly formed Psychological Study Group. 
     Gray was succeeded by Frank Pace as Secretary of the Army.  When Pace took office as the 
new Secretary of the Army in April, 1950, just months prior to the opening wave of attacks by 
the North Koreans, integration in the Army was moving slowly, if at all.  After the conflict broke 
out on the Korean peninsula, Pace received an inquiry from the White House seeking the status 
of “integration of all white and non-white troops in the Armed Forces” that was part of order 
9981.  Pace responded (either through ignorance or sophistry) that, “a careful check of all 
instructions received to date failed to reveal any such instructions from the President.”  
Perceiving the need to offer his advice, “in fact, I would strongly advise against the issuance of 
any instructions to this effect at the present time.”
191
  Perhaps, Pace should not be criticized too 
harshly for not being aware of the President’s order, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton 
Collins also made a comment during this period “that he regarded President Truman’s Order 
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banning segregation in the armed services as a suggestion and not a directive.”
192
  As part of the 
inquiry from the White House, Pace was asked if the Army had finally removed the identity of a 
soldier’s race on assignment orders.  Pace responded that the Army still showed a soldier’s race, 
“not for purposes of discrimination, but in order to ensure that the Army may equitably and 
expeditiously assign such individuals” - or in other words, so the Army could continue to 
segregate and deny “equality of treatment and opportunity.”
193
 
     Among those who wore the nation’s uniform, from the highest ranking officer to recently 
commissioned lieutenants, most joined in with criticism for Truman’s plan for desegregation.  
General Omar Bradley, speaking in front of the Fahy Committee, was the most tactful, but he too 
advised for a cautious approach to integration.  Bradley worried that “if we try to force 
integration on the Army before the country is ready to accept these customs, we may have 
difficulty attaining high morale.”
194
  Although General Bradley was without question a 
remarkable soldier and officer, he was out of touch in understanding the status of African 
American troops in his Army.  Bradley could not see the proverbial forest because of the trees, 
namely, that segregation was hurting the African American soldiers in the military forces - and 
as a result affecting the fighting capability of the armed services as a whole.  Bradley testified “I 
believe the Negro soldier, in general, considers his lot, from his viewpoint, a good one.”
195
  
Unfortunately for many in the African American community, General Bradley’s testimony 
would tarnish the otherwise remarkable opinion they had of him.
196
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 In response to General Bradley’s testimony, an editorial in the Afro-American commented that “President 
Truman, in order to make his executive orders calling for an end to discrimination in the armed services and for fair 
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     Another World War II hero to speak out against Truman’s Order was General Mark Clark.  
As late as 1956, General Clark was still publicly arguing that “my World War II experience 
persuaded me that Negro units in combat tended to be undependable under fire.”
197
  One of those 
“undependable” units underneath General Clark in World War II was a platoon within the 92
nd
 
ID that was led by African American Lieutenant Vernon Baker, whose Distinguished Service 
Cross was upgraded to a Medal of Honor in the 1990s.
198
 
     According to historian Richard Home, even while some of the higher ranking military officers 
bowed down to pressure from President Truman and slowly proceeded with integration, “the 
officers at the mid-and lower-level ranks maintained the status quo.”
199
  Retired African 
American Army Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton Jr. recalled his experience as a young 
officer in 1948 when President Truman issued Executive Order 9981.  “I remember the post 
commander assembled all the officers and he read the order to the assembled group.  He then 
said, ‘As long as I am commander here, there will be no change.’”
200
 
     By late 1949, several branches of the Armed Forces, especially the Navy and Air Force, were 
beginning to break down the barriers between white and black personnel.  The Fahy Committee 
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in large part was responsible for the progress.  The Fahy Committee remained committed to 
confirming the progress being reported to the committee by the various branches of the armed 
forces.  President Truman, after winning his surprise election in November 1948, also was keen 
on making sure that his pre-election commitment to desegregating the armed forces was 
followed out.  During a White House meeting on January 12, 1949 with members of the Fahy 
Committee and the Armed Services, President Truman pressed Secretary of the Air Force Stuart 
Symington for a report on his branches’ progress.  Secretary Symington responded to President 
Truman, “Sir, I just want to report to you that our plan is to completely eliminate segregation in 
the Air Force.  For example, we have a fine group of colored boys.  Our plan is to take those 
boys, break up that fine group, and put them with the other units themselves and go right down 
the line all through those subdivisions one hundred percent.”
201
 
     Of all the services, the Army was the only service to continue to hesitate to desegregate their 
personnel.  In a column published by the British journal The Economist, the British noted, “The 
Army offered the only serious resistance to reform, partly because it has had segregated units 
since 1866 and partly because of the large number of officers from the South.”  The Economist 
commended the Fahy committee, noting that the committee “has pointed out insistently that it is 




     In spring 1949, the Army conducted a survey to assess the opinion of its members concerning 
integration.  For the question are you “definitely opposed to complete integration (living and 
mess areas)” – 61% of the respondents replied in the affirmative.  For the question “not 
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definitely opposed to complete integration” – 39% of the respondents replied in the affirmative.  
The question “partially opposed” received 32% and “partial not definitely opposed” received 
68%.  Not surprisingly, the study found that “men from the South are most opposed; while those 
from the Northeast are least opposed.”  What the military brass focused on in the study – was the 
sample of expressed opinions.  A twenty year old Private First Class (Pfc) with only a grade 
school education informed the surveyors, “about Negroes, they are human and can’t be taken off 
the face of the earth.  But they shouldn’t be together with white soldiers because some of them, 
the bestest (sp) percent, are still like head hunters.  They have bad blood, some them are like 
animals … they just shouldn’t have them live with white men, for sure all the G.I’s will quit the 
Army or buck like hell to get out.”
203
  Opinions like those of the Pfc were used as part of the 
delaying tactic by the Army.  The Army’s leaders argued that they would like to integrate their 
services, but the rank and file members of the service will not tolerate integration because of the 
social values of society at large.  Secretary Royall in a memorandum reinforced the argument, 
noting that “the Army is not an instrument for social evolution.  It is not the Army’s job either to 
favor or to impede social doctrines, no matter how progressive they may be – it is not for us to 
lead or to lag behind the civilian procession except to the extent that the national defense is 
affected.”
204
  Even General Eisenhower, when expressing his opinion regarding the question of 
integration in 1948, commented that one of the hurdles with desegregation was “that there is race 
prejudice in this country, and when you put in the same organization and make live together 
under the most intimate circumstances men of different races, we sometimes have trouble.”
205
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     The question of intelligence and education posed another obstacle to integration that the 
Truman Administration had to overcome.  Before being accepted into the Armed Services, a 
prospective recruit was given a battery of written tests that were called the Army General 
Classification Tests, or AGCT.  Results of the AGCT were grouped into various grades ranging 
from I for the most intelligent to V for the least intelligent.  Under the quota system that was 
utilized throughout World War II and for several years afterward, the Army only allowed a 
certain percentage of grade V and grade IV recruits, because the Army felt they lacked the basic 
intelligence and education to operate as combat soldiers and were only suitable for simple, 
menial jobs, such as truck driver and cook. 
     President Truman and the Fahy commission were bombarded with memorandums and reports 
from the military pointing out that integration and increasing African American troop levels was 
impossible based on the data of African American results on the AGCT.  The reports concluded 
“considering the number of noncommissioned officers and specialists required in modern armies, 
it is evident that it is difficult to build efficient Negro units where personnel in the higher 
intelligence brackets is so limited.”
206
   According to the data put forward by the Army, World 
War II figures showed that of all African American soldiers tested (prospective officers and 
enlisted) only 16.6% scored in Grade III or better - and that included those prospective 
candidates that were looking at the Navy or Air Service.
207
   
          1948 Army results of African Americans taking AGCT: 
                          Above 90 (GCT III or better)   - 68,475   
                          Between 70 and 90 (GCT IV) - 129,947  
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                          Below 70 (GCT V)                   - 214,087 
     Thus, the Army concluded that in order to meet the demands of the Truman Administration 
and make the troop levels of African Americans fall in line with their percentage of the 
population as a whole (roughly 10% in 1948) - the Army would need approximately 138,600 
new troops from both enlistment and selective service.  And deducting the African Americans 
that go into the Navy or Air Force, the Army argued that they would have to rely on massive 
numbers of Grade IV and Grade V men.
208
  
     Part of the question the Truman Administration had to deal with was to what extent was the 
military complaint regarding African American enlistee education and intelligence accurate and 
to what extent did that hamper the efficiency of military units.  Discerning between an 
individual’s inherent intelligence and education are two different things.  Clearly, an individual 
could have little to no prior education, but is still quite capable of learning.  As Robert Edgerton 
noted in Hidden Heroism, “even at the time ... it was obvious that this IQ test was measuring 
education far more than generic intelligence.”
209
   Edgerton cited several examples of questions 
in the Army AGCT that showed a distinct bias towards a more “white” oriented education, such 
as, “whether Scrooge appeared in Vanity Fair, A Christmas Carole, Romola, or Henry IV?”  
When African American proponents of integration pointed out that Northern educated blacks 
often outscored most Southern educated whites, Southern politicians became enraged.
210
    
     Although it presented a problem to the goals of the Fahy Committee in moving integration 
forward, even they had to acknowledge as General Eisenhower had in 1948 that “in general, the 
Negro is less well educated than his brother citizen that is white.”  And the consequences for 
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having major discrepancies between the educational level of white and black soldiers was also 
summarized by General Eisenhower, “in every company the Negro is going to be relegated to the 
minor jobs, and he is never going to get his promotion to such grades as technical sergeant, 
master sergeant, and so on, because the competition is too tough.”
211
  Fortunately, the Fahy 
Committee had a solution for this potential roadblock to integration.  If the education level of 
African American personnel were not what they needed to be – then the Army would just have to 
see to it that their personnel received the education they needed to be effective. 
     Ultimately, and reluctantly, the Army embarked on an organizational-wide educational 
program to help the African Americans within their midst to get up to par with most of the other 
white soldiers.  In Los Angeles, Colonel Henry C. Newton who was in charge of one of the 
Army education centers for these black troops commented that they have “a remarkable talent for 
grasping knowledge and have shown a high potential for becoming military leaders.”
212
   With 
the intelligence and education argument removed, the chief resistance to integration and 
“equality of treatment and opportunity” for African American soldiers would come from the 
entrenched “old school” white officer corps determined to use their power to continue to 
denigrate the combat performance of black soldiers in the Korean War.  Their hostility might 
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White Officers, Black Officers and Black Soldiers: Examples of Leadership in 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
     While the Truman Administration wrestled with the problem of getting the Army to accept 
desegregation, several thousand miles away on the Korean peninsula the seeds for war were 
sprouting in the fertile rice paddies of Korea below the 38
th
 parallel.  In 1945, Brigadier General 
George Lincoln had recommended the 38
th
 parallel as the dividing line for North and South 
Korea because it appeared to be the approximate mid-point on the peninsula.  Historian William 
Stueck later observed: “The thirty-eight parallel was a line in a map, nothing more.  It followed 
no political boundaries or physical features within Korea.”
213
  The selection of this seemingly 
innocuous geographical way-point only exacerbated growing tension in Korea between several 
factions; those who had worked with the Japanese occupying force during World War II and 
those who had worked against it, those who were aligned with the growing communist ideology 
flowing out of China (and in some cases had fought in the Chinese Civil War) and those who 
looked toward the capitalist oriented west; and those who looked for a new Korea to reclaim its 
identity as an independent Asian empire and those who wished to align Korea with the European 
powers and the United States.  The selection of a random geographical dividing line coupled 
with the political machinations of foreign states was the starting point for what would become 
essentially a Korean Civil War.  
     Most Americans think the Korean War commenced with the invasion by North Korea into 
South Korea in June, 1950.  As Allen Millet chronicled in his The War for Korea, 1945-1950, in 
reality the Korean War (the Korean Civil War) began on April 3, 1948, on the island of Cheju-do 
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with the “orchestrated attacks by Communist-led partisans against the civil government, the 
rightist youth associations, and the island’s detachment of the Korean National Police.”
214
  In the 
two years following the attack on Cheju-do in 1948 and prior to the invasion of South Korea on 
June 25, 1950, both sides violently lashed out at their opponents.  The estimates of Korean dead 
ranged between 30,000 and 100,000.
215
    
     As is often the case in any civil war the animosity between the two sides was amplified by the 
bitterness and cruelty that a war amongst countrymen can foment; brother against brother, father 
against son, and villager against fellow villager.  In The Korean War: A History, Bruce 
Cummings declared that the Korean War was a “dirty” war with “a sordid history of civilian 
slaughters;” and “here was the Vietnam War we came to know before Vietnam – gooks, napalm, 
rapes, whores, an unreliable ally, a cunning enemy, fundamentally untrained GIS’s fighting a 
war their top generals barely understood, fragging of officers.”
216
  Cummings could have added 
racial strife to his litany of “sordid history;” a racial strife that pitted the mostly white “West” 
with the oriental “East;” creating condescension towards the Asian population by the white 
senior officers in Korea that almost became their undoing on several occasions.  One example 
was when General Almond famously quipped to Marine General Oliver P. Smith on the shores 
of the Chosin Reservoir, “Don’t let a bunch of Goddamn Chinese laundrymen stop you.”
217
  
From Civil War to Race War 
     As American soldiers, both white and black, entered Korea the conflict turned from a civil 
war to a struggle with global ramifications.  Underneath the surface of this civil turned global 
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war was a second battle; a racial conflict that pitted black soldiers against the white Army 
leadership.  Mershon and Schlossman noted in their monograph that despite the efforts of the 
Truman Administration and Fahy Committee, when the United States Army entered the Korean 
peninsula “the Army possessed almost exactly the same racially segregated organizational 
structure that had existed in World War II.”
218
  African American soldiers were committed to 
battle alongside others of their race while being led predominantly by white officers.     
     Instead of viewing the Korean War as an opportunity to breakdown the use of segregated 
units, the military brass saw the war as yet another card to play in delaying integration of military 
personnel.  Secretary of the Army Frank Pace summed up the position of civilian and military 
leaders in a memorandum to President Truman’s Administrative Assistant, David Niles, almost a 
half-year into the war: “The Army is engaged in very severe fighting in Korea under difficult 
conditions at best.  No change in the Army’s basic policies should be made at this time which 
might have an adverse effect on the fighting efficiency of our troops.”
219
  For the U.S. Army 
forces engaged in combat in Korea, the unspoken hurdle to any form of integration was the racial 
biases of members of the officer corps, from “butter bar” lieutenants fresh out of officer training 
to the Tenth Corps Army Commander, General Edward Almond. 
     This chapter explores the racial views of both white and black soldiers and officers during the 
Korean War.  We are also going to discuss and analyze several administrative actions by the 
Army that were critical to the dynamics of race relations within segregated units such as the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment.  For instance, was it true that the Army had an unwritten policy of sending 
white officers with ties to the southern states to act as commanders of segregated black units?  
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How did white officers view an assignment to lead soldiers in a segregated unit?  And how were 
black officers and soldiers assigned to units?  Where most studies of the black soldiers in 
segregated units focus on the negative effects of racism on the soldiers themselves, portraying 
the black soldiers as merely victims, this chapter looks at the ways that black soldiers resisted 
racism and dealt with officers with racial bias.  Finally, we are going to use examples from the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment that demonstrated several important tenets of military leadership and 
ways that officers, both white and black, either lived up to or failed to live up these goals.    
     This chapter pays particular attention to the dynamics of the officer corps, for this is essential 
to an understanding of how the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment performed as a combat unit.  In the 
introduction to Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two Original 1951 
Field Reports, the authors noted: 
          it might be expected that the performance of Negro troops would be profoundly influenced  
          by the conditions under which they are used … accordingly, this study is concerned with  
          the views of senior officers, expressed in reports and interviews, not only because they  
          represent military judgments on the subject of Negro manpower, but because they reveal  
          the assumptions and premises which underlie the official handling of Negro personnel and  
          which shape official policy.
220
  
      
     Leadership matters to a military organization and often success or failure can be traced to the 
quality of officers in a given unit.  The surveys conducted by researchers in 1951 revealed that in 
Korea the “assumptions” and “premises” under which some white officers handled African 
American soldiers were little different from the viewpoints of their predecessors in World War I 
and World War II.  Many of the Korean War officers held similar viewpoints as World War II 
white officer, Captain John Runyon, the CO of company C – the same company that contained 
African American Second Lieutenant Vernon Baker.  Captain Runyon wrote at the end of the 
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war that it was a “foolish officer who leads colored soldiers because invariably he loses half of 
his men.”
221
  At the end of World War II, Captain Runyon joined a large segment of the white 
officer corps who had no desire to ever lead black troops in combat.     
     Floyd A. Johnson, a veteran of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea, recalled his awakening to 
racial biases in the Army while still at basic training at Fort Riley when his first sergeant 
pointedly told him “I don’t want any niggers here.”  Johnson said that once over in Korea, he 
observed firsthand other comments and actions by white officers with racial biases.  One day 
while rethreading a cable which had broken on his bulldozer a white captain came up to him and 
said “you think you have problems, I have to command a bunch of niggers.”  Johnson, 
interviewed forty years later still wondered “how anyone could perform in that kind of 
situation.”
222
  Johnson’s observations were shared by British war correspondent Reginald 
Thompson who could not avoid noticing and be appalled by the “ubiquitous, casual racism of 
Americans, from general to soldier.”
223
 
     The 1951 team of scientists that deployed to Korea was sent to conduct in-depth analysis of 
the results of desegregation in the military, how fully it was instituted, and where it was 
successful.  The code name given for the classified research operation was Project Clear.  
During the research phase, the scientists interviewed hundreds of soldiers, both white and black, 
and both enlisted and officer.  However, it was the interviews of white officers that most clearly 
indicated the level of inherent racial bias still present during the Korean War.  
     The results of those interviews speak volumes to the attitudes of the white officer corps in the 
Army in the early 1950s and the lengths the Army would need to go if the institution was serious 
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about creating an integrated Army with true “equality of opportunity” for all soldiers.  One of the 
more tame complaints documented by Project Clear came from a white Major.  The Major said 
that the officer casualty rates for units with a large contingent of African Americans was very 
high because “the officer is forced to expose himself unnecessarily in order to try and direct his 
men, control their erratic fire, and do the duties that are normally taken care of by an NCO.”
224
  
The unidentified white Major appeared to be repeating the observation of Captain Runyon in 
World War II that a white officer leading black soldiers was a “foolish officer.”   
     Another individual identified as a “General Officer” repeated the traditional view of African 
American troops that “their effectiveness is less in combat” and “they should be in service units” 
until they prove themselves there - and only then be “reassigned to an infantry unit.”
225
  Perhaps 
the most offensive interview documented by Project Clear came from an officer who attempted 
to interject his own racial humor in describing the black soldiers under his command.  Here was 
how that interview went: 
          Interviewer: How’s the morale in your squad? 
          General Officer: Morale’s fine.  We’ve got two niggers in our squad and they keep us    
          laughing all the time. 
          Interviewer: What do you mean? 
          General Officer: Oh, one day we were laying a mine field and suddenly we were fired   
          upon, and we piled into the jeep.  But that colored boy wouldn’t get into the jeep.  He just    
          ran on ahead of us down the road, then he sat down and took off his shoes, and said “I  
          can’t go on because my feet are tired.”  Well if I assign a squad to do a job I want to be  
          able to count on the whole squad to do that job, whether it’s laying a mine field or jumping  
          into a jeep and taking off.  A Negro in that squad will lower efficiency.
226
   
      
     Although these white officers comprised only one part of the total command hierarchy, their 
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biases most certainly influenced how African American soldiers were treated in their command.  
The officers that African American soldiers interacted with on a daily basis represented to the 
men the “face” of the Army.  These soldiers were dependent on their officers to lead them into 
combat and all the uncertainties the come into play with battle; and more often than not, the 
black soldiers were left feeling less than certain that their officers and the Army at large had their 
best interest in mind.   
     J.P. Easterling, a radio operator in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, upon landing in Korea from the 
unit’s pre-war encampment on Japan recalled his introduction by a white senior officer who 
made it clear to him that “blacks were inferior on the battlefield.”  The senior officer informed 
Easterling and the other African American soldiers with him in the 24
th
, “I’m going to make you 
guys the fightin’ deuce four instead of the frightened two four.”  To further “pep-up” the men, 
the officer then “told the men that he didn’t remember their outfit accomplishing too much in 
World War II.”
227
  It is hard to imagine that the white officer’s words instilled in Easterling and 
his fellow black soldiers anything other than loathing for their leader.   
     The logical question to ask when confronted by case after case of racial bias among white 
officers assigned to lead black soldiers is how were officers assigned to segregated black units in 
Korea?  Was there a policy in place that purposefully or inadvertently placed these racist officers 
into black units?  Although there were no written instructions per se, from the anecdotal evidence 
available it would appear that officers for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were selected in much the 
same manner as in previous wars – on their native “understanding” of African Americans as 
determined by what section of the United States they came from.   
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Assignment of White Officers to Black units – Southern Men Preferred 
     When the Army’s Center of Military History conducted their research on the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment, one of the first things they discovered was the prevalence of white southerners, from 
junior to senior officers, in positions of leadership.  It was noted that “a number of northerners 
were present, but many of the regiment’s officers appear to have been from the South.”  Not 
surprisingly, studies conducted by the Army in the interwar years had demonstrated that African 
American soldiers actually preferred to be led by other African American officers or short of 
that, white northern officers.  But those studies had apparently been ignored by the senior 
officers in the Army, and as a result, Steve Davis observed: “Army personnel officers still 
continued to believe that African Americans performed best under white southerners.”  So if 
enough officers were present in the pool to select from when a replacement was needed for the 
24
th
 “the southerners tended to be the first chosen.”
228
  Steve Davis stated that at the Pentagon 
level it was put in writing, “white southerners as better disposed to command black troops.”  
From Davis’ observations first hand at the Pentagon and in the field, “this was the preponderance 
of thinking on the subject of both junior and senior officers.”
229
 
     In many ways, the policy of assigning white southerners to black soldiers can be traced to the 
history of the 93
rd
 Infantry Division in World War I and the 92
rd
 Infantry Division in World War 
II.  Dale Wilson observed in his scathing article, “Recipe for Failure: Major General Edward M. 
Almond and Preparation of the U.S. 92
nd
 Infantry Division for Combat in World War II,” in The 
Journal of Military History that the 92
nd
 ID had a “Mississippian as division commander, South 
Carolinian as artillery commander – and assistant division commander Virginian (Edward) 
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  In his interview in 1974, General Almond was asked if he was selected for the 
leadership position of the 92
nd
 ID because he was from the south.  Almond stated that it was true 
that he was selected because he “had an understanding of southern customs and Negro 
capabilities.
231
  General William P. Ennis Jr. commented that besides being southern men, the 
leaders of the 92
nd
 ID also shared a common bond by being graduates of the Virginia Military 
Institute.  General Ennis stated; “I think the only reason the VMI got picked for this job is that, in 
theory, they knew more about handling Negroes than anybody else, though I can’t imagine why, 
because (Almond) just despised the ground they walked on.”
232
  Although Almond was not 
sympathetic to African Americans, this should not suggest that all southern officers were bad 
officers or racist.   
     Occasionally a white southern officer would be chosen because he was from the south and the 
officer would perform exceptionally well and receive the respect of the African American 
soldiers that he led.  This was the case with Colonel Buckner M. Creel – a respected officer with 
a decorated war record.  Besides being from the South, Colonel Creel came from a long line of 





Cavalry, his grand-father was a major general in World War I, and great-great grandfather had 
fought in the Civil War.  Colonel Creel could also trace ancestors to the War of 1812 and one 
that fought for General Washington in the Revolutionary War.  Yet, when Colonel Creel was 
asked why he was chosen as a replacement officer in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment during the 
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Korean War he replied: 
          I was told that there was an urgent need for combat experienced infantry company   
          commanders in that regiment.  I fit the bill; they also noted that I was born in the South.  I  
          was told that meant that I probably could better handle black troops than officers hailing  
          from other areas of the USA.”  Colonel Creel noted, “It seemed to mean nothing that my  
          father was an RA officer and I that I was an Army brat.
233
   
      
     The Army preferred personnel issues to be clear and concise and once the decision was made 
that white officers assigned to black units should be from the south the bureaucracy of the Army 
attempted to make that the reality.  
     What seems obvious for anyone in the 21
st
 Century is that white officers who grew up in the 
south with the culture of segregation and second-class status for African Americans would most 
likely bring their cultural baggage with them when they led black troops, was not apparent to the 
Army during the Korean War.  The fact, as Neil Sheehan noted in the A Bright Shining Lie, was 
that “the Southerners who had dominated the Army officer corps since their return during the 
Spanish American War had been denigrating black combat units for a half century” and were 
more often than not the cause of racism in the military.
234
  Just as problematic as any pre-
conceived notions that white southern officers might have held regarding their black soldiers was 
what white officers thought leading black soldiers would do to their careers in the military.  
White officers, not just those from the south, viewed leading black soldiers as punishment.   
Assignment of White Officer to Black units – Punishment? 
     One 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran Al Brooks believed that the 24
th
 was a “penal regiment 
for white officers who had screwed up.  This was their last chance.”  Brooks said that he had 
been asked by other white officers why he was in the 24
th
; the implication, what had he done to 
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deserve that punishment?  Brooks said that in his opinion some of the white officers in the 24
th
 
were not very good; “we had guys there in (the regiment) who were bad news” and the “bad guys 
of the regiment were all white.”
235
  Tom Bowers also remembered the reaction he received from 
his fellow white officers when he found out that he had been assigned to the all-black 159
th
 Field 
Artillery.  Bowers said before he went to his new unit he talked with some other newly arrived 
white officers “who laughed when they heard of his assignment.”  Bowers said that “the majority 
didn’t think highly of black units and had pity on him for his assignment.”  Bowers was from 
Massachusetts and had limited exposure to African Americans prior to his assignment to the 
159
th
, a variation from the norm, but also a blessing since he went into the assignment with an 
open mind and was able to gain the respect of his men.
236
 
     The identification of assignment to a black unit as punishment, or at the very least, not a 
career enhancing assignment can be traced back to the inter-war years.  In 1926 one of the white 
officers selected for command in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was a young Army officer named 
Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Eisenhower biographer Jean Smith observed that in 1926 “assignment 
to the 24
th
 Infantry – the old Deuce Four – was scarcely a career-enhancing move” and “few of 
whom relished their posting.”
237
  Unlike most officers assigned to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, 
Eisenhower was able to escape the placement because of friends in high places.  In this particular 
instance it was his friendship with General Fox Connor.  On December 15, 1926, less than five 
months from his original posting to Fort Benning and the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
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Eisenhower received orders assigning him to the American Battle Monuments Commission 
under the direction of General of the Armies John J. Pershing – from his biographer’s viewpoint 
a significant step up from his previous assignment.  Smith remarked; “… to assign the honor 
graduate of the Command and General Staff School as executive officer of a unit of support 
troops at Fort Benning made no sense whatever.  If not punitive, it was certainly myopic.”
238
        
     Eisenhower wasn’t the only white officer to believe that assignment to an African American 
unit was viewed by [big-Army] as a punishment.  E. T. Hall, a white officer who served with 
black units observed that: “… although some white officers who had charge of black units were 
conscientious and treated black soldiers and sailors with respect, many harbored deep racial 
prejudices.  These officers did not want to be where they were, and they regarded assignment to 
a black (unit) as a career setback.”  Hall stated the common belief among white officers was that 
“such a post in a black unit was widely regarded as an indication that a white officer lacked the 
competence to command whites.”  The resulting resentment “affected officers’ conduct” and that 
poor unit performance could be traced to “the fact that, almost without exception, white officers 
did not desire to serve with Negro troops.”  In Hall’s experience, “officers transferred to our unit 
who expressed a definite prejudice against Negroes were never good officers.”
239
  Some of these 
officers with a definite prejudice also did not disguise their racial views. 
     24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran Jesse James recalled that at Sasebo, Japan, they had a 
Lieutenant named Goodwin who transferred to their unit from the 7
th
 Infantry Regiment.  James 
said everyone in his unit knew early on that Lt. Goodwin didn’t want to be there.  Goodwin made 
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racist remarks such as “you boys” and “damn niggers; I don’t want to be around them.”
240
  Not 
surprisingly, Lt. Goodwin was not well received by his troops and was subsequently shipped off 
to another unit. 
     The problem of racist and poor officers was not just an issue with the junior officers; other 
African American veterans of the 24
th
 noted that senior officers came to the regiment after 
having been passed up for other prime assignments.  Lt. Bussey recalled that “we had drunks.  
We had whore hoppers. We had the poorest quality of field grade officer that could be found.”
241
  
Some of these officers referenced by Lt. Bussey will be discussed further in Chapter IV.   
     Sometimes, finding a commanding officer for the 24
th
 could prove troublesome.  Early in the 
Korean War, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment had received such a bad reputation for failure and racial 
strife that when Commander of the Eighth Army, Lt. Gen. Walton Walker sought a replacement 
Colonel for the unit, one prospective colonel commented about the meeting with General 
Walker; “he wanted me to take over the all black 24
th
 regiment.  Nobody, including me, wanted 




   
     In his volume of the OCMH history of the Korean War, Disaster in Korea: The Chinese 
Confront, Roy Appleman was one of the few historians to take the opposite view of the white 
officers assigned to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Appleman claimed that for the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment’s, “officers … were white and were handpicked from among the top performers in the 
U.S. Army.”
243
  Appleman based this claim on an interview he had with Colonel John Corley, 
the commanding officer of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea during 1950-1951, but did not 
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  Appleman may have been right that the officers for the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment were “handpicked” but as we will see they were with only a few exceptions “top 
performers” in the Army. 
     Another possible interpretation for Appleman’s view that the officers for the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment were “handpicked” would be that some of the officers who either requested or were 
selected for assignment with the 24
th
 were motivated by ambition.  It would appear that General 
Almond’s selection to lead the 92
nd
 Infantry Division in World War II was partly motivated by 
his motivation to make a name for himself and to get experience as a Division commander.  This 
leads us to the next question; is it possible for an officer to be too ambitious in war?   
Dealing with Ambitious White Officers 
     To address adequately the question one needs first to define ‘ambition’ within the context of 
an Army officer’s career.  Ambition in this context does not necessarily refer to zealously 
executing the orders of one’s superior officer or the exhibition of personal bravery.  Career 
ambition by officers in this context can refer to an officer seeking to achieve a certain battlefield 
reputation which will enhance his chances for further promotion.  The profession of arms is one 
of the unusual careers whereby the risking of life (occasionally one’s own, but for an officer, 
more often others’) is sometimes the key to further success and promotion.  This could 
occasionally cause problems for a military organization.  Max Hastings noted in The Korean 
War that “senior commanders in Korea also faced serious difficulty in checking the ambitions of 
professional soldiers who came to the country bent upon achieving a battlefield reputation.”  
According to Hastings, “there were not a few American major generals who arrived to take over 
divisions for a tour in the line and had to be decisively checked in their determination to mount 
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an attack in order to further their own reputations.”
245
  While Hastings was more focused on the 
senior officers, the junior officer ranks could be just as cut-throat for officers to make a name for 
themselves.   
     Many of the junior officers sent to Korea were part of the Army reserve and were vying for a 
position as a regular Army officer, especially the white junior officers assigned to the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment.  The Army during the Korean War decided that to select only the best 
officers for full-time active duty status they needed a process to “weed out” the less desirable 
officers.  As part of the weeding out process the Army created what was referred to as the 
“Competitive Tour Program.”  Through this program officers would be rotated into combat 
positions for a set period of time so they could be evaluated regarding their battlefield 
leadership.
246
  This created in many instances a sense of urgency by the junior officers to “prove” 
their leadership ability so that they can move along in the process for a full-time active duty 
officer billet.  For the soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, the ambition of these white officers 
was seen as especially problematic since the black soldiers were already wary of any racial 
motives influencing a white officer’s orders. 
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Johnson, and John Zanin.    
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White Officers: Fear of Failure 
     Although many of the white officers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment wanted to create a 
reputation for themselves on the battlefield, they also desired to avoid receiving the blame for 
any failures within the unit that could mar their careers.  Military failure of a unit could be  
devastating to the career of a military officer, as was demonstrated in the case of Colonel Paul L. 
Freeman during the initial phase of the Korean War.  His actions on the night of November 30, 
1950 led to a long and bitter battle between him and other military leaders about his reputation as 
a leader.   
     On that fateful night a Chinese Offensive swept down the west side of the Korean peninsula 
and caught the Army completely off-guard.  The ensuing panic as units attempted to retreat from 
the onslaught created several choke points along roads the Army was using to move men and 
material south.  The 2
nd
 Infantry Division was ordered by General Keiser to move down the 
Sunchon road and Colonel Freeman’s 23
rd
 Infantry Regiment was to be the rearguard for the 
movement.  Although the issue is clouded by different recollections of those involved, the best 
evidence indicated that Colonel Freeman was provided some leeway as to how he carried out the 
withdrawal of his troops.  Fearing the total destruction of the 23
rd
 Infantry Regiment by the 
Chinese, Colonel Freeman led his men down an alternate road from the 2
nd
 Infantry Division – 
thus exposing the 2
nd
 ID to near annihilation by the enemy.  Appleman observed in Disaster in 
Korea, that as a result of the separation of the 23
rd
 Infantry Regiment from the 2
nd
 Infantry 
Division, there was considerable “condemnation of Colonel Freeman for not following the 2
nd
 
Division down the Sunchon road as its rear guard.”  Colonel Freeman became almost overnight a 
pariah among the officer corps in the Eight Army and the negative opinion of him as an officer 
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“was very strong and quite widespread in the 2
nd
 Infantry Division and in Eighth Army.”
247
  
Despite Colonel Freeman’s attempt to rehabilitate his reputation – the actions of November 30, 
1950 would follow him throughout his career.
248
  Ultimately the blame for the destruction of the 
2
nd
 Infantry Division was assigned to General Keiser and he was relieved of command. 
     In the case of an officer leading African American troops, military failure could be blamed on 
the racial composition of one’s soldier.  Perhaps if Colonel Freeman’s 23
rd
 Infantry Regiment 
had been composed of black troops he might have been able to avert some of the criticism as was 
the case with General Almond in Italy during World War II.  General Almond explained during 
his interview in 1974 that after the 92
nd
 ID operation at Cinquale Canal the “failure” of the 
operation was reported all the way up the chain-of-command to General Marshall.  According to 
Almond, because of the “failure” of the black troops at Cinquale Canal (note: not the failure of 
the division’s leaders) General Marshall decided to reorganize the 92
nd
 ID by introducing an 
attachment of the famous Japanese-American 442
nd
 Infantry Regiment to the 92
nd
 ID.  Almond 
reconstructed how the conversation went with General Marshall: 
          When General Marshall arrived at my command post, he looked at me with an eagle eye  
          and said, “You have had a heck of a time in the last two weeks, haven’t you?”  I said,  
          “Yes, General, you can rely on that.”  He then said, “If you had some re-organization in  
          this division, would it help you if I sent the Japanese-American unit known as the 442
nd
  
          Infantry Regiment to be attached to this Division?”  I said, “Anything you did in that  
          manner would help me … I understand that this regiment is very reliable in a combat  
          way.”  General Marshall said, “Then that will be done.  You can expect them to arrive  
          within the next 10 days from the Seventh Army area in France.”
249
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     In General Almond’s conversation with General Marshall one can almost hear Almond’s 
guffaws when General Marshall remarked that he “had a heck of a time in the last two weeks.”  
What is most remarkable about this conversation was that had the 92
nd
 ID been a white unit then 
Almond’s meeting with General Marshall would have ended with Almond’s relief from 
command – along with most of his senior subordinate commanders.  Instead, Almond’s failed 
leadership was rewarded with the addition of one of the most highly decorated fighting units in 
the European Theater, the 442
nd
 Infantry Regiment. 
High Turn-Over of Officers in Black Units 
     Another condition found in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea and other African American 
units was the high turn-over of white officers within the unit.  As with the unwritten policy of 
assigning white officers from the south to lead black units, the frequency with which white 
officers were rotated in and out of black units begs the question of whether this was an 
intentional Army policy at the time.  This situation manifesting quick rotation clearly had 
negative consequences for the unit as a whole. 
     As white replacement officers were assigned to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, each officer 
would have had to earn the respect of the men.  At the same time, the black soldiers would need 
to learn what their officer expected.  Each individual has their own unique twist on leadership; 
some officers can be micromanagers while others are comfortable delegating assignments to the 
other junior officers and NCOs.  The time it takes for an officer to adjust to a new unit and for 
the men to adjust to their new officer varies with the personalities of each officer, through the 
uncertainties and vagaries of combat the “feeling out” process can take even longer.  While it is 
expected that in war there will by necessity of combat casualties be a certain level of turn-over in 
officer ranks – the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment seemed to have an unusually high turn-over rate 
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among junior and senior officers.  An article in the Los Angeles Times in 1989 observed that, 
“During the first three months the regiment (24
th
 Infantry Regiment) was in Korea, there were 13 
changes of battalion commanders – an average of one a month in the three battalions – and even 
more rapid turnover at the company commander level.”  To make matters worse, as was widely 
noted, the “regiment’s excellent, combat hardened noncommissioned officer corps was 
decimated in the early fighting and was replaced by less experienced men.”
250
  This turn-over 
would negatively affect any combat unit, but with the added pressure placed on the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment through segregation – turn-over created a vacuum of leadership that even the best 
officers could barely manage. 
     Part of the problem with officer turn-over was due to the Competitive Tour program already 
discussed, but the other was due to segregation itself.  The authors of Black Soldier White Army 
noted; “The desire to maintain racial segregation among company officers, the abrupt 
impositions of so many unfamiliar officers and the adaptations soldiers had to make to the 
standards and styles of the new commander intensified problems of leadership and discipline 
already present within the regiment.”
251
  One of the units in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment that 
struggled under the burden of high officer turn-over was C Company.   
     C Company early in the Korean War suffered a high ratio of officer and NCO casualties.  
Soon, men of C Company were demonstrating their distrust of military leadership with their feet 
– moving to the rear without orders, i.e. “straggling.”  The Regiment attempted to staunch the 
degradation of unit cohesion and discipline with a steady flow of new officers.  Stuart G. Force 
recalled that one of the new officers was Captain Lawrence M. Corcoran.  Stuart said “several 
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officers and men who served under him believed that he tried hard to lead his men, but just 
didn’t know how.”  Captain Corcoran was also handicapped, according to Force, by having a 
NCO named Paulfrey “who was superb in garrison, but a coward in combat.”
252
  Force said that 
“in Korea people came and went so fast I think the soldier never got to know their leaders.”  
Despite Captain Corcoran’s best efforts C Company struggled with unit cohesion.  As Force 
noted, in his opinion the problem was that Captain Corcoran just didn’t know how to lead the 
men of C Company.  Captain Corcoran had been dealt a difficult hand by receiving command of 
a company that was already frayed and undisciplined, but had he perhaps known how to handle 
the “problem” soldiers of C Company it might have turned out differently.  As was the case with 
many of the junior officers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, by the time Captain Corcoran started to 
“learn the ropes” and establish a relationship with his men, he was rotated out and replaced by 
another white officer. 
     Although there was not a paper trail per se indicating a specific policy by the Army to 
purposefully rotate white officers in and out of black units quickly, there was some foundation in 
the Army records supporting this as a possible solution to “improve” the capability of black 
units.  During the Gillem Board, one of the witnesses, Colonel William McCaffrey, General 
Almond’s Chief-of-Staff in Korea and regimental CO in Italy with the 92
nd
 ID purposed to the 
board that the rotation of white officers in black units would benefit the Army and the officers.  
Colonel McCaffrey said unequivocally: “Rotation of white officers assigned to Negro units is 
advisable from a morale standpoint and will provide a larger group of white officers with 
experience of Negro units.”
253
  His assertion lacked a timeline for these rotations, but the 
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implication was that the rotations be of limited duration.  The clear problem with this proposal as 
made evident by the experience of soldiers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was that it limited the 
ability of an officer to get a sense of close connection with his unit, a dilemma which negatively 
impacted both the officer and his men.   
Common Complaints among White Officers in Black Units 
     Besides the common belief among white officers in World War II and Korea that assignment 
to a black unit was looked at as a punishment, or at best not career enhancing, there were other 
misconceptions by white officers that colored their impression of serving with African American 
troops.  These complaints ranged from the more benign, such as black soldiers recklessly 
disregard equipment, to the more serious, that white officers are more likely to be killed when 
leading black troops.  Judging by the interviews conducted with numerous 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment veterans and Korean War veterans in general, these complaints by white officers were 
prevalent and were responsible for a number of white officers either attempting to avoid service 
with black units or causing a change in their leadership when forced to lead black troops. 
Black Soldiers Disregard Equipment 
     The racial stereotype of African American soldiers was not formed overnight as has been 
previously discussed.  It was a stereotype that was developed during two world wars and was in 
the process of being recycled for the war in Korea.  A common complaint among white officers 
was that black soldiers were reckless and careless with the maintenance of their equipment and 
would “ditch gear” at the first round of hostile fire.  Lieutenant Pidgeon, the 2
nd
 Battalion’s 
supply officer reported what he believed was a case of recklessly disregarding equipment by a 
group of black soldiers in July of 1950 – still in the early phase of the North Korean assault on 
the South.   
121 
 
     As Lieutenant Pidgeon related, a machine-gun section from his unit’s heavy weapons platoon 
was ordered to move to the rear.  When the group set out, they had two machine-guns.  However, 
according to Lieutenant Pidgeon, when the group reached their destination the machine-guns 
were gone.  Lieutenant Pidgeon reported that the group had not encountered hostile fire, and the 
only conclusion he could make was “that the men had abandoned both guns rather than endure 
the inconvenience and discomfort of having to carry them over a distance.”
254
  Over the course 
of the next month, Lieutenant Pidgeon reported that his battalion lost all seventeen of its assigned 
heavy and light .30 caliber machine guns and half of its eight .50 caliber machine guns.  
Lieutenant Pidgeon stated that he only saw one weapon that showed damage consistent with it 
being hit or destroyed by enemy fire. 
     Lieutenant Pidgeon’s report was striking and at first glance would appear to demonstrate that 
his men were derelict in their duty to protect their weapons.  However, Lieutenant Pidgeon was a 
white officer with definite racial bias.  On one occasion Lieutenant Pidgeon told an inspector 
general, “Have you ever seen the pictures of ‘Step-and-Fetchit’ where (the actor’s) eyes were 
sticking out?” – referring to the antics of a popular black actor during the 1940s that played to 
white prejudices, “That is what they (his black soldiers) reminded me of.”
255
   
     The question that should have been asked by Army officials if the reports of equipment loss 
were true: where was Lieutenant Pidgeon and the other officers of the battalion when all of this 
equipment loss was taking place?  It is the officer’s responsibility and duty to ensure that the 
men under their command are following orders and maintaining good discipline and order. 
White Officers More Vulnerable to Injury or Death 
     Another prevalent complaint by white officers was that leading black soldiers made them 
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more vulnerable to injury or death than white officers leading white troops.  One of the officers 
interviewed for Project Clear opined that the reason the casualty rate for officers in his regiment 
was so high was because as one of his white officers led black soldiers in combat the officer was 
“forced to expose himself unnecessarily in order to try and direct his men, control their erratic 
fire, and do the duties that are normally taken care of by an NCO (Non-Commissioned 
Officer).”
256
  The implication of the Major’s statement was that black soldiers were hesitant to 
engage with the enemy or conduct effective counter-fire in the heat of battle.   
     The other commonly held view by white officers was that if they were wounded in combat 
they would be abandoned by black enlisted men to die on the battlefield.  This was a viewpoint 
that had been relayed in several inter-war Army studies and repeated by white officers with 
experience leading black troops during World War II.  General Almond cited a case where he 
alleged that one of his junior officers in the 92
nd
 ID was left to die on the battlefield by his black 
troops.  According to Almond, during the fall of 1944 one of his best lieutenants, Lieutenant 
Birdsong (who was actually an African American officer), was deserted by his patrol while 
leading the men through a precarious position in the Apennine Mountains.  The area the patrol 
was attempting to navigate was controlled by the enemy and the patrol ended up getting cut-off 
from their own front lines.  Almond said, “The people who were with him on this patrol deserted 
him and left him to his fate, which was death in the immediate future.  Those who ran had 
abandoned their leader in combat.”  Almond concluded that Lieutenant Birdsong’s black troops 
“deserted him because they were afraid of their own future and disregardful of their comrade.”
257
  
Almond implied in his statement that black soldiers may have acted out of fear, but that the 
soldier’s “cowardice” was a trait characteristic of the African American – one of several 
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common misconceptions continued throughout the inter-war years and into the Korean War 
among many of the white officers in the Army.  Some white officers felt that they would be 
abandoned by their black troops in combat as a type of reverse racism. 
     Colonel Corley, one of the commanding officers for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in Korea, 
reportedly informed one of his white lieutenants, Philip Harper, that he was not “leading white 
troops” and that if he was “ever wounded, you’re dead.  These men will never bring you down 
the hill.”
258
  The inference was that either black soldiers’ racial bias was just as strong towards 
their white officers or that black soldiers were unwilling to risk their life for that of a white 
officer. 
     The question that should have been asked was: did hard evidence exist that white officer 
casualty rates were higher among white officer leading black troops than white officers leading 
white troops?  Casualty rates for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment’s white officers as compared to other 
units did appear to be greater.  However, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment also saw more combat in the 
initial stages of the Korean War then comparable white units.  Another factor to be considered 
was that the appearance of a white officer amongst black soldiers in combat could be 
problematic for the well-being of that white officer for no other reason than his skin color made 
him stand out in a group of black soldiers. 
     Clinton Moorman, a black soldier with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment realized quickly once in 
Korea that in combat a black officer on the battlefield directing black soldiers “could blend in.” 
But the “white guy stood out like a sore thumb.”  Moorman observed, “So, you know, they 
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(white officers) could get pinpointed a lot easier.  That was kind of unfair to them also.”
259
  
Colon R. Britt, another veteran of the 24
th
 observed, “the North Koreans knew that the white 
soldiers where the leaders.  Many white officers became casualties, especially replacements.”  
Britt recalled that in an attempt to blend in with their men better, some white officers “used 
camouflage paint on their faces.”
260
  
     Another distinct possibility for white officer casualties could be the quality of the officers 
themselves.  A comparison of casualty rates among two different companies of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment provides evidence that officer proficiency was a key factor in determining casualty 
rates among officers and NCOs.  Company B of the 24
th
, which was considered to be one of the 
most reliable units early in the war, also had one of the lowest casualty rates among officers of 
any company in the regiment.  For Company B there were 26 casualties among the officers and 
NCOs, compared with 80 for Company C, and the other companies ranged from 44 to 60.
261
   
     The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as a whole had gotten off to an inauspicious start when their 
executive officer, Lt. Col James B. Bennett, upon arrival to Korea with the men of the 24
th 
had to 
be evacuated for medical reasons.  According to the authors of Black Soldier White Army, this 




     A third possibility for white officer casualties was the lack of training of African American 
units like the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment prior to their introduction to combat in Korea.  Numerous 
black soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment reported that while they were stationed in Japan 
prior to the Korean War their time was filled with parade drilling for reviews for visiting 
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dignitaries and athletic competitions, and they spent little time in training for combat activities.  
     The white officers in charge of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were also woefully unprepared for 
leading men in combat.  24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran Wilbur T. Felkey commented that the, 
“24
th
 definitely didn’t have the officer leadership that they needed and that this caused high 
casualties.”  Felkey observed that what little training they had received in Japan was not combat 
training.  Felkey provided a case in point for how inadequately prepared some of the officers 
were for real combat.  In Korea one of Felkey’s commanders directed that a bonfire be built as a 
marker for an aerial resupply.  Felkey tried to point out to his commanding officer that the 
placement of the bonfire would give away their position to the enemy, but his commander 
refused to listen.  Felkey said, despite the risk of causing potentially dire consequences for 
himself and his fellow soldiers, he somehow “was never able to get that bonfire lit.”
263
  
     Over the course of the numerous interviews conducted under Project Clear during the Korean 
War a pattern emerged regarding the opinions of the white officer’s regarding the combat 
efficacy of black soldiers and especially the soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  The Project 
Clear findings found that in reports “largely from white officers in the regiment (24
th
)” the 
common assertion was that: 
          Negro troops are unreliable in combat, particularly on the defensive and at night … that  
          they leave positions suddenly, without adequate warning to the troops protecting their  
          flanks; that they are prone to sudden panic and hysteria; that they are frequently  
          malingerers and that, in summary the regiment is a handicap to the United Nations war  
          effort.
264
 
      
     At the beginning of the war in Korea the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was thrown into combat 
quickly, and without question the regiment as a whole was ill-prepared.  However, the 24
th
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Regiment was far from the only military unit early in the Korean War to suffer major set-backs 
at the first contact with enemy units.  The story of the Korean War from June, 1950 until at least 
September, 1950 when the Army finally regained its sense of balance and MacArthur planned 
his counter-punch with the invasion of Inchon was one of withdrawals, surrender, and defeat on 
the battlefield.  However, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment appeared to be singled out for particular 
blame because of its racial composition.  
     As early as September 9, 1950, General Kean, commander of the 25
th
 Division, wrote to 
General Walker, commander of Eighth Army, that “it is my opinion that the 24
th
 Infantry has 
demonstrated in combat that it is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected 
of an infantry regiment.”  General Kean noted that, there “are a number of individuals in the 24
th
 
Infantry who have been and are performing their duties in a credible manner” but their actions 
have been “completely nullified by the actions of the majority.”
265
  General Kean probably felt 
the need to insert the caveat that some members of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were performing 
in a “credible manner” because he would have been well aware of the actions of men such as 
Private First Class William H. Thompson – a soldier who died holding his position so other men 
could withdrawal and who would subsequently be the first African American to receive the 
Medal of Honor since the Spanish-American War. 
     Some criticisms of black soldiers’ skills were clearly nothing more than sad attempts to 
portray anything black soldiers did in a negative light.  One such example was Captain Johnson’s 
story about his men’s attempt to open a safe.  According to Captain Johnson, when his men came 
across a bank in one of the Korean towns they liberated, they discovered a medium to large safe 
inside the bank.  Captain Johnson said that “during the night it couldn’t be readily opened so two 
                                                          
265
 Bowers, Hammond, MacGarrigle, Black Soldier White Army, 175. 
127 
 
anti-tank mines were placed against it and blown.  In the still of the night the safe went through 
the roof of the bank building.”  As if to put his take on the episode into focus, Captain Johnson 
noted sarcastically, “these guys can’t even rob a safe without messing it up!”
266
  Despite the 
patently ridiculous criticisms of the Captain Johnson’s of the time, there was one criticism cited 
by white officers in Korea about their black troops that had a twinge of credibility.  That charge 
concerned what the military referred to as “straggling.” 
Black Soldiers Prone to “Straggle” 
     The word “Straggle” is defined under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 134, as 
the “means to wander away, to stray, to become separated from, or to lag or linger behind.”
267
  
Simply defined, straggling is the movement of troops towards the rear and away from their 
assigned positions without orders.  It is differentiated by “desertion” in that the “straggling” is 
only a temporary action by the troops where desertion implies that the soldier has no intent to 
ever return to the lines.  That some African American soldiers in Korea, and specifically men of 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, did on occasion straggle is without doubt.  According to 2
nd
 
Battalion’s adjutant, black 1
st
 Lieutenant Gorham L. Black Jr., “at least one hundred and fifty 
men deserted their positions” during combat around Sangju, Korea.  The problem was so 
endemic that the 24
th
 set up a “straggler control point on the main road, 1.5 miles west of 
Sangju” to round up the men that were moving to the rear.
268
  
     In some instances, the act of straggling was codified by soldiers in the 24
th
 to nearly a ritual.  
Charles Green provided his recollection of what was referred to by the men of Company C as 
“Tam Time.”  While the company was being probed by enemy attacks, some men began to move 
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to the rear, leaving Captain Corcoran and other soldiers behind to fight on their own.  Green said 
this “leaving” without permission was referred to in the regiment as “Tam Time” which meant 
“time to go.”  Green said it occurred mainly when a fight was “in the offing or had begun, or 
after dark.”
269
  Colonel Buckner M. Creel described his first encounter with “Tam Time” while 
he was with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment: 
          When I first arrived, some troops left their positions to go down from the hill; they  
          normally did so in ones and twos – no mass “bug-out.”  One night I heard a whispered  
          voice say “TT-TL” I was told by a soldier next to me that meant “tam time, travel light!”   
          He said that earlier, the code-word for taking off was “hat time.”  On the day I was  
          wounded, about half the company left their positions without permission and went down  
          Battle Mountain.  Those around me and which I could control generally stayed.  I was told  
          that the partial unauthorized withdrawal actually was a big improvement.
270
    
      
     Straggling was not an issue that was unique to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment or to black soldiers, 
for large numbers of white soldiers could be found making their way to the rear without orders to 
do so, especially in the early days of the Korean War, or when units were overwhelmed by 
enemy forces as was the case in the winter of 1950 when Chinese forces entered the fray en-
mass.  The problem of straggling in black units was that some of the white officers interpreted 
the action of black soldier’s straggling as having to do with the soldier’s race.  Major Carson told 
Eighth Army investigators “I think that when (the men of the 24
th
) … become scared they react 
with an animal instinct which is to run.”  Carson, perhaps realizing that he was generalizing 
about the entire black race provided a caveat to his observation by adding, “I am not saying that 
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all the men are like that.  Five or ten percent are not, but I am saying that there is about 85 or 90 
percent that do react this way … These people are different in instincts.”
271
    
     Although a large number of white officers throughout the Army in Korea believed that black 
soldiers were more prone to straggling, in reality the black soldiers of the 24
th
 did not 
disproportionately straggle as supported by several senior leaders of the 24
th
.  Colonel John B. 
Zanin, the commander of the 3
rd
 battalion of the 24
th
, stated “there was certainly some straggling 
in the 3
rd
 Battalion, but often when he gave the stragglers a forceful command to return to their 
position, they would comply.”  Colonel Zanin also observed after reviewing the War Diary for 
3/24 on the night of July 7, 1950 – one of the particular nights in which “straggling” was 
reported to be exceptionally high – on that particular occasion “it was his feeling that the 3/24 
was being sacrificed to cover the pull back of the other units of the regiment.”
272
  Colonel Zanin 
implied that if men feel they are being “sacrificed” needlessly by Army commanders it is natural 
for the soldiers to consider straggling as a means of survival.  Further, Colonel Zanin reported 
that reports of straggling were often exaggerated by officers. 
     One of those officers that Colonel Zanin thought was “exaggerating” might have been Price 
Mosher, a platoon leader with the 519
th
 MP.  Mosher told interviewers from the Center of 
Military history that at Chorwan, Korea, “there were about 300-400 24
th
 soldiers many of whom 
had no helmets, etc. who were breaking and running.”  The interviewer from the Center of 
Military History was not impressed with Mosher’s testimony and next to his quote about mass 
straggling by men from the 24
th
 the interviewer wrote – “his credibility is zilch!”
273
  
Unfortunately, the consequences of repeated allegations of straggling can take a toll on the 
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morale of a unit.  The men of the 24
th
 were still sensitive fifty years after the fact by these 
allegations.  When asked about what he witnessed in Korea relating to straggling and men 
“breaking and running,” Gray Johnson, a chaplain with the 24
th
 reacted; “I feel anger.  If we took 
a hill there was no one on it; if we lost it we broke and ran (interviewer note: begins to weep).  
There were rumors then and it wasn’t true.  I saw too many of them stretched out.  I saw too 
many kids die.”
274
  In Gray Johnson’s memory, straggling was just another way that racist Army 
officials attempted to denigrate the black soldiers’ war record.   
     The question that the Army should have asked when reports of straggling by members of the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment arose was; does segregation create an environment where straggling 
becomes more acceptable by the rank and file soldier?  As implied by Colonel Zanin, if troops 
feel that they are being “sacrificed” does not that negatively affect morale?  Does not the 
institution of segregation encroach on the feeling of self worth of each individual black soldier?   
     Further, does not the act of segregating replacement troops based on race negatively affect a 
unit’s effectiveness and increase the possibility of straggling.  Historian Bernand Nalty observed; 
“Racial segregation required that black soldiers replace blacks, and initially, few trained 
noncommissioned officers, weapons specialists, or even riflemen were available in the Far East 
or the United States, for that matter.”
275
  If the Army sent an untrained cook to the front was it 
really that surprising that when faced with the enemy that soldier might decide “flight” was 
better than “fight” for his continued survival.  The ineffectiveness of the replacement system for 
soldiers in Korea under a segregated system, discussed later in this chapter, was notorious. 
     Instead of investigating these reports of straggling and trying to resolve the issue through 
better leadership, or through an analysis of the replacement system for soldiers to black units, the 
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Army ignored the issue as just another example of the inferiority of black troops.  Someone in 
the Army even decided to have some fun with it and coined a new phrase to describe the 
activities of members of the 24
th
 that straggled – “Bug-Out.” 
“Bug-Out” and “Bug-Out Boogie” 
     On September 21, 1976, the popular T.V. series M*A*S*H featured an hour long special to 
debut the series’ fifth season.  The title of the hour long episode was “Bug Out.”  The episode 
featured members of the fictitious 4077
th
 Medical Detachment having to quickly pack their camp 
and move towards the rear to avoid the oncoming North Korean forces, Hence the title, “Bug 
Out.” 
     The word “Bug-Out” was added to the English lexicon during the Korean War through 
American media reports that used the term to describe U.S. forces being forced to withdrawal 
under the pressure of enemy forces.  In the United States in the early 1950s the word became a 
household term.  But for the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment the term gained a more 
significant meaning since “Bug Out” was used as a pejorative to describe the actions of African 
American soldiers in combat.  Appleman in Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur 
suggested that the term originated in Japan prior to the Korean War and was used frequently by 
members of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment to describe someone who had gone Absent Without 
Leave (AWOL).  Appleman stated: “It suggested the way bugs and insects would scurry 
frantically, seeking cover, when their shelter of a rock or a log was turned over.”  In Korea, 
according to Appleman, the term was used to “mean that soldiers or a unit just simply ran away 
when confronted by an enemy force. The troops bugged out without fighting.”
276
  Lyle Rishell 
who was a white officer with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment said that from “Bug Out” the term 
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evolved to “Bugout fever” and from there to the idea that members of the 24
th
 “sat around 




     Bradley Biggs, a member of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, wrote in an article titled “Were 
Blacks Scapegoats for Our Failures in Korea” that “white racists in and out of the military” cited 
the song “Bugout Boogie” to “denigrate black performance in Korea.”
278
  The term “Bug-Out” 
and the song “Bugout Boogie” were embraced by several senior white officers as a way of 
demonstrating the inferiority of black soldiers.  On June 16, 1951 a Saturday Evening Post 
article quoted an anonymous battalion commander – later identified as Colonel Blair – who 
described the action he reportedly witnessed first-hand of black soldiers from the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment.  Blair stated: “All three companies broke at once.  The men fled like rabbits across the 
great open field.”  Blair continued that later the black soldiers were signing the “Bugout 
Boogie.”  According to Gerald Astor, the song started with the lyrics; “When them Chinese 
mortars begins to thud.  The old Deuce-four began to bug.”
279
   
     Bradley Biggs stated that “there was a bug-out song.  But actually it was just another type of 
black blues song” and that “whites ignored the fact that blacks have long made humor of misery 
and failure.  The joking attitude was misread and misinterpreted as black cowardice.”
280
  
Regrettably for the black soldiers of the 24
th
, the moniker “Bug-Out” stuck with them.  The 
authors of Black Soldier White Army observed that the 24
th
 Regiment’s newspaper Eagle Flight 
had to be renamed Eagle Forward after jokers in white units mocked the original name as being 
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  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran Floyd Johnson recalled 
that “he had heard talk about (not) getting around the 24
th
 because they would bug-out and that 






     In the face of such intense criticism it is hard to imagine the African American soldiers being 
able to press onward and fight effectively.  However, the record of the men of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment and other black units in Korea demonstrated that black soldiers were not helpless in 
the face of withering criticism and racism.  There existed ways and means that black troops 
could express their dissatisfaction with inadequate white leadership. 
Black Soldiers’ Responses to inadequate White Leadership 
     Black soldiers in Korea, particularly the members of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, were 
exposed to a range of behavior by their white officers.  Sometimes, the white officers conducted 
themselves commendably and the men respected them and followed them without question.  
Some of these officers will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.  But sometimes the white 
officers allowed their prejudices to come through or were just simply incompetent as leaders.  In 
these instances, the black soldiers of the 24
th
 could and would demonstrate their lack of respect 
for authority by several means.  This resistance to poor leadership most often came in the form of 
mild civil disobedience but on occasion went to the other extreme – “fragging” or deliberately 
killing an officer.  
Civil Disobedience by Black Soldiers 
     Prior to deploying to Korea, the 24
th
 Regiment, First Battalion, was commanded by Lt. 
Colonel William Thomas McDaniel, a native of Florida in keeping with the assignment of 
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southern officers.  According to Leonard Kushner, Lt. Col. McDaniel “was a bigot” and his 
bigotry “was contagious among the white officers” under McDaniel’s command.
283
  The black 
soldiers of first Battalion decided that it was time to teach a lesson in leadership and used the 
opportunity of a special parade in Osaka, Japan, for Secretary of the Army Royall to seek their 
revenge.  One battalion per regiment were to be selected to participate in the parade in honor of 
Secretary Royall, and the men of the first battalion practiced extra hard to ensure their selection 
in the parade.  Then during the parade, as the battalion was preparing to pass the reviewing stand 
where Secretary Royall, General MacArthur, and the 25
th
 Division commanding general, Major 
General William B. Kean, were seated, the men of the first battalion unleashed a surprise.  At the 
order of “Eyes right,” Leonard Kushner recalled, “the battalion fell apart – slouched, out of step, 
ranks sloppy.”  Kushner stated that the plan went even better than expected because “McDaniel 
in the front didn’t realize what had happened” until after the parade when Major General Kean 
chewed him out.   
     Kushner said the battalion received a chewing out by McDaniel back at Gifu, but the 
frustrated battalion commander was unable to identify any particular person as being responsible.  
The black soldiers of first battalion through their act of civil disobedience demonstrated that a 
leader who regarded his men as inferior did so at his own peril.  Kushner added ominously the 
observation that, “fortunately McDaniel left the unit before Korea,” because “he would have 
been killed in Korea.”
284
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Power of Group 
     Another tactic the African American soldiers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment used to combat 
racism was the power of group.  Similar to the men working together during the parade in an act 
of civil disobedience, because the black soldiers were concentrated together in segregated units 
they could use their numbers to change behavior.  While one or two black soldiers alone might 
be intimidated by the racist behavior of white soldiers, it could be any entirely different story 
when white soldiers were surrounded by an entire battalion or regiment of fellow black soldiers.    
     Theodore R. Eldridge, a member of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, recalled a particular incident 
in a bath house where having the “power of group” helped him handle a couple of racist white 
soldiers.  Eldridge stated that while he was taking a bath three white soldiers walked in led by a 
Korean boy.  One of the white soldiers said, “We can’t be taking baths with niggers; do you like 
niggers?”  The Korean boy replied “Me no like niggers.”  Eldridge said that it was obvious to 
him that the Korean boy didn’t even know what he was saying.  Eldridge said that he pointed out 
to the white soldiers that “they were near an entire black regiment that would blow them away if 
they didn’t watch out.”  That was enough for one of the white soldiers to apologize and for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
moved north towards the Chinese border.  According to his Distinguished Service Cross citation, that was awarded 
posthumously, McDaniel displayed courage and leadership while the American prisoners “were suffering from 
wounds, hunger, disease, malnutrition, and the constant brutality of enemy guards.”  The citation continued: “At 
great personal danger, Lieutenant Colonel McDaniel continually interceded with the captors for food, medication, 
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others to shut up, Eldridge recalled.
285
  No doubt the authors of the 1926 Army study at the War 
College would have seized this episode as clear evidence of the “crowd psychology” among 
black troops that they warned could lead to disaster.  
Use of Chain-of-Command 
     Occasionally African American soldiers were able to use effectively the military’s chain-of-
command and official channels to redress their grievances.  The efficacy of this approach though 
was heavily dependent on getting through to an official sympathetic to the soldier’s concern or 
complaint.  Lt. William L. Jones, an African American Army officer, found himself in a difficult 
situation when on October 8, 1953, he received a form letter signed by the Adjutant General 
stating that he had been board selected for release from the Army.  After receiving this letter, Lt. 
Jones found himself being called into the office of Lt. Col. Smalley, the commanding officer of 
the 278
th
 RCT, an attachment of Jones’ unit but separate from Jones’ chain-of-command.  
Smalley recommended that Jones “resign immediately rather than wait for the orders to save 
himself the disgrace.”  Under “duress” Lt. Jones tendered his resignation.  
     Instead of passively accepting his involuntary dismissal from the service, Lt. Jones availed 
himself to an inquiry through military channels.  Through the subsequent investigation, it was 
determined that Lt. Col. Smalley, “who was not Lt. Jones’ immediate superior, had rendered an 
efficiency report on him to the special board contrary to army regulations.”
286
  Lt. Jones was then 
allowed to withdraw his resignation papers and the Adjutant General ordered Smalley to correct 
Jones’s efficiency rating, amending the evaluation to “an excellent rating,” and Lt. Jones was 
allowed to remain in the Army.  Although Lt. Jones was successful in getting his problem 
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properly handled by resorting to official military channels, more often than not the fact of being 
African American caused their complaints to fall on deaf ears.  This will be explored further in 
chapter III concerning courts-martial cases and issuance of medals to African American soldiers. 
Self-Wounding 
     Another way that some black soldiers choose to handle a poor leader was through self-
wounding.  As early as the American Civil War, the act of self-wounding has been 
acknowledged as a possibility among combat troops.  Under duress and faced with their own 
mortality, a soldier could become so disillusioned that the idea of purposefully inflicting a 
wound was seen as the only alternative to death.  That was especially operative when faced with 
immersion in combat situations over a long period of time as was the case with some units in 
World War I and World War II.  The situation becomes murky when trying to ascertain exactly 
how many injuries of combat soldiers were self-inflicted.  Even injuries that clearly show signs 
of self-infliction can be troublesome to place in the category of an intentional act of self-
wounding.  
     Under combat stress, soldiers routinely shoot themselves or their fellow soldiers without any 
ill intention.  As a result, without self-admission or eye witness corroboration most acts of self-
wounding are noted as nothing more than combat casualties.  Statistics tend to confirm that some 
members of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment would have resorted to self-wounding as a way to deal 
with a situation they viewed as hopeless.  Project Clear researchers found that “there are more 
wounds of the feet than would be expected in normal battle conditions” among black soldiers.
287
  
But there was no analysis of the number of these injuries as compared to white units.  In all of 
the interviews conducted by Project Clear and the Center of Military History there were no 
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reports of self-wounding or even the observation of an incident of self-wounding.  Perhaps there 
was a sense of understanding among these veterans about the desperation caused by combat, and 
men who intentionally injured themselves were viewed more with pity rather than anger.   
“Fragging” 
     Along the spectrum of possible action black soldiers could take when faced with poor or 
racist officers, fragging was the extreme.  To resort to “fragging” an officer was an admission of 
complete desperation and opened the soldier(s) to the possibility of a death sentence if caught.  
Similar to self-wounding, fragging was also a very difficult action to pin-point within the context 
of the battlefield.  War by its very definition is characterized by chaos, violence, and death.  
These conditions offer a variety of possibilities to a soldier contemplating the death of an officer.  
Sergeant Waymond Ransom, who did not actually resort to the “fragging” of his lieutenant, 
acknowledged that he and others in his unit had become so frustrated with the officer’s 
leadership that they had discussed that course of action before the violence of the battlefield had 
settled the issue for them with the death of the lieutenant in an ambush. 
     Charles Gregg told interviewers from the Center of Military History about some of the 
officers he remembered from the Korean War.  Gregg recalled that “P Co. Commander was a 
strong good leader – always followed orders and called himself the ‘Big Fox’ … (and) Lt. 
Teague was a good leader of the I and R platoon.”  But then Gregg stated, “Captain Steinberg of 
E Co was anti-black and was mortally wounded in his own company area.”  Gregg didn’t 
elaborate further on the death of Captain Steinberg, but left the impression that Captain Steinberg 
was a victim of a “fragging.”
288
  But was fragging an officer really something that soldiers would 
turn to out of desperation and how often?  Bruce Cummings acknowledged in his research for 
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The Korean War: A History that “several veterans have told me that they thought fragging was 
more common in Korea that in Vietnam.  I have no way of judging this matter.”
289
 
    Although the interviews of soldiers from the 24
th
 revealed that the majority of black soldiers’ 
angst was directed at white officers, there was at least one mention of black soldiers becoming so 
disgusted with a black officer that they considered fragging the black officer.  Lyle Rishell was a 
white officer assigned to lead African American soldiers during the Korean War.  Rishell 
recalled that one day he overheard a group of his men talking about a black lieutenant “who had 
ordered his platoon recklessly into some action.”  Rishell stated that the black soldiers “were 
venting their anger as they remembered the incident, and one even professed that the lieutenant 
would be one dead nigger if the officer ever crossed his path.”   
     Rishell’s take on the exchange was that “the men were willing to go all out for their 
commander, whether he was black or white, and it was clear that this officer had lost their 
respect.”
290
  Rishell stated that contrary to what he expected as a white officer leading black 
soldiers, many of the black soldiers “expressed surprise that I was white – after all, they had been 
assigned to a black unit.”  But instead of holding it against him Rishell said “there was never a 
hint of animosity as they faced me that first time.”
291
  While Rishell’s men were surprised that a 
white officer was assigned to lead them, most men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment expected that 
their officers would be mostly white.  After all, this had been the norm going back to the 1800s 
and the original “Buffalo Soldiers.”   
Assignment of Black Officers and Soldiers 
     This raises the question; how were black officers assigned in the Korean War?  How were 
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black soldiers assigned as casualties took their toll among black units?  For African American 
officers in the Army at the outset of the Korean War, there was almost no question what type of 
unit they would be assigned to – a segregated black unit.  For the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, African 
Americans made up as much as 52 percent in 1947 and 40 percent in 1949.  However, as the 
authors of Black Soldier White Army remarked, the black officers “almost never supervised or 
commanded white officers, even in cases where their dates of rank gave them precedence.”  To 
avoid the conflict of having a black officer oversee a white officer, “the regiment command 
would reassign officers wholesale within a battalion or in the regiment rather than allow a black 
to lead anyone but other blacks.”
292
  This was exactly the situation that Lt. Col. Loften found 
himself in at the outbreak of the Korean War.  According to 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran 
Emmett J. Allen, because the regiment was “not ready for a black Lieutenant Colonel,” he was 
left behind in Japan as the rest of the unit departed for combat.  Allen said that Lt. Col. Loften 




     Gorham Black Jr., an African American soldier with the 24
th
, recalled: “It didn’t matter what 
your specialty was, if you were black you ended up in Gifu (home of the 24
th
).”  Black stated 
there were a couple of exceptions, but they were few and far between, and “the same was true of 
enlisted men.”
294
  What was worse, the Army attempted to provide the illusion of not 
intentionally segregating black officers to black units.  According to Black Soldier White Army 
they discovered after interviewing numerous veterans of the 24
th
 how the Army provided a black 
officer the illusion of “equality of opportunity” as ordered by President Truman: 
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          When a black officer arrived in Japan, the U.S. Eighth Army interviewed him as though it  
          had positions matching his training and ability and sent him around the country to speak  
          with various commanders who supposedly also had openings.  All concerned nevertheless  
          understood that the procedure was a charade.”
295
   
      
     John “Tommy” Martin reported that “black officers were not assigned to Eighth Army” with 
the exception of a black officer named Luther McManus who was sent there by mistake because 
the personnel gurus mistakenly thought McManus was white.  Martin reported McManus (to the 




     As Gorham Black Jr. observed, the assignment of black soldiers was essentially the same as 
black officers.  It didn’t matter what the soldiers’ specialty or training had prepared him for – he 
was destined for a black unit at the outbreak of the Korean War because the Army still refused to 
place him with white units.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was the ultimate destination for most of 
the early black soldier replacements.  The authors of Black Soldier White Army acknowledged 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, “as the last black regiment in the U.S. Army serving overseas, it was 
in effect a segregated holding unit for the many black soldiers who arrived in the Far East.”
297
   
     This method of assigning both black officers and black enlisted men was in direct contrast to 
the way white officers and white soldiers were assigned to combat units and it created problems 
for both the officers of the 24
th
 and the individual soldiers who found themselves in positions 
they were woefully unprepared for.  Lindsay Bowers, a black veteran of the 24
th
, used his own 
experience to make the same point to the Center of Military History interviewers: 
          BOWERS: I came out of armored basic, 29
th
 Heavy Construction Signal, went into Japan   
          zeroed in a rifle and went into Korea as an infantryman.  Then when you get in there, and I  
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          didn’t go right into the line, I went in HQ Co. but I was in company commo and we strung  
          wire into the front companies.  But you take the kid who went there with me at that time  
          with that type of training, what’s he going to do? 
          
          QUESTION: It’s like dropping meat down a meat grinder? 
           
          BOWERS: You’re doggone right.  A lot of them didn’t stand for it, they did rebel.  They  
          wasn’t what you’d call panic or misbehave before the enemy, as much as they were  
          rebelling because they knew they weren’t properly trained.
298
 
      
     Because men such as Bowers were assigned to units completely unprepared, and because 
officers were often assigned because of the region they were born or their race rather than their 
capability, the effectiveness of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and other segregated units entering the 
Korean War was handicapped at the outset.  Only through exceptional leadership could it be 
expected that these segregated units would function effectively as a fighting force.   
      
Leadership Tenets and the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
     Throughout the annals of warfare, great leaders have inspired their men to military feats 
thought impossible.  We admire military leaders such as Washington, “Stonewall” Jackson, and 
Patton for their resolve under hardship, their ability to anticipate an opponent’s course of action, 
or for their flare.  Military institutions in the United States and throughout the world have tried to 
identify and synthesize the attributes of great leadership and instill them in their future leaders.  
In that context, the role of military history has been in large part a tool to prepare future 
generations of military leaders.  But just as we can learn by what past military leaders have done 
right, we can equally learn by what past military leaders have done wrong.  The role of 
leadership within the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was especially crucial because of the inclusion of 
segregation and race.  How the officers approached leading men of different races at a time of 
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heightened racial tension was as much a testament to their success or failure as leaders as the 
battles won or lost. 
     Leading men into harm’s way has never been an easy task.  The human desire of self-
preservation is strong and it takes exceptional leadership under the best of circumstances to get 
men to forego their own survival instinct and work as a single unit for a common goal.  The 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment in particular has taken a lot of criticism for their battlefield performance in the 
last sixty years since the end of the Korean War.  As noted previously, often these criticisms 
have focused on the enlisted men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment that make up the backbone of all 
fighting units.  The claims are often that the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment were 
undisciplined and prone to panic and poor judgment.  The real question should have been; what 
were the leadership deficiencies within the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment that allowed men to be 
undisciplined or to panic and straggle towards the rear lines?  More importantly, to what extent 
did the institution of segregation deserve the blame for the breakdown in esprit de corps among 
the men of the 24
th
?  On a larger scale, to what extent did a breakdown in leadership at the 
highest levels of the Army in Korea deserve part of the blame for failures of units composed of 
both white and black soldiers during the early part of the war?  
     When the Chinese entered the war in the late fall – early winter of 1950, the Army as a whole 
panicked and there were numerous instances of both white units and black units displaying 
undisciplined full scale retreats.  Appleman noted of this period in the Korean War that what was 
lacking in the Army in Korea was “the will to fight, morale to contest the outcome, confidence of 
the professional leadership.”  Appleman observed that “the rank-and-file might have responded 
had the leadership been up to it.  But it was not.”
299
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     General Mathew Ridgway agreed with Appleman’s assessment of the failure in leadership in 
the Eighth Army in late 1950 – early 1951.  Shortly after taking over for General Walker after 
his tragic death in an automobile accident in December, 1950, General Ridgway wrote to his 
friend and the Army Chief of Staff, General Joe Lawton Collins, “there continues to be a lack of 
aggressiveness among some Corps and Division commanders” and that “there is a marked 
absence of vaunted American resourcefulness.”  General Ridgway concluded by telling General 
Collins: “Let’s be ruthless with our general officers if they fail to measure up!”
300
  Unfortunately 
for the men of the 24
th
 too many of the officers did not measure up to the standard that General 
Ridgway spoke of and instead of being relieved of command they remained in place.  Any 
negative criticism of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was quickly deflected to the “peculiar” nature of 
the African American soldiers that made up the ranks instead of to the defective leadership by 
the primarily white officers. 
Issuing Orders to Black Units 
     Orders are the backbone of any military organization.  They provide guidance to soldiers 
about how they are expected to behave and give the chaotic battlefield some semblance of order 
and are the means by which officers direct men on critical missions that can make or break the 
outcome of an engagement with the enemy.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was no different from 
their fellow white units; they were guided by orders as much as any other unit.  The only 
difference was that most of the orders the soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment received came 
from officers of a different race.  In some instances this difference between the 24
th
 and other 
regiments played out in subtle ways.  Eugene M. Lynch recalled one particular difference in the 
way he and others of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment received orders from that of their fellow white 
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units through the issuance of “hold at all cost” orders.  Lynch noted that “it is a basic tenet that if 
orders to subordinate commanders might result in destruction of their units, the senior 
commander must issue them in person.”  However, when Lynch and other subordinate units in 
the 24
th
 received these orders they were sent by “written or telephonic means” and not in 
person.
301
  The sloppy way in which these orders were delivered to the men of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment made the men feel they were being “sacrificed” and that senior leaders felt they were 
expendable.    
     In Korea, the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment often received these orders when faced with 
an overwhelming attack by enemy forces.  In several instances the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was 
told to “hold at all costs” so that other units could withdrawal to a better fighting position.  The 
fact that often the 24
th
 received these orders to “hold at all costs” while other white units 
withdrew did not escape the attention of the African American soldiers of the 24
th
.  A second 
tenet that Lynch recalled to these “hold at all cost” orders was that if the orders include optional 
decisions for subordinate commanders then the orders need to “specify both the authority to 
exercise the options, and the conditions under which they may be made.”
302
   
     Lynch and other veterans of the 24
th
 noted that most of the time their orders were vague 
regarding “options” and that when Lynch and other subordinate commanders used their 
discretion and pulled their men back in the face of overwhelming forces – instead of being 
lauded for their judicious use of men and resources, Lynch and the soldiers he led were viewed 
as cowards and the men as stragglers and malingers.  Lynch said that he led his men based on the 
fundamentals of military tactics since he wasn’t provided with clear and specific orders, 
specifically that “first, when faced by superior enveloping forces, attempts to defend with 
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exposed flanks and minimum reserve will result in destruction of the unit.  And second, 
offensive action by inferior forces against a superior in the attack will cause senseless 
expenditure of men for no real purpose.”
303
  
     Another crucial facet of orders is that they follow the chain-of-command.  For instance, the 
corps commander will give an order to a division commander who will in turn give the order to 
the regiment commander and so on.  However, in several instances the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
was treated differently in regard to orders following the chain-of-command.  Colonel Owen 
Carter recalled that the Acting Division Commander (ADC) General Verrand Wilson almost 
never followed the chain-of command when issuing orders to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and 
subordinate battalions in the 24
th
.  Colonel Carter stated that General Wilson, known to most of 
the men as General “Draw Sabers and Charge” Wilson because of his World War II reputation, 
often skipped over regiment and would “issue mission orders to battalion commanders of the 
regiment, perhaps believing that the battalion would report his change to regiment.”  Colonel 
Carter theorized that General Wilson had his reasons for doing this even though it created 
unnecessary tension and chaos at regiment.  Colonel Carter said General Wilson “spent a lot of 
time with the 24
th
 Infantry” partly to prop up a “shaky Colonel White.”
304
   
Sense of Belonging 
     For an officer effectively to lead men, it is important that the men feel that they are part of a 
cohesive unit and that they play a role in the functioning of the unit.  In essence – there needs to 
be a sense of belonging from the leader on down to the lowliest private.  Developing a sense of 
belonging was particularly difficult in a segregated unit.  The very nature of a segregated unit 




 Interview with Colonel Owen H. Carter, June 21 and 24, 1994, Box 3, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH.  
Colonel Wilson thought the other reason General Wilson enjoyed spending time with the 24
th
 was because “of the 
excellent food served by the regimental mess.” 
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denotes a set of differences between the men of the unit (African Americans) and the officers of 
the unit (primarily white).  For a leader to overcome the hurdle created by the Army’s 
reinforcement of racial inequality by segregation would require exceptional skill and tact.  As we 
noted earlier, it was also difficult for a white officer to develop this sense of belonging with his 
men when officers were constantly being rotated in and out of the unit.  
     Colonel Buckner Creel realized the hurdles he faced as a junior officer in Korea assigned to 
the 24
th
, and specifically, his ability to develop rapport with his men.  Colonel Creel related to an 
interviewer with the Center of Military History that “my units in World War II were better 
disciplined.  Every objective we were assigned in those units had to be taken, perhaps not the 
first time, or maybe occasionally a second try, but nonetheless, eventually we would reach the 
objective.”  However, Colonel Creel recalled that when he took over Company K in the 24
th
 
Regiment in Korea, “the unit had not achieved any success.  Nor did the men of Company K 
have a sense of belonging.”
305
  It is not surprising that Company K like most of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment lacked a “sense of belonging” early on in the Korean War.  Many of the 24
th
 veterans 
stated that initially they lacked officers that seemed to care much of one way or the other to the 
plight of the men. 
     Al Brooks, another veteran of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, observed that they never had a 
senior officer give them a “Patton-like” speech as they prepared to go to Korea and face combat.  
Brooks said he half expected to get a speech such as “you’re going to Korea and will face an 
enemy who is going to kill you and you ought to be prepared.”  Instead, Brooks said “what they 
got was pack this, pack that, go here and get shots, go there and get shots, line up here, load on 
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this train, load that train” and then, finally, “niggers get out there and do it.”
306
  For even the 
most capable white officer coming in as a replacement to the 24
th
 Infantry the goal of getting the 
men to feel a sense of belonging and to respect their leadership was an arduous undertaking.  The 
black soldiers of the 24th were accustomed to getting officers that misunderstood them at best 
and at worst were blatant racists. 
     Colonel Joseph Baranowski was a white junior officer in the 24
th
 who realized that he had to 
get his men to respect him as an officer if they were to survive and succeed as a unit.  
Baranowski took over Company A, which prior to his arrival had always been commanded by 
black officers who had black lieutenants under them.  Baranowski was a veteran of World War 
II, and he had been taught in that conflict the use of “marching fire” in the attack.  Baranowski 
had successfully led men in Europe utilizing marching fire and as a result he decided that his first 
course of action with Company A would be to teach them how to use the technique.  Baranowski 
taught his officers and his NCOs marching fire and then had the entire company practice it.  
     Baranowski had the opportunity to put his training with Company A to the test when only a 
week into his command, on September 19, 1950, “marching fire played a dominant role in 
overrunning the fortified enemy position” without the loss of any of his men.  Baranowski said 
his ability to demonstrate to his men that he was as much a part of the unit as any other man and 
that their fate depended on working together had won him his “spurs” and “the confidence of his 
men.”
307
  He demonstrated successfully the old military adage that in order to lead men you must 
first gain their trust. 
     Although the tactic of “marching fire” was something that Baranowski had learned through 
training, the understanding of how to demonstrate to the men of Company A that he had their 
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best interest in mind was something that was difficult to teach to new leaders.  Some would say 
impossible because it is one of the qualities of leadership that some men have and some men do 
not.  Similarly, knowing that as a leader you need to experience many of the same hardships as 
your men was a difficult lesson for junior officers to embrace.  After all, many of these junior 
officers were fresh out of Officer Candidate schools where they were taught that as officers they 
were set-apart from the enlisted men.  They were warned about fraternization and taught that as 
officers they must separate themselves socially from the enlisted men.  As a result, it can be 
difficult for the junior officer to understand that in combat there is a sense of cohesion and 
camaraderie that is essential for all men to embrace – including the officers.  In the segregated 
24
th
 Infantry the ability of a white officer to share in the hardships of the black enlisted personnel 
was essential if he wanted to demonstrate that he was a part of the unit.   
     Bernard Abrams, a junior officer in the 24
th
 recalled one particular instance where he and his 
fellow officers demonstrated to their men that they were all part of one unit that shared hardships 
equally.  Abrams stated that during a turn-over of command a list of material shortages was 
recorded and put forward to Battalion as “combat loss.”  Abrams related that the Division G-4 
disapproved the report of “combat loss” and “bucked it back with a nasty letter indicating that 
the responsible people should punish the guilty ones and pay statements of charges.”  Abrams 
said that “after a massive effort to make up the losses through trades and the like, the senior 
NCO’s of the unit banded together and with the supply officer arranged for everyone in the 
company to sign statements of charges to cover the cost of the remaining losses.”  Included 
among those who agreed to have their pay docked were all of Abrams officers “both black and 
white officers” and Abrams himself.
308
  Abrams had demonstrated to his men they were all in it 
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     Abrams did not stop with sharing an economic burden with his men.  He endeavored 
continually to reinforce the conviction that he would be with his men through thick and thin.  
According to Abrams, during the summer of 1951, as the war turned into a stationary fight with 
truce talks ongoing, there was a subtle change in his unit.  Abrams said that “during this time the 
black-white issue became more visible” and “at times black soldiers complained that the 3
rd
 
Battalion had harder missions to accomplish than those, for example, of the white Battalions.”  
Abrams said to counteract the rising racial tensions and to “emphasis a one army concept,” 
Abrams and his fellow white officers made sure to stay close to the men.  Abrams said that they 
constantly “reminded them that they were with them” and were quick to point out a white a FO 
(forward observer) that was operating with the company, along with other white crews that were 
in supporting tanks and quad fifties.
309
  But perhaps the most convincing part of Abrams attempt 
to instill in his men that he was one of them and they were all in it together was Abrams 
willingness to demonstrate that he would take the same risks as everyone else and that he wasn’t 
going to risk anyone’s life more than his own.   
     Abrams stated that after an engagement in which he was seriously injured and evacuated to 
Japan he received a letter signed by all the men in his company – Company L.  Abrams said that 
the letter in essence said “thank you.”   Abrams said there was one particularly poignant line that 
read, “We trusted you because we knew that you would not waste our lives.”
310
  They could have 
added as well, because you were right there with us at every point of the battle. 
     Many of the soldiers in the 24
th
 did not feel as confidently as did Abrams’ men that their lives 
would not be wasted.  They realized that they were part of a segregated unit that the Army often 







considered unreliable, but yet was still chosen to take on many of the most difficult tasks.  
Lindsey Bowers told interviews with the Center of Military History “for some reason – perhaps 
this is personal but – I felt the 24
th




Officers Accepting Responsibility/Setting the Standard 
     President Truman was fond of using the expression “the buck stops here” to show that he was 
ultimately responsible for what happened in his administration and the government in general.  
As the top executive “officer” – President Truman said that he would be the one to accept the 
responsibility of problems created by subordinates – whether he had any direct knowledge of 
them or not.  For military officers the responsibility for the acts of subordinates falls on them as 
well.   
     Colonel Carter learned first-hand during World War II the burden of responsibility.  In World 
War II Carter was the commander of the 5
th
 Ranger Battalion.  Colonel Carter related how on 
one particular occasion his Rangers got into a fight with a black engineer service company 
comprised of stevedores that resulted in many casualties.  Although Colonel Carter was not even 
physically present for the brawl he was still none-the-less relieved of command and reduced in 




  He did not complain about his demotion because he 
accepted responsibility for the actions of his men.  Carter was ultimately vindicated for his 
willingness to take responsibility for his men by being quickly promoted through combat to his 
former rank.   
     Although the 24
th
 received much criticism throughout the early months of the Korean War, 
the responsibility for any shortcomings were not placed on the officers themselves, but instead 
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were placed on the African American soldiers.  Had the officers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
followed President Truman dictum – they would have stood up and accepted responsibility for 
any performance issues on the part of the regiment. 
     Besides taking command responsibility for the failures of subordinates, it is also crucial for 
the good order of the unit that officers set the standard for their men.  Any discrepancy between 
what was considered appropriate for enlisted men and for officers was a sure way of 
undermining the good order of a unit as a whole.  In the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment this usually 
related to white officers setting an appropriate standard for the black soldiers of the unit, 
although there were several black officers who also had to be mindful to set an appropriate 
standard for the men.  However, in a segregated unit such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment with 
tension already running high between white officers and black soldiers, any hypocrisy on the part 
of white officers would instantly destroy their credibility.  For a black officer in 1950 there was a 
dual battle; the successful black officer had to mindful of both the impression he made on his 
troops and his image to the white officers who served with him.    
     Lieutenant General Emmett Paige learned as a junior officer how difficult it could be for a 
black officer to set the standard in a predominantly white Army.  As a junior officer, Paige was 
sent to a leadership course which he was the first black officer to ever attend.  Paige stated that 
from his first day he seemed to be singled out by the commanding officer for harassment above 
and beyond any of his fellow (white) classmates.  Paige recalled that the training was designed to 
be especially difficult and that officers that did not pass muster were summarily kicked out of the 
course.  Paige said that “over the intercom system, they called the names of the people who were 
going to be kicked out to report to the commandant.”  Despite all the harassment he endured, 
Paige remained in the course and actually excelled.  However, during the final week – on a 
153 
 
Saturday afternoon – his name was called over the intercom.  Paige remembered telling his 
fellow officers, “ok fellas, I guess today’s the day for me.”  Paige said he was dejected because 
he was going to be kicked out and his fellow officers told him that he should go see the Inspector 
General because they thought he was being singled out because of his race.   
     Paige went to see the commandant, Captain Prentiss.  Captain Prentiss looked at the dejected 
Paige and said “student Paige, guess you suppose I’ve been giving you a hard time since you’ve 
been here.” Without waiting for a reply Captain Prentiss continued “Well, you’re right.  You’re 
the first Negro to go through the course, and I wanted to see just how much you could take.  You 
set the example for the others who will follow you.”  Captain Prentiss told Paige it wasn’t fair, 
but for him to succeed as a black officer he would have to be twice as good as the white officers.  




     Another important role for the successful officer was making sure that the orders you give to 
your subordinates are carried out.  As was noted earlier, the 24
th
 was accused of straggling by 
enlisted soldiers on a scale supposedly greater than other white units.  Part of the fault for 
straggling by enlisted soldiers rested with the officers who were supposed to oversee those men.  
Where were the officers as these men moved to the rear?  Where were the NCO’s that were 
entrusted by the officers to ensure that all orders to remain in position were adhered to by the 
unit’s soldiers?   
     Colonel Creel recalled during his formative years as a junior officer that he had the 
opportunity to serve with General Charles D. Palmer who made the often quoted remark, 
“nothing gets done except that which is checked.”  Creel said that he took the saying to heart 
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himself as an officer: 
          I firmly believe that and insisted that my officers and NCOs practice that rule and often  
          checked just to be sure that they were doing their job of checking.  Furthermore, I was  
          with the company “on-line” all the time.  My “CP” was my foxhole just behind the crest of  
          the ridge; the rest of the units had theirs forward of the ridge.
314
   
 
Creel wanted to be there with the men when they needed the calming presence of an officer 
during the height of battle.  He knew that by leading from the front he would ensure that his men 
were doing their duty. 
     The true test of leadership does not come when leading a unit of highly trained, disciplined, 
combat tested soldiers.  Rather, the true test of leadership comes when leading difficult, 
undisciplined, frightened, dispirited soldiers.  Major General Oliver Dillard was an African 
American junior officer, who in 1950 was assigned to command a company of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment in Korea.  Early on in his command he had a problem with an unknown member of his 
unit sneaking away from the unit to shoot chickens belonging to nearby Koreans.  Despite his 
best efforts to make sure that all of his men knew that this was unacceptable behavior, night after 
night he kept hearing the report of a gun firing as another chicken was being killed.  Dillard 
explained what happened one night when he went to investigate the sound of gunfire: 
          I had firmly come to the conclusion that it was a member of my platoon shooting chickens.   
          And indeed, I walked around a hut, and, indeed, it was one of my men.  I walked face to  
          face with one of my guys, whose M1 rifle was almost literally smoking.  He threw a round  
          into the chamber, pulled it right up, and pointed it squarely at my forehead.  And, of  
          course, I didn’t know what to do.  And just, I guess, from normal reaction, I put a round in  
          my chamber in my carbine and pointed it squarely at him and said, “okay, what are you   
          doing down here shooting chickens?”  And it seemed to me that we stood there for about   
          15 hours, but it was probably about 15 seconds.  And he said, finally, “Oh, I just down  
          here.  I know you told us not to shoot chickens, but I came on down.”  (Dillard said that he  
          was aware at this point that the rest of the men of the company were watching him – and  
          he realized why)  They (the other soldiers) knew he was down there.  This guy was a  
          renegade.  He was the platoon renegade … and everybody knew he  
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          was down there, and he was one of these loudmouths, boisterous, don’t follow orders, any  
          orders individuals … but I took him and I said, “Okay, let’s go,” and took his weapon,  
          brought him on up, put him in a jeep and went over to the company CP.
315
   
      
     What Dillard did next was what defined him as a leader – to the renegade soldier and to the 
rest of the men of the company.  Dillard sought and received permission to handle the soldier in 
his own way – knowing full well that under the circumstances of the soldier pointing a weapon at 
a superior officer that the soldier would at the very least receive several years in federal prison as 
a result of a general courts martial.  Instead, Dillard used the possibility of courts martial to get 
the soldier to become a fully functioning member of the unit.  And in so doing, Dillard solidified 
his reputation with the other men of the unit as an officer that could be fair and understanding 
while at the same time making sure the men did their duty. 
     Bernard Abrams, a white junior officer in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was another officer who 
knew that sometimes an officer has to be creative when dealing with a difficult soldier.  Abrams 
had a soldier that was so frightened during an attack up a hill that he refused to attack.  Abrams 
ordered a sergeant to take the rifle away from the disobedient soldier and make him go up the hill 
without the rifle.  Abrams said “furthermore, that night the disobedient soldier was placed in his 
own single fox hole without his weapon.”  Abrams recalled that throughout the night the 
disobedient soldier begged for his weapon out of fear that he would be overrun by the enemy and 
killed.  Abrams informed the disobedient soldier that if he took off during the night the sergeant 
next to him would shoot him.  Abrams said the next morning the disobedient soldier received his 
rifle back.  According to Abrams, “the man regained control over his fear and henceforth 
performed as a good soldier.”
316
  While certainly not the most orthodox way of dealing with 
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straggling, Abrams’ method was effective in demonstrating to the soldier that his life was 
dependent on his fighting.   
     A good leader not only looks for solutions to difficult soldiers through innovative ways, but 
also attempts to use the strengths of the men to help them.  Colonel Creel recalled that one of the 
things that impressed him the most during his time leading African American soldiers in Korea 
was their ability to bounce back after adversity.  Creel talked of his men’s ability to come out of 
a particularly brutal combat situation and be able to brush it off and move on.  Creel said “that 
was their strength” and it impressed him.  “After adversity, perhaps even after defeat, my troops 
from Companies K and L” seemed to recuperate quickly “more so than white troops in the 
companies I had led during World War II.”
317
  Perhaps, some of the ability to bounce back from 
adversity by the African American soldiers in Korea was part of a lifetime of dealing with 
segregation and second-class citizen status.  Whatever the cause, Creel realized that it was a 
strength inherent in his men that could be drawn on to lead them through difficult battles. 
Racism Destroys Ability to Lead 
     When attempting to establish a reputation as a leader in a segregated unit, nothing could 
destroy the respect African American soldiers had for an officer more than the display either 
overtly or covertly of racist attitudes towards black soldiers.  Dillard remembered that some of 
the white officers he was with in the 24
th
 proved to be “effective and capable” officers while 
others were “far from superior leaders.”  The more glaring problem from Dillard’s perspective 
was the officers who came to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment with racists attitudes.  Dillard noted “it 
was obvious to anyone who opened his eyes and ears that some came to the 24
th
 Regiment 
                                                          
317
 Interview with Colonel Buckner M. Creel, December 3, 1993, Box 3, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
157 
 
believing that blacks were congenitally inferior and that blacks would not fight.”
318
   
     The men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment quickly realized that a racist white officer would not 
hesitate to blame any failure by the unit on the men instead of his leadership, further 
undermining any chance the officer may have had to be an effective leader.  According to 
Dillard, racist officers “knew that there were many others at every level of command throughout 
the Army who shared their belief.”  Thus, “they knew that any failure involving the 24
th
 
Regiment, notwithstanding its real cause or origin, could safely be attributed to this shared 
belief.”
319
  The attitudes and actions of some of these officers will be discussed further in 
Chapter IV. 
     Dillard wasn’t the only African American member of the 24
th
 who knew that racist officers 
were already anticipating any failings on their part to land squarely on the black soldiers.  
Mershon and Schlossman observed, “Black enlisted personnel believed that they had been 
systematically blamed for the leadership failures of white officers who disliked black troops.”
320
  
The race blame game was not new to the Korean War; white officers in the 92
nd
 during World 
War II used it to propel their careers, such as General Edward Almond.   
     During World War II one of the white officers in the 92
nd 
ID who served under Almond had 
been so blatantly racist that during an investigation launched after numerous complaints that the 
white officer ordered the NCOs “to strike their subordinates,” the white officer acknowledged 
that he ordered the beatings “although he knew it was wrong.”  In response to the accusation of 
nagging and swearing the same officer responded, “You know how Niggers are, if you don’t 
keep after them they simply lie down on the job.  If I ever cussed any of them at any time it was 
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  While some officers were blatant in their expression of racial dislike for 
the men, others could be more subtle in displaying their bias.  For these types of racist white 
officers, it was not so much a question of what they did to their men, but what they did not do for 
their men that showed their inherent bias. 
     This subtle type of racism on the part of white officers was described by Mershon and 
Schlossman as “oppositional leadership.”  Oppositional leadership was defined by the way 
“military officials acted deliberately to uphold racial discrimination against proposals to reduce 
it.”
322
  Officers who displayed oppositional leadership might not stand up for their men when 
they were denied access to on-base recreational facilities for instance, or allowed white soldiers 
to disparage their men with racial epitaphs.  Gaston Bergeron, a white 2
nd
 lieutenant assigned as 
a forward observer attached to Company B of the 24
th
 noted one example when white officers 
failed to stand up for the African American soldiers.  While the black soldiers of the 24
th
 moved 
up the line to replace a white unit, the men of the white unit “hurled terrible insults and racial 
slurs at the blacks without interference from their officers, who were present.”  Bergeron realized 
the debilitating effect this could have on the morale of the black soldiers and wondered how 
“could any soldier, subjected to such abuse time after time, develop a good opinion of himself or 
summon up a resolve to fight for the country that permitted it to occur?”
323
  Certainly, for the 
officer who refused to stand up for his own men his ability to lead was severely crippled.   
Officer Utilization of NCOs 
     Any officer who has served in the armed forces for any length of time quickly learns that his 
or her effectiveness was often dependent on strong NCOs who are there to back-up the officer’s 
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orders.  While many of the officer positions in the 24
th
 were assigned to white officers, all of the 
NCO positions in the 24
th
 were assigned to black soldiers.  There was one exception during the 
Korean War.  When the 24
th
 was getting pummeled with combat losses – especially within the 
ranks of the NCOs – the Army experimented with a program by which combat tested NCOs from 
the 29
th
 could volunteer for duty with the 24
th
 with the understanding that if they succeeded with 
the 24
th
 than they would receive a battlefield commission.
324
  These black NCOs were 
responsible for providing the connection between the officer and the average enlisted soldier 
trying to stay alive in a chaotic environment.  For the white officer, these black NCOs were often 
the men who ensured their own survival. 
     While a bad officer ran the risk of being killed, “fragged,” by his own men, a good officer 
would have men willing to risk their own life to save the life of their officer.  Philip Harper was a 
white lieutenant who owed his life to a black NCO in the 24
th
.  Harper had been wounded and 
the enemy was closing in on their position when Harper ordered his men to move out.  Harper 
was slowly staggering towards the rear.  Harper detailed what happened next: 
          At that point, a black sergeant, whose name I regret to this day I do not know, was in a dry  
          irrigation ditch and saw that I was wounded and about to be overrun by the enemy.  By  
          this time the Chinese had taken the US soldier to my front prisoner and were dragging him  
          to the rear.  The lead elements of the enemy assault force were only about 20 yards from  
          me when the black Sergeant, who had neither a weapon nor a helmet, grabbed me by the  
          arm and yelled “Come on Lt, - you can make it!”  The Sergeant and I locked an arm  
          around the other’s waist and, as though running a three-legged race, made a mad 50 yard  
          dash to the irrigation ditch.  With the adrenaline pumping harder and faster with the sound  
          of each enemy bullet whistling past our heads, and without either of us saying a word to  
          the other, at a point about 10 from the edge of the ditch, we both did a flying somersault  
          through the air and rolled in the bottom of the ditch.
325
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     Harper was not the only white officer who had black NCOs willing to look out for him.  
Leonard Kushner said that his platoon sergeant was “Big Boy” Williams, a heavy weight 
champion boxer who always took care of him and was a very reliable platoon sergeant.  Kushner 
said that Williams once told him, “he (Kushner) had to stay alive; if he goes, we all go.”
326
  
Harper and Kushner were officers who knew that the strength and leadership qualities of black 
NCOs like Williams were absolutely necessary if they were to be effective at leading their men. 
     The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in many respects was similar to any other combat regiment on 
paper.  Its members comprised a fighting force that had multiple responsibilities, from 
intelligence to logistics, and when properly led would work as a unified team towards achieving 
a military goal.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment had the same cohort of officers, technicians, cooks, 
infantrymen as any other regiment.  The men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment wore the same 
uniforms and carried the same weapons as did, for example, the soldiers of the 29
th
 Infantry 
Regiment – or any other regiment in Korea.  Yet, despite the similarities on paper, the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment was still the only African American regiment in Korea; the only regiment 
where soldiers were separated out for no other reason than the color of their skin.  Because of 
this difference and this difference alone, so much of the success or failure of the 24
th
 rested with 
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Trials, Drugs, Venereal Disease, and Medals: The Fight for Equal Treatment 
in Korea 
     When North Korean troops stormed across the border into South Korea on June 25, 1950, one 
of the first Army components sent into action was the 25
th
 Infantry Division, comprised of 
several subordinate units including the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  As the front lines 
shifted with each assault and counter-assault, several units were singled out for praise.  The 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment was praised for its heroic efforts in slowing down the North Korean advance 
into the southern reaches of the peninsula.  In an article titled “U.S. Hails Tan Warriors: 24
th
 
Infantry Victory May Turn Tide of Battle” in The Chicago Defender, the newspaper declared: 
“Never before, not even during the smashing victories in World War II, had Negro fighters been 
hailed as were the men of the 24
th
 when the flash came that Yechon was captured.”
327
  The 
editors of this African American newspaper believed the news from the Korean battlefront was 
proof that black men could fight as well as their white counterparts. “It squelched any doubt that 




     Praise for the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was not restricted to the African American 
press in the United States.  Other newspapers ran articles about the successful exploits of the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment outside Yechon, Korea, including the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, Chicago Daily News, Chicago Herald American, Chicago Tribune, New York 
Daily News, New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, Louisville Courier Journal, and the 
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North Carolinian Charlotte Observer.
329
  Although at the time of the battle for Yechon the news 
media praised the action as one of the first “victories” for American forces in Korea, high 
ranking officers such as General Almond would later declare that there was no battle at Yechon, 
Korea, and the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment accomplished nothing more than securing an 
abandoned village.
330
  This revisionist narrative of the battle of Yechon by senior officers might 
have partially been due to the reported exploits of an African American Engineer, Lieutenant 
Charles Bussey, who claimed that he had killed scores of enemy soldiers and was deserving of 
the nation’s highest medal – the Congressional Medal of Honor.  Lieutenant Bussey reported that 
during a conversation between him and his commanding officer (CO), Colonel John T. Corley, 
his CO said, “I cannot allow you to become a hero, no matter how worthy.  I reduced the size of 
the battalion that you saved to a group, and I reduced the number of men you killed so that 
finally the job was only worth the Silver Star.”
331
   
     In this chapter we are going to explore Lieutenant Bussey’s account of events outside 
Yechon, Korea, along with other accounts of feats of bravery by African American servicemen 
in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment that may not have received the attention they were due because of 
racism by the Army officer corps.  In order to understand how Lieutenant Bussey or another 
black soldier could be denied recognition for an award of valor it is important that one has an 
understanding of the award system in the Army during the Korean War.  What were the 
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requirements to receive an award of valor and who could nominate someone for the award?  
How did the Army bureaucracy come into play once a recommendation was made, and most 
importantly, who ultimately decided on whether an award of valor was approved?  
     This chapter also examines several inconsistencies with the way the Army handled black 
troops as opposed to white troops.  Specifically, as it pertains to discipline issues, there were 
obvious differences both with regard to the formal courts-martial proceedings and the less formal 
handling of issues pertaining to venereal disease and drugs.  Were African Americans singled out 
because of their race for a disproportionate number of courts-martial proceedings?  Were black 
troops treated differently than white troops in reference to venereal disease and drug abuse?  As 
was discussed in the previous chapter, the answer to these questions depended on the type of 
leadership present in a given African American unit – a leadership that primarily consisted of 
white officers who may have had ulterior motives when deciding how to handle black soldiers. 
From Praise to Courts-Martial 
     The accolades for the fighting spirit of the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment continued 
through July, 1950 and into August, 1950 as the American and South Korean forces were forced 
to retreat to the Pusan Perimeter.  This was a period of the war where the American forces faced 
the real possibility that they could be forced to withdrawal from the Korean peninsula in what 
was already being referred to in the media as potentially “America’s Dunkirk” – a reference to 
the British withdrawal of forces from France at the beginning of World War II.  Again, The 
Chicago Defender picked up accounts of the action outside Pusan and wrote an article titled 
“Tan Yanks Hit Counter Drive” that was published on August 5, 1950.  According to the editors, 
“As the savage Korean battle entered the ‘do or die’ phase, Tan Yanks of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment met continuous Red drives with smashing counter attacks and gave little ground under 
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withering fire of swarming enemy troops.”
332
  The newspaper quoted a member of the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Jasper R. Jackson of Durham, North Carolina, who said the men 
under his command refused to withdraw until ordered to do so.  White Lieutenant Jackson 
commented to reporters, “Our boys did fine.  There were just too many of them and we had to 




      The praise provided by Lieutenant Jackson and the American media in the early days of the 
Korean War for the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment gave the false impression that the corner 
had been turned as to the use of black soldiers in combat.  There was a hopefulness expressed in 
the black press in the early days of the Korean War that perhaps this would be the first war in 
which the color of one’s skin was not considered an instant indication of combat effectiveness.  
However, within weeks of the August headline in The Chicago Defender a new and more 
troubling narrative began to leak out about the “Tan Yanks” of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  
Slowly at first, but with growing frequency, reports about scores of African American soldiers 
being held for trial on charges of “Misbehaving before the Enemy” and “Straggling” made their 
way to the United States.  These troubling reports grew severe and common enough to be noticed 
by the NAACP. 
     Once again The Chicago Defender was at the forefront in alerting their readers to the reported 
problems in Korea.  An article in the paper on November 18, 1950, under the headline “NAACP 
Alarmed by Smears on Negro Troops” provided some of the underlying reports coming out of 
Korea.  The paper observed that James L. Hicks, a war correspondent, “reported from Tokyo that 
he had seen on a train in Japan 11 members of the 24
th
 Infantry who had been convicted by 
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general courts martial of ‘misconduct before the enemy’ and had been sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment at hard labor.”
334
  Another war correspondent, Frank Whisonant, made an even 
more serious revelation to The Chicago Defender when he proclaimed that “ninety-nine and 





  According to the newspaper, based on these allegations and other similar 
reports coming out of Korea, the NAACP Special Counsel, Thurgood Marshall, asked Frank 
Reeves, the NAACP’s Washington attorney to make inquiries with the Department of the 
Army.
336
      
     The initial inquiries with the Department of the Army proved troubling, the NAACP 
requested and received permission from the Truman Administration to have Thurgood Marshall 
travel to MacArthur’s Far Eastern Command and to Korea to get a first-hand look at the situation 
on the ground.  Marshall’s findings were dire and confirmed the NAACP’s worst fears.  Marshall 
reported that “without exception the Negro soldiers were given an unbelievably dirty deal, solely 
because of their race.”
337
  The Chicago Defender, in an article titled “Marshall Says Korean 
Army Trials Unfair,” quoted the attorney as saying that the courts martial of black soldiers in 
Korea were “carried on in an atmosphere making justice impossible.”
338
 
     The Chicago Defender went on to note that in the flurry of courts martial trials conducted 
after the initial invasion by North Korea, only two white soldiers were convicted out of 8 tried, 
while over 23 African American soldiers were convicted of 60 tried.  And there were major 
discrepancies in sentences imposed on white soldiers and black soldiers.  The two white soldiers 
convicted were given three and five years while one of the African American soldiers was given 
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the death penalty and the others similarly disproportionate long sentences.
339
  According to 
Bernard Nalty in Strength for the Fight, ultimately “twice as many blacks as whites faced 




     Justice came swiftly for the African American soldiers tried in the “field” in Korea.  One 
black defendant was accused, tried, and sentenced to life in prison in less than 42 minutes.  
Marshall noted about that particular incident, “even in Mississippi a Negro will get a trial longer 
than 42 minutes, if he is fortunate enough to be brought to trial.”
341
  For those in the African 
American community in the States, the actions of the Army on the heels of so much public praise 
for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment appeared to be simple jealousy on the part of the white officer 
corps.  “It was partly because of this resentment against Negroes stopping the enemy when 
numerous white units broke under fire and fled that a number of Courts-Martial of Negroes 
occurred for the obvious purpose of negating the laudatory publicity Negro troops had received,” 
proclaimed an editorial in The Chicago Defender.
342
  
     It only could be taken as a sign of guilt, immediately after Thurgood Marshall’s report was 
made known to the world, the Army attempted to remedy some of their earlier mistakes.  The 
Chicago Defender noted with some satisfaction that four black servicemen who had been 
convicted in courts martial cases in Korea were freed by acting Judge Advocate General Franklin 
P. Shaw.  The newspaper reported: “Cpl. Vernon S. White, Pvts. Willie Martin, Jr., Hardy 
Sanders and Bernell Gorden were given one year suspended sentences for being without leave.  








 The Chicago Defender, February 3, 1951, p. 1. 
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They were previously sentenced to 10 years and dishonorable discharge.”
343
   
     One of the questions that must be asked regarding the flood of courts martial cases in Korea 
is; were there African American soldiers who displayed cowardice in the face of the enemy?  
The answer was unquestionably yes.  But just as important, many white soldiers fled in the face 
of danger as well.  The true testament to the double-standard employed in Korea by the white 
leadership was the difference in treatment received by accused white soldiers and accused black 
soldiers.  One example involved 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran Ivory Perry.  Perry recalled that 
when he was brought up on charges the white soldiers investigating his case “kept emphasizing 
that I was a troublemaker” and constantly referred to him as “boy.”  Perry said they were clearly 
being “hostile” towards him and he said it was because of his race.
344
  A more troubling case of 
purposefully “railroading” of an African American soldier for “misbehavior before the enemy” 
occurred during the courts martial of Pfc. Jesse James.   
     On November 11, 1950, James was convicted by general courts martial for “Misbehaving 
Before the Enemy” and sentenced to twenty years.  Upon closer examination of the facts of the 
case it was clear that this was not a normal or fair trial.  For one James was not allowed to call 
defense witnesses and the defense counsel appointed to him was white.  More troubling, 
according to James, his attorney was “ordered” not to defend him because the Army already 
knew the outcome of the courts martial before it began. 
     Early on in the proceedings, James had been told by a white officer named Captain Mays that 
it would be all right if he were tried with two others because a deal had been worked out with the 
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prosecutor to get him off.  Instead, the government moved for a trial against James.  Serious 
questions surfaced early on during the trial when James was not allowed to call Doctor Booker, 
who would have testified that James had been wounded at the time of the incident.  Further, 
James stated a non-commissioned officer, “Sergeant O’Neil,” testified that he was James’ 
Section Chief when he was not.  The most damning evidence presented by the Army raised even 
more questions.  As “eye witnesses” the Army called two soldiers who had also left their 
positions only to be found “drinking in the rear,” but were allowed to have their sentences 
reduced by ten years for testifying against James. 
     As for the jurors for the trial, “twelve were called for the jury but six were excused.  The 
remaining six were white and from the infantry.”  The make-up of the jury of white infantry men 
was crucial in understanding the flaw in the juror selection because James was part of an artillery 
unit.  He was responsible for maintaining over 12 miles of communication wire, which helped 
explain his location and injury during the battle.  Unfortunately, a jury made up of infantrymen 
would probably not understand the actions of someone assigned to an artillery unit.  Also, having 
a jury made up entirely of white soldiers during a time when the Army still segregated black 
soldiers probably did not do James any justice.  James was ultimately found guilty and served 18 
months in prison before he was then allowed to go back to Korea as part of the 8
th
 Field Artillery 
as a private.  James retired from the Army in 1969 as an E-6 and throughout his career he tried to 
have his conviction removed but failed.
345
  
     From the Korean War stories of those such as Private Jesse James who faced courts martial 
trials for “Misbehaving Before the Enemy,” it would appear that the white leadership in the 
Army had already made up their mind that black soldiers were prone to “cowardice” – just as the 
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inter-war Army studies had predicted – and that the only effective way to deal with them was to 
make an example out of as many black soldiers as possible.  A white soldier who might have 
drifted away from the front might be gently reprimanded and led back to the front, but in contrast 
the black soldier was immediately brought up on serious charges – charges that technically could 
include the death penalty.  Lyle Rishell was one of the wise officers in Korea that realized that 
there were better ways to deal with straggling instead of courts martial proceedings.  Rishell 
recounted what happened on one particular occasion during his time leading black soldiers in 
combat when the men began to move to rear in response to heavy “friendly fire” shelling that 
came in on their position: 
          I turned and looked down the hill behind me, which had required such an effort to climb,  
          and saw a dozen men already down the steep side about fifty yards, going hell-for-leather.   
          “hey there, you bastards,” I yelled, “Where do you think you’re going?  Get the hell back  
          here or I’m shooting!”  When I first screamed, the men stopped shagging and turned  
          around, waiting to hear what I wanted them to do.  They looked at me as if they were  
          seeing a ghost.  They could not escape seeing the weapon I pointed at them … the men  
          sheepishly started to hike back to the top.  When they got back, I reamed them out again  
          and cussed their mothers and their friends and anyone else I could think of.
346
 
   
     Although Lyle Rishell’s methods were unorthodox, they were effective and less costly to the 
Army than attempting to courts martial all of the offenders.  The quality of discretion is one of 
the most important attributes to being an effective leader and one that many white officers 
ignored when dealing with potential courts martial cases among black troops.  Had Rishell 
decided that his men should receive some type of official punishment he and his immediate 
supervisor had several types of punishment they could have chosen from that were far less severe 
than the general courts martial.  One option was non-judicial punishment. 
     Morris MacGregor, in the Army Center of Military History study Integration of the Armed 
Forces, noted that “in general, unit commanders had a great deal of discretion in framing the 
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charges brought against an alleged offender” and on the less serious offenses the officer could 
“conclude that a given infraction was not a serious matter at all and simply dismiss the soldier 
with a verbal reprimand” as was the case with Rishell.
347
  This discretion unfortunately could act 
as a double-edges sword, with one officer displaying judicious use of his discretion and another 
blowing a seemingly insignificant infraction into a full scale courts martial.  MacGregor 
observed, “Whereas one commander might decide that a case called for a charge of aggravated 
assault, another, faced with the same set of facts, might settle for a charge of simple assault.”       
     MacGregor went one step further and declared that since white officers used their discretion 
to punish black soldiers and because so many white officers were biased towards black soldiers; 
the entirety of the argument that black soldiers statistically faced more discipline had to be 
reassessed.  MacGregor reasoned, “If it is reasonable to assume that, as part of the pattern of 
discrimination, Negroes accused of offenses like misconduct toward superiors, AWOL, and 
assault often received less generous treatment from their officers than white servicemen, then it 
is reasonable to suspect that statistics on Negroes involved in crime may reflect such 
discriminatory treatment.”
348
  The record in Korea definitely supported MacGregor’s assertion 
that a number of reported incidents of misconduct by black soldiers were due to bias among 
officers.  Another question that MacGregor might have asked; why did so many troops, both 
white and black, display a tendency to withdrawal in the face of the enemy?  The answer to that 
also comes back to leadership and the lack of preparedness by the Army prior to the Korean War. 
     When American troops retreated pell-mell in the early days of the Korean War, a major 
problem was that the soldiers were completely unprepared for combat.  Months of garrison and 
occupation duty in Japan after World War II had made units, such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, 
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complacent.  Combat drills were replaced with sporting activities and military parades.  This lack 
of preparation was directly attributable to the senior leadership of the Army in the Far East.  It 
was after all their duty to see to it that the men of their command were prepared for all possible 
contingencies, such as a major invasion by North Korean forces into South Korea, and across the 
board, the Far East Command was not prepared for the events of June 25, 1950.   
     Thurgood Marshall was correct when he observed that General MacArthur “was responsible 
for maintaining the conditions which brought about the courts-martial and made them 
inevitable.”
349
  Marshall also leveled criticism at MacArthur for the prevailing segregation of 
African Americans in the U.S. Army forces committed to battle in Korea, a policy which only 
added to the hardships faced by black soldiers.  After going on a tour with MacArthur, Marshall 
commented that “the rule of segregation was most glaringly apparent at the headquarters of the 
Far East Command, to which no Negroes are assigned.”
350
  It is clear that discipline problems in 
a military unit are only exacerbated when the average soldier realizes that his commanders do 
not have their best interests in mind and treat the men as second-class citizens.  
Discipline Problems in the 24
th
 – Drugs and Venereal Disease 
     One of the problems that plagued African American units at the beginning of the Korean War 
was the use of illicit drugs.  While the number of black soldiers implicated in the use of drugs 
before and during the Korean War represented a relatively small percentage of the troops at 
large, it still posed a problem for the officers of these units.  While marijuana occasionally was 
the culprit, the drug of choice and the one that created the most problems for military discipline 
was heroin.  In a foreshadowing of the problems of Vietnam heroin entered the ranks of the 
military due to close proximity to the production sites in various Asian countries, and because of 
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the prevalence of prostitutes that acted as pushers for the drug by their pimps.  Houston 
McMurray recalled that prior to his time in Japan with the 24
th
, he had never even heard of 
heroin.  McMurray stated that he soon witnessed his fellow soldiers consuming the drug, first by 
injecting the drug into a cigarette and smoking it, and later by injecting it directly.
351
  
     Although the use of heroin also occurred within the ranks of white soldiers as well, during the 
Korean War it appeared to be predominantly associated with African American soldiers.
352
  The 
reason for this would appear to trace back to the 24
th
 Infantry’s assignment to Japan prior to the 
war.  While on garrison duty in Japan, the men of the 24
th
 were allowed fairly open access to 
parts of Japan that were rampant with prostitution.  And in some instances, prostitutes would 
provide free services to American servicemen provided that the servicemen would use and 
purchase heroin.  This access to prostitutes and pimps that also doubled as drug pushers was a 
dangerous combination. 
     One of the lingering questions about the prevalence of drug use by African American soldiers 
in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment is whether the institution of segregation had anything to do with the 
increase.  This question is especially important when paired with the problem of prostitution 
among troops in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  There are numerous examples from World War I 
and World War II when black troops were forbidden to visit the same locations as white soldiers 
when on temporary R&R, and this included areas where prostitution was active.  Although as 
was discussed earlier, General Eisenhower had policies in effect during World War II in the 
European Theater that prohibited such segregation, most white officers had a hard time 
swallowing the possibility that their white soldiers might be engaged with the same prostitutes 
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that black soldiers were frequenting.  This segregation of prostitutes usually had the effect of 
pushing black soldiers away from the “sanctioned” prostitutes and deeper into the unregulated 
areas where venereal disease, and in the case of Japan/Korea, drugs were more prevalent.  
Unfortunately, the data regarding this possible trend is only anecdotal and hard statistics are not 
available.    
     While the Eighth Army in Japan did prosecute and investigate drug related offenses during 
the time the 24
th
 spent in Japan, the main concern by regiment and division commands was a 
rising rate of venereal disease (VD) among the troops.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in particular 
attempted to curb the rate of VD among the African American troops in the years preceding the 
outbreak of the Korean War.  According to Houston McMurray, during the time he spent with 
the 24
th
 at Camp Gifu, the VD rate became so prevalent among the soldiers that the command 
went to extraordinary lengths to attempt to curb the problem.  McMurray recalled that a special 
station was set up outside the main gate to Camp Gifu and as soldiers came on base after leave 
“everybody had to take what they called a penicillin cocktail.”  At the camp gate there was a log 
book where soldiers would have to put down whether or not they had intercourse while off base.  
McMurray stated this was a poorly thought out idea since it “was almost a matter of honor” 
among the soldiers to sign that they had intercourse; “if you put down no, why everybody would 
laugh you out of the place so everybody checked off yes as though big deal.”
353
  The situation 
involving VD rates among the African American soldiers in the 24
th
 was serious enough to gain 
the attention of the senior most officers in Japan. 
     In a letter from Lieutenant General George Eichelberger to Dwight Eisenhower in February, 
1947 the two discussed the VD rate in Japan.  General Eichelberger noted, “The VD rate while 
                                                          
353
 Interview of Houston McMurray, no date given, Box 9, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
174 
 
too high is improving … our over-all rate in the Eighth Army a week ago was 125 per thousand 
annum with 74 for white and 584 for negro troops.”  General Eichelberger attempted to explain 
the significant discrepancy between VD rates between white soldiers and black soldiers by 
telling Eisenhower; “When one considers that the Negro troops are living in a Mohammedan 
heaven over here one can realize our difficulties.”
354
  The problem of managing VD rates became 
sever enough that it affected officers’ careers and forced officers to go to great lengths to thwart 
the rate of VD among their troops. 
     Colonel John Zanin recalled a battalion commander who was replaced because “instead of 
falsifying the total number of (VD) cases (as Zanin alleged some officers would do), he reported 
the actual number.”
355
  Colonel Halloran, the Regimental commander of the 24
th
 while it was 
stationed in Korea, took the issue of VD rates among his men quite personal.  According to the 
authors of Black Soldier White Army, soldiers who came down with VD “were called to 
Halloran’s office with their commanding officers, where all concerned were chastised.”  After 
this experience, Colonel Halloran ordered that “first time offenders received thirty days of 
medical attention and underwent a punishing regime of physical conditioning.”  If that did not 
get the attention of the offending soldier, Colonel Halloran improvised a method guaranteed to 
get the soldiers attention: “Halloran warned his troops that he would send a letter to the parents 




     This hodge-podge response to venereal disease by white officers in black units showed the 
relative lack of understanding the officers had of their men and their backgrounds.  The issue of 
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“sexual relations” concerning black soldiers had been mired in stereotypes and racial innuendo 
since the beginning of the 20
th
 Century.  Senior officers at the beginning of the Korean War had 
been inculcated throughout their military careers with the premise that black soldiers were sexual 
deviants prone to interaction with prostitutes or even rape.  The 1926 Army War College Study 
under a section titled “Morals” argued: “As judged by white standards, the Negro is unmoral.  
His ideas with relation to honor and sex relations are not on the same plane as those of our white 
population.”  To reinforce this point, the study proclaimed, “petty thieving, lying, promiscuity 
are much more common among Negroes than among whites,” and the white officer should never 
forget that “atrocities connected with white women have been the cause of considerable trouble 
among Negroes.”
357
  Although this crude, racist perspective of African American men was 
leavened with a more realistic approach to black male sexual issues by World War II, the Army 
still struggled to understand how best to deal with black soldiers and with issues related to 
venereal disease. 
     The 1944 Army Forces Manual used to teach white officers how to lead black soldiers 
included an entire chapter dedicated to the “Health of the Negro Soldier,” and of that chapter 
three-fourths was dedicated to venereal disease and prevention.  The manual accurately 
acknowledged that there were significant discrepancies between the VD rate among white 
soldiers and black soldiers.  The Army’s analysis in 1944 for the discrepancy was far more even-
handed and realistic than the 1926 theory that blacks lacked morals when it came to sexual 
relations.  The 1944 Forces Manual said that the cause for a higher VD rate among black troops 
was due to two factors: 
1. Because of a lower average level of education, many Negroes have not yet come to 
realize the gravity of this situation as it affects them as individuals. 
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2. Law enforcement officers and public health officials have failed to apply the same 
educational and clean-up policies and pressures to Negro communities that they have 
applied in the past few years to white communities.
358
     
 
     The analysis was telling because when read between the lines it appeared to acknowledge the 
inequalities of segregation in the lack of education for blacks and the admission that black 
communities had not received the same attention from public health officials as had white 
communities.  Realizing that the solution to part of the problem was a lack of education among 
black soldiers, the Army wanted their officers to tackle the VD problem among black troops with 
a special emphasis on education, a laudable and sensible approach to take and the same approach 
used by the Army to handle VD issues with white soldiers.  Perhaps the only difference between 
this educational approach for white and black soldiers was the Army stressed to the officers of 
black troops that “since many of your troops may be slow learners” they would have to devote 
particular attention to ensure black soldiers understood the message.  To further that end, the 
manual suggested “demonstrations of the use of mechanical or chemical kits and of station 
prophylaxis will be helpful both from an instructional point of view and to overcome the fear of 
pain which often prevents full use of prophylaxis.”
359
 
     The Army also implored white officers to incorporate the use of Non-Commissioned Officers 
(NCOs), which in African American units were always black soldiers themselves.  The manual 
warned that “some adjacent civilian Negro communities, because of long years of poverty and 
neglect, may have a higher venereal disease rate than that of the general community,” and NCOs 
were crucial to fighting VD because the NCOs could go into the communities into which a white 
officer could and should not venture.
360
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     The Army continued to struggle with reducing the number of VD cases in black soldiers as 
well as white soldiers, but the increase in educational programs that stressed preventive measures 
and the use of prophylaxis were effective in bringing down the number of cases of VD in both 
races during the Korean War.  The gradual integration of black and white soldiers during the 
Korean War no doubt also helped to bring the cases of VD in black troops down to levels more 
closely aligned to their white brethren.  
Medals and Race 
     The early twentieth century was in many ways a period of regression when it came to the 
awarding of medals of valor to African American soldiers.  Prior to World War I, African 
American soldiers had been recognized on the battlefield for their acts of courage and valor, 
from the Civil War, and that was also true for the period through the Indian Wars and the 
Spanish American War.  Notably, as historian Allen Mikaelian has pointed out; “Not a single 
African American who fought in the First World War received the Medal of Honor until 1991 ... 
Not a single African American who fought in the Second World War received the Medal of 
Honor until 1997, 52 years after the end of the war.”
361
  One of the cases in a study directed by 
Congress during the 1990s about the Medal of Honor and African American soldiers during 
World War II focused on the actions of Second Lieutenant Vernon Baker.   
     Lt. Baker was a member of Almond’s 92
nd
 Infantry Division in Italy during World War II.  
Baker led his men on an assault of a fortified position and personally engaged and killed enemy 
personnel during the attack.  Baker and his white commanding officer, Captain John F. Runyon, 
were both put in for the Medal of Honor, but both awards were downgraded to the Distinguished 
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Service Medal.  The study concluded in the case of Baker: 
          Both officers had indisputably demonstrated great courage under fire.  Both had also  
          shown superior leadership in combat – Runyon as a company commander, Baker as a  
          platoon leader.  The principle and telling difference between the two, however, was that  
          Lieutenant Baker had repeatedly engaged in close combat with the enemy, whereas  
          Runyon had not.
362
   
     
     While the study did not explicitly find that racial bias was a factor in the downgrading of 
Baker’s medal, they did determine that Baker’s action when compared to other comparable 
actions by white soldiers would have resulted in the issuance of a Medal of Honor.  As a result, 
Baker’s Distinguished Service Medal was upgraded to the Medal of Honor in 1997. 
     Combat during the Korean War was just as chaotic and violent as the preceding wars of the 
twentieth century, and African American soldiers again displayed incredible acts of valor and 
courage.  Black soldiers, such as 2
nd
 Lieutenant William M. Benefield – a platoon leader in the 
77
th
 Engineer Combat Company literally put their lives on the line, and in the case of Lieutenant 
Benefield, paid the ultimate price.  According to the authors of Black Soldier White Army, on 
July 29, 1950, Lieutenant Benefield faced leading his men through a mine field in view of a 
North Korean force.  “Concerned that enemy fire was too intense and that many of his men 
would be killed in the effort to clear the mines, he assumed the task himself but was cut down 
within 200 yards of enemy positions before he could complete it.”
363
  The claims made by some 
white officers during Project Clear interviews that asserted black soldiers would not unduly risk 
themselves to clear mine fields was put to lie by the actions of Lieutenant Benefield. 
     African American soldiers in Korea demonstrated that they had the drive and determination to 
engage with and fight the enemy.  Despite the already well disproven belief by some white 
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officers that black soldiers lacked the “will” to engage in combat, African American soldiers in 
the 24
th 
proved again through their actions that they were quite willing to engage the enemy.  As 
was sometimes the case in World War I and II, the fighting in Korea could be up-close and 
personal.  Clarence Willis recalled how on one occasion he watched “Black Daddy” Williams 
engage with an enemy soldier after they came under attack near the village of Haman.  Willis 
witnessed Captain Williams as “he went up and pulled the enemy out of his hole and choked him 
to death.”
364
  Captain Williams was clearly ready and willing to “engage” with the enemy. 
     Even some of the most “problematic” black soldiers in the 24
th
 could under good leadership 
demonstrate amazing courage and determination under fire.  Philip Harper was an officer in the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment who had several “troublemakers” assigned to him.  Harper stated that one 
of these was Pfc. Boyd.  Boyd was one of several members of the 24
th
 that were in confinement 
in the Eighth Army Stockade at Gifu, Japan, when the Korean War broke out.  He and number of 
his fellow inmates were given the option of completing their prison sentences or volunteering to 
fight in Korea.  Pfc. Boyd chose to fight in Korea.   
     Harper noted that “in the short time that I had been able to observe the men in my platoon, 
Pfc. Boyd had impressed me as being a highly self-confident, level-headed, and forceful young 
soldier” despite his early run-ins with military discipline.  Harper stated that during one 
particularly tense battle, he ordered Pfc. Boyd to “hold what you’ve got” and to report over radio 
when he and his men started to run low on ammunition.  Harper recalled that after a dense fog 
rolled in the enemy reinstated their attack on Boyd’s position.  Boyd called on the phone to 
report that he and his men were out of machine gun ammunition and grenades, and had only 
between two and three clips of M1 ammunition per man.  Harper ordered Pfc. Boyd to “bring the 
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troops home” and issued orders for all available firepower to be used to support Boyd and his 
men’s withdrawal.  Harper recalled with pride, “Pfc. Boyd led his men back into the main 
platoon perimeter without losing a man!”
365
  Forty years later, Harper was visibly impressed with 
Pfc. Boyd’s courage and presence of mind under circumstances in which a lesser man would 
have panicked and brought ruin to himself and his men.  
     There are times in a conflict, as with the Korean War, when doing ones duty in the face of 
danger and chaos is of itself an act of courage.  The cruelty of war was made apparent to the men 
of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as much as any other unit engaged in combat in Korea.  One 24
th
 
Infantry regiment veteran Jerry Johnson, encountered the cruelty of war personally while out on 
a 21 man reconnaissance patrol.  During the nighttime patrol, Johnson and the other members of 
his patrol observed a North Korean detachment near a large bonfire about 500 yards away from 
them.  Johnson watched through field glasses as “captured white and black wounded soldiers 
were being dragged to the fire and thrown in.”
366
  Johnson said at the time they were about five 
miles in front of friendly lines, and the North Korean soldiers were about a thousand strong.  
Johnson said there was nothing he and his fellow soldiers on patrol could do but head back to 
their lines and report what they had witnessed.  Johnson and his men carried those horrific 
images with them the rest of their lives, a burden shared by countless veterans of Korea, both 
white and black. 
     Theodore Eldridge recalled a similar situation when Roosevelt Dixon and the rest of his squad 
were found burned to death with their hands tied behind their backs.  Eldridge said he 
remembered Dixon because “he had volunteered to go the front because he wanted to be a 90 
day wonder” (referring to soldiers who were assigned to positions in the rear but volunteered to 
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go to the front for 90 days to “get a taste” of combat).
367
   
     The cruelty of North Korean and Chinese forces as witnessed by Johnson and Eldridge 
sometimes left American soldiers numb to violence.  As with other wars of the 20th century, the 
morals and rules of combat can become foggy under sustained immersion in war.  Ralph Davis 
recalled a situation involving a lone enemy soldier and his entire company.  Davis said that as his 
company approached a terrain finger where an enemy soldier was holed up, the soldier decided 
to make a run for the next adjacent terrain finger – through at least a foot of snow.  Davis 
explained what happened: 
          If it wasn’t tragic it was almost comical.  The configuration of the finger permitted the  
          entire company a view and a shot at the running soldier.  It was like rapid fire on a rifle  
          range.  Rifles and automatic rifles were blazing away while this man ran down the slope  
          through the snow then up the slippery opposite slope to sanctuary.  He made it down and  
          was about halfway up the opposite slope when he was hit, staggered and fell.  His body  
          jerked a few more times as more bullets hit his stationary body.  Over one hundred  
          marksmen took minutes to down this doomed man!
368
      
      
     The men of Davis’ company had become desensitized to the violence of war and to the 
destruction of a human life.  For Davis and his company the enemy had become nothing more 
than a moving target at a firing range.  It is under these harsh and chaotic circumstances created 
in the cauldron of war that medals of valor can play a critical role for the soldier.  Medals of 
valor recognize those traits that militaries rely on in individuals in time of war: honor, self-
sacrifice, compassion, and courage.  The recognition of these worthy traits acted as a salve for 
the unseen wounds that accumulate on the soldier’s psyche during combat. 
     This recognition was even more important for African American soldiers fighting in the 
Korean War, since they struggled on a day-to-day basis with the ongoing racism of a segregated 
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Army.  Even the smallest token of appreciation by a military bureaucracy that seemed distant to 
the average black soldier went a long way toward improving the morale of the soldier and his 
comrades.  Also, the desire to be recognized for the sacrifices made on the battlefield did not end 
with the war.  For some men who went through the crucible of war the desire to have their 
sacrifices recognized became almost a life-long quest.  
     Yvonne Latty in We Were There: Voices of African American Veterans, from World War II to 
the War in Iraq, related the story of black Korean War veteran Charles Armstrong, an infantry 
platoon leader in charge of leading his men in the capture of a hill.  Lt. Armstrong later described 
the event as a particularly nasty endeavor.  He noted, “We attached bayonets to our rifles, and as 
we marched, we stabbed every dead body we walked by to make sure it wasn’t the enemy 
pretending to be dead.”  Despite the gruesome ordeal, Armstrong and his men successfully 
captured the enemy held hill.  Impressed by his leadership, Armstrong’s captain went up to 
Armstrong and told him: “I’m putting you in for a medal.”  It was a promise that was never 
fulfilled.  Armstrong noted dejectedly forty years later, “I still make calls and try to get the Army 
to recognize what I have done.  I’ll always keep hoping for a medal or something, but so far it’s 
not happened.”
369
  The next few pages explore the process for awarding medals of valor during 
the Korean War, examining circumstances in which race and the bias of white officers could 
have played a deciding role as to whether a medal was awarded to black soldiers.     
Bureaucracy and Medals 
     For the African American soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and other black soldiers 
serving in Korea in the first couple years of the Korean War, the recognition for acts of valor and 
courage amidst the carnage and cruelty of war were slow in coming.  To claim that the majority 
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of African American soldiers were denied recognition for their acts of bravery solely due to their 
race – as was the case in the previous two wars – was not borne out by the evidence.  Indeed, two 
African American soldiers received the Congressional Medal of Honor during the Korean War.  
However, racism still played a role in the issuance of medals to some extent during the Korean 
War – as was the case in Captain Forest Walker’s Silver Star recommendation that General 
Almond denied for no other reason than Captain Walker was an African American.
370
  One 
element of the problem in making a determination whether the issuance (or lack thereof) of 
medals of valor to African Americans was due to race was the dominant assumptions of the 
military bureaucracy that oversaw the medal process.  
     Clinton Moorman served as the Awards and Decorations Officer for the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment for part of the Korean War.  Moorman explained that when he initially took over as the 
Awards and Decorations officer one of the biggest hurdles was getting the officers to put their 
men in for an award.  Moorman said he went to the regimental commander, Colonel Roberts, and 
told him “we need to push the guys on getting these awards and decorations … The guys are 
doing some things and they aren’t putting them in.”
371
  Part of the problem, as Moorman saw it, 
was that the officers were hesitant to write up their men for awards because of a lack of 
understanding of the process and because of time constraints during a situation of ongoing 
combat.  However, as noted previously, the majority of officers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and 
other African American units were white.  Moorman commented: “I think it was very, very 
difficult to get decorations for a lot of the black kids that did things.”  Moorman cited the 
example of Levi Jackson.  Moorman said Jackson’s commanding officer “didn’t want to do 
anything for him” despite the fact that “this kid (Levi Jackson) protected – gave up his life to 
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protect one of the other guys.”
372
 
     The official citation to Corporal Levi Jackson’s Distinguished Service Cross (posthumous) 
stated that on August 13, 1950: 
          Corporal Jackson was serving as medical aid man with Company G when two men were  
          seriously wounded.  Moving across the exposed terrain through the withering enemy small  
          arms and automatic-weapons fire, he reached the men and was administering first aid  
          when the enemy laid a devastating barrage on the area.  Heedless of his personal safety, he  
          shielded the two wounded men with his own body in an effort to protect them from further  
          wounds.  While in this exposed position he was mortally wounded.  Corporal Jackson  
          performed his duties as medical corpsman in a heroic manner.  His primary concern at all  
          times was the welfare and prompt treatment of the many wounded.  On numerous  
          occasions he evacuated men under the most adverse conditions over treacherous terrain  
          while subjected to constant hostile fire.
373
  
      
     Moorman was asked in an interview if he thought that because soldiers such as Jackson were 
black they were treated differently than had they been white.  Moorman responded, “I think so 
… It’s hard to say something like that,” but in the case of Corporal Jackson “…. probably, if 
he’d have been white, [he] would have gotten the Congressional Medal of Honor for what he 
did.”
374
  Other Medal of Honor citations awarded to white personnel add credence to Moorman’s 
claim.  Specifically, medical personnel who risked their own life to protect and shield others 
from danger have received the Congressional Medal of Honor – as was the case of Hospital 
Corpsman Second Class Donald Ballard during the Vietnam War.
375
   
     Augustus Gillert recalled that some years later another attempt was made to get Jackson the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.  He remembered that when Jackson’s body was recovered they 
found him covering the man he had saved who was wounded but still alive.  Gillert said they 
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ended up getting an account of Jackson’s actions “from the wounded guy that happened to make 
it through the fight.”  Gillert said he knew that the Army did eventually recognize two other 
members of the 24
th




     The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was not the only unit that witnessed first-hand the problems with 
military bureaucracy regarding medals.  After Task Force Faith was decimated on the eastern 
shores of the Chosin Reservoir, the Army under the direction of Major Jones attempted to 
identify individuals whose actions warranted recommendations for medals of valor.  Captain 




 Infantry, was one of the individuals whose exploits 
were identified as being worthy of a recommendation for the Congressional Medal of Honor.  
Major General Field Harris of the United States Marine Corps – commander of the 1
st
 Marine 
Air Wing, wrote to Fleet Marine Headquarters that Captain Stamford’s actions “rated a top notch 
decoration and that it looked to me that it was pretty close to a Medal of Honor.”  Unfortunately, 
the award became entangled in the bureaucracy of the Navy and Army.  Appleman recorded the 
outcome, “the problem of getting action on it one way or another by two different services, the 
Army and the Navy, after being proposed by an Air Wing of the Marine Corps, apparently was 
too much for the mechanics of the award system” and as a result – Captain Stamford’s award 
was eventually downgraded to a Silver Star.
377
   
     Major Jones also reported that to his “surprise” the other hurdle he had difficulty overcoming 
was getting survivors to provide statements of actions they witnessed or could corroborate.  
According to Major Jones, “in some instances, lack of education, or limited capability to express 
themselves in writing, might have had an influence on this reluctance.”  Yet, even when Major 
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Jones offered assistance in drafting the witness reports – soldiers were still reluctant to come 
forth with accounts of actions they witnessed.  Major Jones felt that because of the chaos of 
combat, the participants felt “heroic acts were happening continuously, concurrently, endlessly 
and were in fact somewhat commonplace.”  Also, Major Jones thought that some might have 
been reluctant because the participant who committed the act of bravery was deceased and they 
questioned “the necessity of submitting a recommendation for an award for someone who would 
never know about it.”
378
   
     Ironically, the only medals that Major Jones recalled as being pushed through with ease were 
the three Silver Star awards made by General Almond during his brief visit with Lieutenant 
Colonel Don Faith and his surrounded men on the east bank of the Chosin.  When Major Jones 
found out those awards had not been published at X Corps Headquarters, he “filled out three 
forms on the spot, and stated that they had been awarded by the Corps Commander on 28 
November 1950.  No corroborating statements from witnesses were provided.  These were the 
only recommendation that were not returned for rewrite or for additional information.”
379
 
     Another problem with the issuance of medals for valor was that each act was rated by senior 
officers with little to no guidance regarding what constituted an award for the Silver Star as 
opposed to the Distinguished Service Cross or Medal of Honor.  While there is some 
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classification for each award, such as “gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States” 
in the case of the Silver Star; each medal is open to wide latitude in interpretation.  For example, 
the difference between the Silver Star and the Distinguished Service Cross is the addition of the 
word “extreme” right before “gallantry” or in some write-ups the recipient displayed 
“extraordinary heroism” as opposed to just “heroism.”  Essentially, an officer reviewing a write-
up for an award would have to decide whether the action was “gallant” or “extremely gallant.”  
This type of subjective analysis lends itself to differences in opinion – and in particular with 
regard to African Americans ultimately differences in the manner of award forwarded for 
recognition. 
     Augustus Gillert recalled an encounter he had with Colonel Corley regarding a medal that 
Colonel Corley was putting in on Gillert’s behalf.  Gillert said he was called in to meet with 
Colonel Corley and Corley asked, “Gus, I’ve got this recommendation.  How many North 
Koreans did you kill?  You personally?”  Gillert said that out of modesty he reduced the number 
he thought he had killed by one or two and said “I think it might have been six or eight, 
something like that.”  Corley responded “That’s what I thought.  I want the word to get out in 
this regiment that you’ve got to kill North Koreans to get a decoration.”  Corley then turned to 
his clerk and said “this is only a Silver Star action” referring to the write-up for Augustus 
Gillert.
380
   
     Gillert said that years later he had a conversation with Corley and the topic of medals came 
up.  Gillert said that Corley told him that he was “trying to set a standard” for medals.  Corley 








 is way 
down low.”  Gillert said that Corley took responsibility for that because he was trying to set a 
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standard.  Corley told Gillert that during World War II a friend of his ended up getting a 
Distinguished Service Cross, “but he was killed getting it, so that was his criteria.  If you didn’t 
get killed getting it, you didn’t deserve it.”
381
 
     Some members of the 24
th
 would claim that Colonel Corley’s decisions on awards were based 
on the race of the soldier.  One unidentified member of the 24
th
 claimed, “this unit ain’t got the 
medals due it.  Some of the boys have been put in for the DSC and we ain’t heard nothing from 
them.  We get damn tired of doing all of the dirty work and these white officers get all of the 
credit.”
382
      Beverly Scott agreed with the unidentified soldier and admitted that it was a 
“disservice” to the soldiers that were killed in the 24
th
 who were not recognized for their acts of 
valor.  Scott said, “There were a lot of black kids there in our regiment, just like other regiments 
who had no understanding of what they were there for.  Doing what they were told to do” who 
were killed doing their duty to the utmost.
383
   
Distinguished Service Crosses in the 24th 
     The record of Colonel Corley’s tenure as commander of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment does 
include several recommendations for the Distinguished Service Cross.  As noted earlier, the 
actions of Levi Jackson in sacrificing his life for the men he was caring for ultimately resulted in 
the issuance of a DSC (posthumously).  Another Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to 2
nd
 
Lieutenant Chestor Lenon, an African American junior officer with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  
     Lieutenant Lenon tried to eliminate an enemy’s machine gun placement with grenades but 
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was wounded in the attempt.  Lieutenant Lenon stayed behind with his men and hid for five days 
along with six wounded enlisted men.  According to the authors of Black Soldier White Army, 
while Lieutenant Lenon stayed behind with the wounded, one of his soldiers went for help.  
According to the account, “Pfc. Edward Sanders, sometimes crawling, sometimes walking, 
eluded enemy patrols to make his way eight miles to the rear to seek help.  Bitten by a poisonous 
snake during the journey and terribly swollen as a result” he was eventually found by American 
soldiers.
384
  Private Sanders described to his rescuers the location of Lieutenant Lenon and the 
others before he succumbed to his wounds.   
     For his command leadership under the most grueling of circumstances Lieutenant Lenon 
received the DSC.  According to Lieutenant Lenon and other members of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment, Sanders was put in for a Congressional Medal of Honor, but he never received it.  The 
authors of Black Soldier White Army acknowledged that, “since many unit award files from the 
Korean War period are missing, it is unclear whether he (Pfc. Sanders) received some alternate 
decoration.”
385
   
     The inspirational story of Private First Class Sanders, with its similarity to the ancient Greek 
account of Pheidippides’ brave run from the battle of Marathon to Athens to announce to the city 
leaders “we have won” before collapsing and dying, was a remarkable story to begin with; but 
that only scratches the surface of Sanders’ remarkable journey.  According to Lieutenant Lenon, 
who spoke with members of Sanders’ rescuing party prior to being located by American troops, 
Sanders had been briefly captured by the North Koreans and “beaten and left for dead.”
 386
   The 
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journey Sanders made through enemy territory, while being subjected to the elements and at least 
one poisonous snake, and then captured, beaten, and left for dead, yet still able to push-on further 
is a testament to the human spirit.  In an ironic twist that will become evident later in this 
chapter, the man to whom Sanders told his story before he died of his wounds was an African 
American officer in charge of an engineer unit, named Lieutenant Charles Bussey.  Sanders and 
Lieutenant Bussey became inextricably linked because one of the medals of valor denied 
Lieutenant Bussey was due to his actions after hearing Private Sanders’s story and his efforts to 
rescue Lieutenant Lenon and the other soldiers left behind enemy lines.   
     Another member of the 24
th
 that received a Distinguished Service Cross was Corporal Earl 
Phoenix.  According to Black Soldier White Army, Corporal Phoenix, “although badly wounded 
twice, stayed at his machine gun until his ammunition was expended to keep his squad from 
being cut off and overrun.”
387
  The award file for Phoenix, indicated that he initially was 
nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor, but the award was reduced to the DSC.  The 
award file does not provide a reason for the downgrade which begs the question; did Corporal 
Phoenix’s race have anything to do with the change in awards?  Although Corporal Phoenix’s 
race would not have been required to be reported in the medal write-up, because the Army was 
still operating segregated units, Corporal Phoenix’s unit would have been a sufficient indication 
of his race.  This leads to the question; was there a white officer in Corporal Phoenix’s chain-of-
command who realized that Phoenix was from the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and therefore an 
African American and as a result of that information down-graded the medal?  
     These questions are difficult to answer because the Army was careful to not leave behind a 
“smoking gun” as it were to make obvious the prevalence of this type of racism.  The problem is 
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further obfuscated because the record in Korea clearly indicates that African American soldiers 
were being recognized for their acts of bravery in some circumstances.  But were the medals 
issued for acts of bravery equal in precedence to the soldier’s actions: were Distinguished 
Service Crosses being issued in lieu of the Congressional Medal of Honor?  To answer this 
question, it is necessary to look at the two Congressional Medal of Honor’s that were issued to 




Congressional Medal of Honor and the 24
th
 
     Of all the honors that the United States government can bestow on a citizen, all fall short in 
reverence and prestige to the Medal of Honor.  It ranks as the highest military medal and one that 
entitles the wearer to a military salute from all members of the military hierarchy (including the 
President of the United States) regardless of the rank of the bearer of the Medal of Honor.  Yet, 
despite the prestige of the medal, many of the recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor 
carry with them a burden for being chosen for the honor.  More than one living Medal of Honor 
recipient has questioned why they have been selected for this honor when many others around 
them sacrificed their lives and still did not receive the Medal of Honor.   
     During World War I, Edouard Victor Michel Izac, a recent immigrant to the United States, 
wondered to himself and to his superiors why he “was getting a medal when all he did was to get 
captured” by the Germans.
388
  Or William Charette – a corpsmen during the Korean War who 
commented “I’ve often wondered why ... you’ve got four dead corpsmen, and if I don’t get the 
medal, there’d be no live corpsmen out of the Korean War ... I don’t know.  It’s just a 
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  Many of the survivors that are awarded the Medal of Honor wear this medal 
reluctantly.  In his study, Medal of Honor, Allen Mikaelian observed that “those who hold the 
Medal of Honor often wince at the phrases Medal of Honor winner; or won the Medal of Honor.”  
Those warriors do not view the carnage of war as a “contest that delivered the award.”
390
  
Instead, they view it as a distinction they grudgingly receive as a remembrance to their comrades 
who did not live to wear the award themselves.   
     During the Korean War, the first Medal of Honor was issued to Major General William Dean 
who personally led men in an attempt to counteract an assault by an armored unit of the North 
Koreans.  The issuance of the Congressional Medal of Honor was taken very seriously by the 
military.  Major General Dean’s Medal of Honor in September 1950 elicited a memorandum 
from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace to President Truman.  Pace wrote to President Truman 
and suggested: “I feel that it would be appropriate, and I can assure you it would be greatly 
appreciated, if the White House were to issue a press release and statement” regarding the 
issuance of the Congressional Medal of Honor for General Dean.
391
   
     After the issuance of the first Congressional Medal of Honor, many more followed for actions 
performed during the Korean War, 136 to be exact; yet it would not be until the summer of 1951 
before the first Congressional Medal of Honor was issued to an African American.  The honor to 
be the first African American awarded the Medal of Honor went to Pfc. William Thompson of 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment for his actions on August 6, 1950, near the village of Haman, Korea.  
Unfortunately, the award for Thompson was issued posthumously because he was killed during 
his heroic actions.   
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     The significance of Pfc. Thompson’s Congressional Medal of Honor was not lost on the 
African American community.  Harry McAlpin, who had been the first accredited African 
American White House correspondent, was a practicing attorney when he wrote a telegram to 
President Truman on June 14, 1951.  In the telegram McAlpin asked that President Truman make 
the presentation of the Medal of Honor personally to Thompson’s family.  McAlpin wrote, “[I] 
am aware congressional medal of honor is outside realm of politics, but frequent practice is for 
President of United States to make the award, failure of President to make this award in case of 
first negro to receive it after so long a period will be made political capital of opponents.  Why 
make it hard for us?”
392
  What McAlpin was referring to when he said “after so long a period” 
was the fact that the last African American to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor served 
during the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
     McAlpin received a reply to his telegram to President Truman from Major General Harry 
Vaughan, the Military Aide to the President.  Major General Vaughan said “it has been the 
President’s policy to personally award this medal only when the person receiving it is alive to 
accept it.  The President made an exception several months ago when he personally awarded four 
posthumous Congressional Medals.”  However, “the posthumous awarding of medals is 
emotionally very hard on the President and in view of the fact that he is under considerable strain 
at all times it has been recommended that he make no further exceptions to his original 
policy.”
393
  Instead of having the award presented by President Truman, the Thompson family 
received Pfc. William Thompson’s Congressional Medal of Honor from General Omar Bradley 
during a ceremony conducted at the Pentagon on June 21, 1951. 
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     The next African American to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor during the Korean 
War was Sergeant Cornelius Charlton, also of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Sergeant Charlton 
was recognized for his actions near Chipo-ri, Korea, on June 2, 1951.  As was the case with Pfc. 
Thompson, Sergeant Charlton’s medal was also posthumous since he died as a result of his 
heroic actions.  Sergeant Charlton’s family received the medal on March 19, 1952.  Sergeant 
Charlton was the 41
st
 soldier to receive the Congressional Medal of Honor during the Korean 
War.  When his 58 year old father, Van Charlton, learned that his son would receive the medal 
he remarked; “My boy’s action in combat and his death make a liar out of Paul Robeson, who 
said the Negroes would never fight for their country against the Communists!”
394
   
     The issuance of the Congressional Medal of Honor to Pfc. Thompson and Sergeant Charlton 
would seem to make clear that Sergeant Charlton’s father was right: the argument that African 
Americans did not make for courageous soldiers was a lie.  Yet ironically, in October of 1951, 
just several months after Sergeant Charlton’s sacrifice, Gail Buckley noted that the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment was still being “accused of wholesale cowardice” and it was this condemnation of the 
24
th
 that eventually led to the unit’s deactivation in 1951 – a decision that will be discussed 
further in Chapter V.
395
 
The History and Process of Awarding the Congressional Medal of Honor 
     Because of the prestige of the Congressional Medal of Honor the means by which the award 
was processed was complex and labor intensive.  The United States military went to significant 
ends to ensure that the reputation of the medal remained high and that each and every recipient 
of the medal was truly deserving of the nation’s highest honor.  This was not always the case.   
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According to Allen Mikaelian, when the Medal of Honor was created in 1862 the initial problem 
was “this medal wasn’t just the highest honor a soldier or sailor could receive, it was practically 
the only one.”
396
  As a result, when the entire 864 men of the 27
th
 Maine received the Medal of 
Honor as a way of encouraging them to stay on a couple weeks past their enlistment - even 
though only 300 of the 864 actually stayed - this was because the Medal of Honor was the only 
military medal that Secretary of War Edwin Stanton had to offer.  However, by 1890 with the 
creation of the Medal of Honor Legion, headed by Major General John Schofield (also a Medal 
of Honor recipient), the foundations were in place for making the Medal of Honor into a 
prestigious award worthy of the name “Congressional Medal of Honor.”  
     Drawing on the work already done by the Medal of Honor Legion in the late 1800s and early 
1900s, in January 1917 a military board reviewed the 2,625 Medal of Honor’s that had been 
issued to that point and ordered the withdrawal of 911 of the Medal of Honors that did not meet 
the new requirements of “distinguished bravery in action.”  The rearrangement of priorities for 
issuing the Medal of Honor along with the creation of the Distinguished Service Crosses and 
Silver Star on July 9, 1918, meant that World War I was the first major conflict where the Medal 
of Honor would stand out as a truly significant military medal.  In some regards the standard set 
for the Medal of Honor during World War I was set almost too high.  At the end of the war, 
General John J. Pershing realized that only four Congressional Medal of Honor medals had been 
issued.  General Pershing ordered a review of Distinguished Service Cross recipients and as a 
result 78 DSCs were upgraded to the Congressional Medal of Honor.”
397
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     According to the congressionally mandated study, The Exclusion of Black Soldiers from the 
Medal of Honor in World War II, with the onset of World War II and in an effort to protect the 
reputation of the Congressional Medal of Honor the “War Department reserved for itself final 
authority to award the Medal of Honor and disapprove a nomination” while the other lesser 
medals to include the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star were allowed to be authorized 
by theater or subordinate commanders.
398
  Despite their efforts to allow for an unbiased outcome 
in the awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor, internal studies after World War II noted 
that “differentiating the acts meriting the Medal of Honor from those deserving the next two 
highest valor awards was extremely difficult.”
399
   
     The main unanswered question regarding the Medal of Honor during World War II and the 
one that the congressional study attempted to answer in the 1990s was; was submitting and 
processing of Medal of Honor awards based on race?  The study ultimately concluded that “no 
explicit, written evidence in official documents proving that African Americans were 
discriminated against in the awarding of medals in general or the Medal of Honor in 
particular.”
400
  On face value such a claim would seem to be contradictory given the fact that 
there were no Congressional Medal of Honor medals awarded to African Americans.  The key 
factor in this statement is “explicit, written evidence in official documents.”  Even among the 
most racially biased officers, they would have been very leery of putting in writing their reasons 
for disapproving or not forwarding a medal based on race.  This act would have been tantamount 
to career suicide even in the Army of World War II.  Perhaps more illustrative was the study’s 
finding that “in one case, circumstantial evidence indicates the nomination may have been 
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stopped by the acting battalion commander for reasons of racial prejudice.”
401
   
     Unfortunately, in both World War II and in the Korean War, to find examples of racial bias in 
the issuance of medals the only real source of information was circumstantial evidence.  One 
potential clue regarding circumstantial evidence was to identify officers who showed racial bias 
and extrapolate from that they could very well have discriminated against African American 
soldiers under their command in the issuance and support for medals based on the soldiers’ race.  
Another possible method would be to identify the actions of an African American soldier who 
displayed similar actions to a white soldier and then compare the corresponding medals issued to 
the white soldier and black soldier.  This was the primary basis of analysis of the congressional 
study in the 1990s that looked into the procedures for medals awarded to African Americans in 
World War II. 
     The process of submitting a soldier for the Congressional Medal of Honor began in much the 
same way as any other medal of valor.  After an act of bravery by a soldier in the face of the 
enemy, members of the unit, usually but not necessarily at the direction of the soldier’s 
commanding officer, would write an account of what they witnessed the soldier do in battle.  
These first hand witness reports were the first crucial step in the process.  These eye-witness 
accounts also demonstrated one of the drawbacks of medals of valor; if eye-witness reports were 
not written in a timely manner, or the soldiers who witnessed an act worthy of an award of valor 
were themselves killed in combat, or wounded, or transferred to another unit, or to the States, 
then there was no first-hand corroboration of the act of valor to be used in beginning the process.   
     In the case of Pfc. Thompson, the ongoing conflict around the time of Thompson’s selfless 
sacrifice and death meant that eye-witness reports were not initially completed.  (Thompson was 
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killed on August 6, 1950).  When Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair first forwarded the reports on 
Pfc. Thompson’s acts without all of the corroborating statements, the recommendation was 
returned awarding Thompson the Silver Star.  According to Lt. Col. Blair, the reports were 
submitted a second time and this time the recommendation came back for a Distinguished 
Service Star.  Then in November, 1950, Lt. Col. Blair stated that he “personally interviewed 
many of the witnesses to Thompson’s valorous actions” and specifically, he determined that 
when they found Pfc. Thompson’s body “it had been riddled with gunfire and repeatedly 
stabbed.”  In his write-up, Lt. Col. Blair attributed the state of Thompson’s body as “an 
indication that surviving enemy soldiers sought vengeance for the damage Thompson had done” 
prior to his death.
402
  Lt. Col. Blair stated that based on all the evidence he was convinced 
Thompson was clearly deserving of the Congressional Medal of Honor, so he resubmitted the 
request a third time with all the required paperwork, including a certificate (dated November 25, 
1950) summarizing his investigation and his recommendation. 
     According to Lt. Col. Blair, with additional administrative delays it took until June 3, 1951, 
for the Army to finally approve Pfc. Thompson’s Congressional Medal of Honor.  Lt. Col. Blair 
was insistent that the long delay in processing Thompson’s Medal of Honor had nothing to do 
with Thompson’s race, but was due to the administrative hurdles that were already in place 
regarding the submission of medals.   
The Case for Private First Class Edward Sanders 
     From Lt. Col. Blair’s account of the process it would appear that had it not been for his 
persistence in resubmitting the paperwork several times, Thompson may have never received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.  Unfortunately for Pfc. Edward Sanders, the soldier who crawled 
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for help through enemy territory even after being bitten by a venomous snake and being beaten 
by the North Koreans and left for dead, there was no officer to painstakingly guide his award 
submission through the laborious process.  Despite the testimony of Chester Lenon, who 
received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions with Pfc. Sanders, and First Lieutenant 
(later Captain) Charles M. Bussey, who found Pfc. Sanders and led the rescue of Lenon and the 
other soldiers; Sanders did not receive the Congressional Medal of Honor.  Sanders did not even 
receive a Distinguished Service Cross.  There is no record that Sanders received any medal for 
his actions that led to the rescue of five soldiers and cost him his life.   
     The War Diary for the 65
th
 Engineer Battalion for August, 1950 (prepared in November 1950) 
did mention a recommendation for Pfc. Sanders to receive (posthumously) the Congressional 
Medal of Honor.  Major General (then first Lieutenant) Carroll N. LeTellier, who replaced First 
Lieutenant Benefield after he was killed clearing a mine field in Korea, remembered that Chester 
Lenon received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on August 6, 1950, Bussey the 
Bronze Medal Star for leading the rescue of Lenon and four others, but Pfc. Sanders did not 
appear to ever receive a medal.
403
  Pfc. Sanders’ medal recommendation either fell through the 
administrative cracks or was shelved by an unsympathetic officer.  We will probably never know 
the actual case.  Whatever the reason for Pfc. Sanders’ medal recommendation to not make it 
through the system, his actions were one of the truly heroic stories of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, 
and he and his comrades deserve to have his memory recognized with an appropriate medal of 
valor – if not the Congressional Medal of Honor.      
The Case for Captain Charles Bussey 
     Besides Pfc. Edwards Sanders, there is one other African American associated with the 24
th
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Infantry Regiment (with the 65
th
 Engineer Battalion) who probably deserved the Congressional 
Medal of Honor – Captain Edward Bussey.  On October 13, 1989, near Yechon, Korea, Charles 
M. Bussey (Lieutenant Colonel – retired) spoke with Colonel Thomas M. Ryan, the Command 
Historian, U.S. Forces, Korea, 8
th
 U.S. Army.  Bussey described his actions on July 20-22, 1950, 
a story that he had relayed several other times and regarding which has at least several 
corroborating witnesses.  The subsequent controversy regarding Bussey’s tale was that if it was 
to be believed then Captain Bussey was responsible for an act of military bravery that rivaled any 
other during the Korean War and would essentially have made Bussey the African American 
equivalent of Alvin York and Audie Murphy.  According to Charles Bussey, at the exact spot 
where he spoke with Colonel Ryan, almost forty years earlier, he had killed close to 250 North 
Korean soldiers! 
     On July 20, 1950, First Lieutenant Bussey came upon a group of six or seven soldiers of the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment, 2
nd
 Battalion, who were with a truck on the outskirts of Yechon, Korea.  
Bussey drove up in a jeep to survey the town, which at this point was on fire because of 
American artillery shelling.  Bussey said, “I climbed here and I got a pretty good view of this 
thing.  And I see men coming from what appears to be out of the ground.  And so I said that must 
be a river bed.  And with a mountain over here, it’s natural that there would be a river here.”
404
   
     As Bussey retold the chain-of-events from that summer day in July, 1950, he pointed to the 
terrain features he remembered, his memory of that day coming back to him as he described the 
action and his thoughts.  Bussey continued: “I watched a while, and they (North Korean soldiers) 
were coming.  At a point in time I saw 15 or 20 men.”  Bussey said that he then had the men with 
him that were still with his truck bring ammunition boxes to him as he set up a .50 caliber 
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machine gun at the top of the hill.  Bussey also set up a .30 caliber machine gun that he had in his 
jeep.  Bussey detailed what happened next: 
          We set these guns up, and by then these guys have moved in here, and I am looking at,  
          maybe, 50 to 100 men.  And I said, well, (inaudible) as you can be.  This is too many men,  
          as far as I was concerned, to be moving purposefully in this direction.  And I said, now, if I  
          put a burst over their heads, if they are soldiers they are going to flatten out and wait for  
          somebody to take charge.  If they are civilian they are going to start running in all  
          directions.  So I fired a burst out of here.  And these guys went down … By now these  
          guys are maybe, what 300, 250 yards away, which for a fifty is nothing.  But I said, gee,  
          with all these guys here, if I commit myself to killing them, I  (am) committed 100 percent.   
          There ain’t no leaving, no breaking off, there no (inaudible), and I am not feeling very  
          loose about this damn thing because this is a lot of men now.
405
 
      
     Bussey directed one of the other men to fire the .30 caliber machine gun once the enemy was 
with within 100 yards.  Meanwhile, Bussey fired the .50 caliber, “… I shot, shot, and shot until 
this gun overheated.”  And then the enemy responded, “Somewhere from back in here a mortar 
went to work and they saturated this hill pretty well.”  The mortar fire was effective and 
exploded on Bussey’s position – Bussey himself being struck by several pieces of shrapnel.  He 
continued:   
          I got beaten a couple times.  This kid down here got killed.  Meanwhile this gun is  
          overheating now, it is very erratic in its firing.  So I said to hell with that.  I went down and  
          took this gun down here (.30 caliber machine gun – and moved the gunner over) and  
          started firing from here.  By now I’ve got a whole bunch of people in close.  And they are  
          firing, of course.  But firing up hill with a gun or something is sort of a waste of time.   
          Hardly as effective.  So as these guys (enemy soldiers) moved in, finally I think I saw the  
          end of this thing here.  And these guys were in here.  There was no place for them to go.   
          Once they were committed, they were committed as well.
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     At this point, Bussey went back to the .50 caliber machine gun and “poured fire on these guys 
until there wasn’t anymore.”  According to Bussey, “as the evening wore on, and as this thing 
just became a mess down here, we went down later, and we killed one or two who were chopped 







up down there, and still alive.  And then we did a body count.”  Bussey estimated there was at 
least a total of 250 men on the ground in what he described as a “blood puddle.”  Bussey then led 
his men back to their units and reported back to the commander for that sector – Lieutenant 
Colonel Pierce about the action near Yechon.
407
  Bussey stated that after hearing his report 
Colonel Pierce told him, “thanks a million for saving my bacon!”  Colonel Pierce was aware that 
but for Bussey’s action near Yechon, he and his men could have been ambushed by the North 
Korean soldiers and annihilated. 




 of July 
1950, Bussey recalled that his Engineer unit received word that they were to deliver a bulldozer 
to Hank Fisher’s men (another Engineer unit).  Bussey and several of his the engineers that were 
with him took the same road that Bussey had been on when he engaged the North Korean 
soldiers near Yechon.  When Bussey approached the battle site he saw the “townspeople were 
digging graves, and were dragging bodies up” from the rice paddies where they had been killed 
by Bussey and the other soldiers.  Bussey ordered his truck to stop and had one of the soldiers 
man the .50 caliber machine gun that was on a ring mount on the truck while another soldier 
unloaded the bulldozer from the truck.  Bussey then described in detail how he and his men made 
a trench so the dead North Korean soldiers could be buried by the villagers in a mass grave.  
After the trench was dug, about 30 to 40 villagers worked to carry the enemy dead to the trench, 
after which Bussey filled in the trench using the bulldozer.  They then loaded the bulldozer back 
up and continued to their destination. 
     The above narrative is the version of the story that Charles Bussey has consistently relayed 
for over forty years.  Bussey was interviewed by the Center of Military History researchers on at 





least two occasions and told the story in exactly the same terms.  At one point, Bussey even 
pointed out to his interviewer a scar from a mortar wound that he stated occurred during the 
action.
408
  One of the earliest accounts of the firefight Bussey recounted occurred in an article 
entitled, “How Bussey’s Engineers Destroyed Entire City,” in the Washington Afro-American 
that was printed on August 26, 1950.  The author of the article, James L. Hicks, said that he 
recalled hearing about the firefight that Bussey was involved in with the North Korean soldiers 
around Yechon, Korea, when he was assigned as a reporter in Korea.  Hicks claimed, however, 
that he did not have any first-hand knowledge because he did not join the 24
th
 until July 22, 
1950, two days after the firefight.
409
 
     Other clues that point to the veracity of Bussey’s claim included a journal entry made at 0825 
hours in Colonel Pierce’s journal that noted “… on the outskirts of Yechon unable to enter due to 
heavy def. fire.  Col Pierce requests tanks or and ½ track multiple 50 caliber weapons.”
410
  
Carlton Johnson, who was with Pierce on the outskirts of town also recalled that they called in 
artillery fire on the town of Yechon.  “A batter of 105 mm Artillery had been and was firing into 
the town (over 800 rounds)” which set the town on fire – as was Bussey’s recollection.  Johnson 
said that when they entered the town they didn’t encounter any enemy dead “not even a dead 
dog.”
411
  Of course, Bussey’s account was that he was near but definitely not in the town of 
Yechon when he encountered the enemy soldiers. 
     Chester Lenon, who was subsequently wounded and then rescued by Lieutenant Bussey less 
than a month after the Yechon battle, also recalled receiving enemy fire as they approached 
Yechon on July 20, 1950.  Lenon said the North Koreans waited “until they were at the edge of 
                                                          
408
 Interview with David Carlisle and Charles Bussey, June 14, 1989, Box 1, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
409
 Miscellaneous Notes, Box 1, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
410





town then they opened fire.  There was some artillery fire and then small arms fire.”  Lenon also 
reported that he saw enemy soldiers in uniform, but no civilians.  Lenon was ordered to “burn the 
town down” because the enemy would return if they left and that later in the day he met with 
Lieutenant Bussey who “said that he had been on the other side of town fighting.”
412
  John 
French, who was also not present with Bussey during the firefight at Yechon recalled that the 




     Word of Bussey’s exploits eventually reached Colonel Henry Fisher, who was the 
commanding officer of the 35
th
 Infantry Regiment.  On July 20, 1950, Colonel Fisher had 
operational command of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment forces at Yechon.  Clinton Moorman said 
that Colonel Fisher on hearing of Bussey’s exploits “immediately jumped in his jeep with his 
driver and drove over there.”  According to Moorman, Colonel Fisher “got over there and didn’t 
see any action.  He saw one dead Korean lying in street and that’s it … (and) the town burning,” 
but didn’t investigate any further and returned to his regiment.
414
  Clearly, from the testimony of 
multiple individuals, the story of Bussey’s action near Yechon was being repeated among several 
soldiers immediately after the fighting was supposed to have taken place.  If Bussey was making 
the story up, he made it up from the outset. 
     If nothing more had occurred to support the story it would be difficult to argue for further 
reconsideration of Bussey and an award: however, the story continued with a write-up for a 
medal containing sworn depositions and eye witness testimony.  1
st
 Sergeant Roscoe C. Dudley 
was one of the soldiers in the 24
th
 who heard about Lieutenant Bussey’s action on July 20, 1950, 
                                                          
412
 Interview with Chester Lenon, December 7, 1988, Box 6, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
413
 Interview with John French, July 21, 1989, Box 4, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
414
 Interview with Clinton Moorman, September 5, 1988, Box 9, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
205 
 
from several of his men who were with Bussey outside Yechon during the firefight.  Gerald 
Astor in The Right to Fight noted: “On the basis of their statements he prepared a formal 
recommendation for the award of a Medal of Honor for Bussey.  In accord with the rules for the 
nomination, he secured sworn corroboration from two eyewitnesses.”
415
   
     Major General Carroll LeTellier commented in a letter written in March, 1992 to the Center 
of Military History that “the story of Lieutenant Bussey killing many North Koreans at Yechon 
with 50 cal. and 30 cal. machine guns was recounted many times.  I can say unequivocally that 
action as described today is unchanging from the way the incident was discussed in 1950.”  
LeTellier also stated: “I recall seeing a beautifully documented recommendation (including 
marked-up-map) for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross to Captain Bussey submitted 
by First Sergeant Roscoe Dudley of the 77
th
 ECC.”  According to LeTellier, the recommendation 
included “correspondence supporting this award” and that the package was forwarded to 
Headquarters, 65
th
 Engineer Combat Battalion which oversaw the 77
th




     Unfortunately, the Army has no record of a recommendation for the Congressional Medal of 
Honor or the Distinguished Service Cross for Bussey.  The lone recommendation for an award 
around this time for Bussey was a recommendation dated August 31, 1950, for a Bronze Star 
Medal.  The “BSM” was crossed out and upgraded to a Silver Star for “demolition of stores, ect. 
At Sangju on 2-3 August 1950.”  The recommendation mentioned statements by a Lieutenant 
Peebles and Sergeant First Class Dudley.  Of course, the action at Sangju was completely 
separate from the exploit Bussey reported at Yechon. 
     According to Bussey, the reason that the award for a Congressional Medal of Honor or 
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Distinguished Service Cross was not pushed through was because of opposition by Lieutenant 
Colonel John Corley.  Bussey stated that during a conversation with Colonel Corley, the latter 
explained:      
          I only recommended you for the Silver Star for the job you did at Yechon, and I only  
          recommended a Bronze Star for your rescue of Lieutenant Lenon and his people.  The  
          Distinguished Service Cross was appropriate for the Lenon rescue … so was the  
          Congressional Medal of Honor for Yechon.  If you were white, you’d have gotten them  




     Bussey said Corley continued and told him, “I cannot allow you to become a hero, no matter 
how worthy.  I reduced the size of the battalion that you saved to a group, and I reduced the 
number of men you killed so that finally the job was only worth the Silver Star.”
418
  There were 
no corroborating witnesses to the conversation between Corley and Bussey and the statement 
would appear to be completely out of character for Colonel Corley.  But the question remains: 
did something happen to the paperwork submitted by Sergeant Roscoe for Bussey’s actions near 
Yechon, and if so what?  Was the paperwork purposefully lost because of Bussey’s race? 
     The Center of Military History in conducting the research for the history of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment spent considerable time attempting to verify or refute Bussey’s claim of a firefight at 
Yechon.  Colonel Thomas Ryan interviewed Korean residents who lived near the location of the 
firefight Bussey described and discovered that these villagers “specifically remember the black 
soldiers, specifically remember the black bodies.  And they talk about Inmingun, North Korean 
dead, being located on the hills” near where Bussey reported them.
419
  However, they could not 
find any evidence that Bussey had been recommended for either a Congressional Medal of 
Honor or Distinguished Service Cross, all they could locate was the Silver Star medal that 
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appeared to cover Bussey’s actions near Sangju.  Charles Bussey has continued to fight for 
recognition of his actions on July 20, 1950, and in 2002 he published his own account titled 
Firefight At Yechon: Courage and Racism in the Korean War.
420
  As did Charles Armstrong who 
continued to try “to get the Army to recognize what I have done,” Charles Bussey continued to 
wage his battle against what he perceived as an Army still unwilling to admit that racism might 
have clouded the award system during the Korean War until his death in October 2003. 
     Although white soldiers were just as keen to see to it that their exploits were recognized by 
the Army when appropriate, the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, who struggled against an 
Army that still segregated them because of their race, were particularly sensitive to this type of 
racial sting.  As was the case with regard to issues of race discussed in chapter two, the 
perception of reality is just as important as reality.  Indeed, the two sometimes are inseparable.  
     Sensitivity toward being recognized for ones actions was particularly important for the 
relationship between black soldiers and white officers in a segregated Army.  Peter Nelson’s A 
More Unbending Battle effectively demonstrated how critical this relationship could be between 
the men and their officers.  Charles W. Fillmore was a black officer in the 369
th
 Infantry 
Regiment who believed that his white superior officer, Major Arthur Little, had overlooked him 
for an award because of his race.  This broke down the relationship between the two men.  
Fillmore was eventually awarded with the French Croix de Guerre, the highest honor the French 
government bestowed on a soldier.  At a camp in Le Mans, France, prior to disembarking for the 
United States, Fillmore found out that Major Little was also in the camp.  Nelson described what 
happened next: 
          There Fillmore sought Little out to ask if he’d been the one to recommend him for the  
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          Croix de Guerre.  When Little admitted he had, citing Fillmore’s courage leading his men  
          through the gassed swamps on the Marson Road, Fillmore extended his hand, and the two  
          men shook.
421
 
     The strained relationship between Fillmore and Little evaporated through Little’s recognition 
of Fillmore’s actions.  The separation created by a segregated Army, segregated society, and the 
racial tensions of the early twentieth century all came crashing down in Fillmore’s world through 
the simple act of recognition; Little acknowledged Fillmore as a fellow soldier, fellow American, 
and a hero.  Had Major Little’s act of kindness and consideration been repeated more often by 
white officers in World War II and the early days of the Korean War, perhaps the walls of 
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The Officers: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 
     The role of competent leadership in military campaigns is one of the most decisive factors for 
victory.  Competent leadership is also often taken for granted.  While leadership on the 
battlefield can be displayed at all levels of the chain-of-command, from the Non-Commissioned 
Officer through the ranks of junior officers and up to senior leadership; leadership for a major 
battle, campaign, or war is best exemplified by the senior officers in any unit.  For the purposes 
of this analysis, senior leadership comprised the officers in charge at the battalion, regimental, 
division, and corps levels.   
     The senior officers of any military organization are the guiding force for actions taken, 
establishing what is expected of all personnel and making the decisions that can determine 
success or failure on the battlefield.  Although a host of factors come into play during battle, 
many of which are out of the hand of military leaders, such as weather complications, terrain 
features, and civilian/political support for fighting forces, the most significant factor is adequate 
and effective leadership.  Just as success on the battlefield is usually traced to leadership, failure 
on the battlefield can also often be traced to poor leadership.  Quite often, however, inadequate 
performance in combat is blamed upon the rank and file and not their commanders.  During the 
Korean War, the senior officers of the U.S. Army played a crucial role in determining the role 
and reputation of African Americans, especially the African Americans assigned to the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment.   
     The reputation of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in the Korean War, as noted previously has been 
a source of contention among historians and veterans.  The consensus of historians, including 
those from the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History, has been that the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
210 
 
as a whole was sub-par in its battlefield performance as compared to other units.  During the 
Korean War, the majority of white officers attributed the unsatisfactory performance to the 
soldiers, either because of their race alone or perhaps to the perception that they were less 
educated and therefore unable to adapt quickly to the circumstances of combat.  Some white 
officers during the Korean War espoused a more enlightened viewpoint and wondered if the 
performance issues might be due to the inequality of segregating men because of their race.  
Among this group of officers was General Mathew Ridgway, who was ultimately responsible for 
the full integration of soldiers in Korea and whose views and actions will be discussed further in 
Chapter V.  What was not questioned by Army leadership was whether the performance issues 
among African American units such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was due to inadequate 
leadership.  Was the reputation of units such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment unnecessarily tainted 
because of racial animosity by key senior white officers in Korea?      
     This chapter explores the question of leadership in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment by analyzing 
several different officers that led men in the 24
th
 either just prior to or during the Korean War.  
Each of these officers approached their leadership positions very differently and was either 
successful or not successful as a result of their leadership style and abilities.  Some of these 
officers lived up to the highest standards of leadership in the Army, while others completely 
failed the test of combat and were the cause of some of the reported “failures” among the 
soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment. 
     To answer the question of whether the reputation of African American units such as the 24
th
 
was unnecessarily tainted because of racial animosity by key senior white officers requires, first, 
looking outside the immediate chain-of-command of the 24
th
 to the second most powerful officer 
in Korea in late 1950 and early 1951, X Corps Commander and Chief-of-Staff to General 
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Douglas McArthur, Lieutenant General Edward Almond.  Just as one single officer can make a 
significant difference for positive change in an army, as witnessed by the turn-around of United 
Nations forces in the spring of 1951 under the leadership of General Ridgway, the negative 
influence of one officer can determine the reputation of an entire infantry regiment. 
Colonel Halloran 
     During most of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment’s posting in Japan, the regiment was led by 
Colonel Halloran.  Colonel Halloran was in the twilight of his career when he was assigned to 
command the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  During Colonel Halloran’s tenure, the 24
th
 was in a 
garrison state with little expected of its soldiers other than to stay out of trouble.  Colonel 
Halloran’s leadership therefore can only be viewed from the perspective of a caretaker.  Despite 
not having much in the way of demands placed on his men, Colonel Halloran’s tenure was one of 
little trouble or tension – even racial tension.  Of all the commanding officers of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment around the time of the Korean War, Colonel Halloran was the one most often referred 
to in affectionate detail by the African American veterans.  Colonel Halloran’s favorable 
reputation by the 24
th
’s black soldier was not without justification.   
     One of the often repeated stories about Colonel Halloran recorded in Black Soldier White 
Army had, 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veterans discussing an episode when the Eighth Army 
command staff (which included Lieutenant General Edward Almond) failed to invite the 24
th
 to a 
July 4
th
 parade in Tokyo.  The veterans recalled that Colonel Halloran sent them to Tokyo 
anyway despite the obvious snub, directing them to report directly to General Douglas 
MacArthur to receive their assigned place in the parade.  Another story by the authors of Black 
Soldier White Army related that during an inspection Colonel Halloran came across a soldier 
whose footwear was nearly worn out.  Colonel Halloran asked the soldier’s commanding officer 
212 
 
why this soldier’s footwear was not replaced and after having received “unsatisfactory 




     Long time black Captain William A. Bobo stated that Colonel Halloran “had his faults,” but 
he agreed that Colonel Halloran was typically quite fair and had become so identified with the 
24
th
 “that some said he could have been born black.”
423
  Al Brooks, another officer in the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment, put it this way, “Halloran was totally colorblind.”
424
  Of course, as Bobo 
noted, Colonel Halloran had his faults, the most significant of which was that he did not properly 
prepare the men for combat.  Of all Colonel Halloran’s responsibilities to the men of the 24
th 
Infantry Regiment, preparing them to go to war was the most crucial.   
     A military unit by its very nature must be ready at any moment to take up arms at the call of 
the nation.  The training the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment received in Japan prior to the Korean War 
was minimal.  What little training they did receive consisted of maneuvers whereby the men had 
to simulate the use of weapons because of shortages in weapons and ammunition.  Some of the 
blame for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment’s unpreparedness rested with the senior leadership of the 
Eighth Army and the military as a whole.  Unfortunately for Colonel Halloran and the men of the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment, the period just prior to the Korean War were rife with massive cut-backs 
in military spending which led to a shortage of military weapons and supplies and funds for 
training operations.   
     Despite the Army-wide cut backs however, Colonel Halloran could have done more to 
prepare his men.  He was after all a veteran officer of World War II, who knew ways of 
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preparing men on the “cheap” as had been the case in the Army prior to Pearl Harbor and in the 
early days of World War II.  Halloran could have devoted much more attention and time to 
ensure that the men of the 24
th
 were prepared for a future war and less time having the men 
practice parade drill and participate in athletic competitions, two occupations in which the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment was known to excel during garrison time in Japan. 
     Ultimately, it is difficult to appraise Colonel Halloran fully as an executive officer because he 
was not able to demonstrate his leadership abilities under fire with the men of the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment.  Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, Colonel Halloran was assigned to 
Fort McPherson to be the 3d Army Special Services Officer.  Unfortunately for the men of the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment, Colonel Halloran’s transfer created a window of several months whereby 
the senior leadership of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was continually changing with officers 
coming and going so frequently that the men they led barely had time to learn the names of their 
officers.  After a period of rapid turn-over, the next Regiment commander to establish himself 
with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment for any length of time a quite different individual in comparison 
with Colonel Halloran. 
Colonel Corley  
     Colonel John T. Corley came to the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment with a reputation for courage and 
exceptional leadership that would have made any military officer envious.  A graduate of the 
West Point class of 1938, at the time of the Korean War Colonel John Corley was only 35 years 
old but had already received two Distinguished Service Crosses, eight Silver Stars, and 
battlefield promotion to the rank of colonel.  OCMH historian Roy Appleman noted Colonel 





  Appleman’s assessment was seconded by Major General Al Smith, who stated 
“Corley was one of the best battalion commanders anywhere in the world during World War 
II.”
426
  According to Smith, Corley was among twenty or so officers selected by name by 
MacArthur and his staff to be brought over to Korea after the outbreak of hostilities. 
     Even with all of his combat experience from World War II, the regiment that Colonel Corley 
inherited in the early days of the Korean War was one of the biggest challenges he had ever 
faced.  Morale was at a record low with men reportedly “straggling” to the rear at every 
opportunity.  As noted before, the vacuum created by the constant rotation of senior officers in 
and out of the 24
th
 left the men feeling rudderless and adrift in an Army that continued to 
segregate them because of their race.  Charles Gregg said that prior to Colonel Corley’s 
assignment “white commanders remained in the rear too much, especially at night when much of 
the fighting took place.”
427
  According to Gregg, this left the black NCOs responsible for trying 
to maintain some semblance of order, a difficult assignment given the state of morale of most of 
the men.  According to Gregg, it was the assignment of Colonel Corley that began the facelift of 
the 24
th
 “partly through seeking out good leadership.”
428
  Colonel Corley did not waste any time 
beginning the work of cleaning up the 24
th
’s leadership vacuum and he did not suffer the officers 
who were not doing their jobs.   
     One part of Colonel Corley’s push to improve leadership in the 24
th
 was to promote 
competent African American officers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Although Colonel Corley 
did not say as much, he seemed to instinctively know that part of the racial tension was due to 
the prevalence of white officers instead of black officers in the mid-to-upper levels of leadership 
                                                          
425
 Appleman, Disaster in Korea, 137.   
426
 Interview with Major General Al Smith, June 26, 1989, Box 7, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
427







.  Prior to Colonel Corley’s taking command, most of the black officers were very 
junior.  Some of Colonel Corley’s first acts were to recognize the African American officers that 
were doing their duty and provide them with increasing responsibility.   
     Colonel Corley’s action in promoting black officers instantly created enemies among the 
white officers.  Joe Davis recalled that “Corley was badmouthed by other white officers,” who 
complained about Colonel Corley’s attention to what the white officers referred to as “those coon 
officers.”  Davis said he would hear some white officers complain “the boss wants to promote 
another coon: the boss wants to do so and so for so and so and the coon doesn’t even have 
platoon time.”  Davis said he was a “fly on the wall” as he listened to these white officers 
disparage Colonel Corley.
429
  The problem for the disgruntled white officers was that Colonel 
Corley was achieving some measure of success with his changes.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment’s 
reputation improved with Colonel Corley’s tenure, and Colonel Corley was cementing his 
respect by the men of the 24
th
 through his actions.  Colonel Corley was one of those few officers 
who wore the cloak of leadership with ease and was able to engender the respect of the average 
soldier.  He did this the way all great leaders do – through his actions. 
     One of the reports about Colonel Corley’s near legendary exploits came from Augustus 
Gillert, an African American officer in the 24
th
 who was the S-3 at the time.  Gillert stated on one 
particular occasion Colonel Corley approached him outside of Chorwan, Korea, and asked, 
“Well, have you run into any opposition?”  Gillert responded “Not yet, but I’ve got 
reconnaissance out.”  According to Gillert, Colonel Corley then hopped into a jeep and 
proceeded to drive down the road and into the town ahead of the main body of troops with 
nothing more than his jeep driver and a shotgun sitting in the back seat.  Gillert said about an 
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hour and half later the first troops entered the town with him and Gillert went looking for 
Colonel Corley because nobody knew where he was.  Gillert said he eventually found Colonel 
Corley in the only Catholic Church in Chorwan kneeling at the altar.  Gillert said “whether this 
was brave, smart, foolish, or whatever; he (Corley) made an assessment of the situation” and 
made his decision.  Gillert said that was one of the characteristics that people admired about 
Colonel Corley – he was a man who could make a decision.
430
 
     Three days later Colonel Corley again impressed Gillert with his command presence and 
courage.  On this occasion Colonel Corley displayed his courage during a fierce firefight.  Gillert 
described the situation: 
          I was lying in a ditch trying to talk on a radio, the old SCR300, I looked up and Corley was  
          standing above me – standing.  There was so much stuff flying you could hear it, literally  
          hear it.  I think that guy went through World War II and Korea without getting a scratch,  
          and he was always up where the action was – it wasn’t because he wasn’t where the action  
          was.
431
   
      
Colonel Corley was the first senior officer in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment during the war that the 
men had seen near the front.  Colonel Corley was able to bolster the confidence of the men of the 
24
th
 by demonstrating that he was willing to take risks along with them. 
     Gustav H. Franke recalled from his experience serving alongside Colonel Corley in Korea 
that Colonel Corley was the type of battle hardened soldier who knew how to remain calm under 
fire and close with the enemy.  Franke explained that one example of Colonel Corley’s 
battlefield decisiveness occurred during an incident at the regimental command post (CP) that 
was located in a school house at Kunu-ri, Korea.  The CP came under automatic fire from a 
nearby enemy soldier.  Without hesitation Colonel Corley drew his pistol and “figured out where 
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the enemy soldier who had fired was located, and gunned him down.”
432
  Word of Colonel 
Corley’s action worked its way through the 24
th
 quickly and acted as a tonic to the men’s morale.  
Here was a leader who knew how to fight. 
     One of Colonel Corley’s leadership qualities, according to 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veteran 
Ralph Davis, was his commitment to providing leadership throughout a battle.  Davis said that 
Colonel Corley was always the last man to leave the battlefield.  Davis recalled “one of my 
fondest memories of the man who earned two DSCs and eight Silver Stars was when we reached 
Yongdungpo and were turning to start south.  Colonel Corley and his staff were standing by a 
fire greeting us as we passed.  He stayed until he was literally the last man to leave.”
433
   
     Many of the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment also stated that Colonel Corley knew how to 
relate to the enlisted men and he treated them no differently than any other soldier, black or 
white.  William M. Factory was an African American enlisted soldier who often rode “shotgun” 
with Colonel Corley in his jeep.  According to Factory, Colonel Corley was one of the “finest 
men” he ever saw in Korea who did not forget how the average soldier experienced war.  As an 
example, Factory stated that on one occasion Colonel Corley busted him for drinking whiskey 
one day but then promoted him the very next day.
434
   
     As Charles Gregg noted, Colonel Corley truly was responsible for the facelift of the 24
th
.  
Unfortunately, even with a turn-around in morale among the men of the 24
th
 and improved 
competency on the battlefield, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was still a “Negro” unit in a 
predominantly white Army.  Whatever successes made by the 24
th
 were downplayed and the 
failures overblown.  This pressure eventually led to what many believe was the premature 
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implosion of Colonel Corley’s career.  Sandro A. Barone was one of several members of the 24
th
 
who felt that “the bad reputation of the 24
th
 Infantry unfairly limited Corley’s advance to higher 
rank.”
435
   
     Colonel Corley retired from the Army in 1967 at the rank of Brigadier General, a seemingly 
low rank considering the numerous military honors bestowed on him throughout his career and 
his reputation as a military leader.  After the war, even Colonel Corley seemed to realize that 
assignment to lead the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment might have dimmed his career 
prospects.  His wife, Mary, noted in an interview for the Army Times that Colonel Corley was 
“reprimanded by then General Mark Clark for giving an interview to a black publication in 




  The attention Colonel 
Corley received by senior Army officers such as General Mark Clark for his defense of the 
African American soldiers of the 24
th
 certainly did not earn him any points for promotion. 
     Despite the nearly universal praise Colonel Corley received from his men there were several 
critics of Corley as a leader, especially among some of his subordinate officers.
437
  However, 
even one of his critics, Oliver Dillard, noted: “Corley had the best interests of the regiment as a 
priority at all times … the medal he got for Kunu-ri was probably undeserved – yet Corley was 
one of the bravest men he has ever known.”
438
  What was undisputable was that Colonel Corley 
did more for the image and fighting morale of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment than any of his 
predecessors or successors – and perhaps in an ironic twist of fate – by breathing new life into 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment he may well have pushed back the eventual desegregation of the 24
th
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by a year.   
Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair 
     For most of Colonel Corley’s time with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, the executive officer 
(XO) was another World War II veteran named Melvin Russell Blair.  According to Blair, 
Colonel Corley personally sought him out to assist with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Blair stated 
that Corley “told him about the unreliability of the troops of the 24
th
 Infantry and their inability 
to remain in position and fight.”  Blair stated that Colonel Corley told him that he wanted a 
commander who was “low keyed, never excited, one who had experience in combat, and who 
would work hard.”  Blair reported that Colonel Corley told him that morale was poor with the 
24
th
 and that the men were “tired and scared” but that together, Colonel Corley and Lt. Col. Blair 
were going to “rebuild the regiment.”
439
  Thus entered Lt. Col. Blair – one of the more unusual 
and controversial officers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment. 
     While Colonel Corley typically let his actions speak louder than his words, Lt. Col. Blair was 
not shy about expressing his opinions and in particular to praise himself.  In the June 23, 1951 
issue of the Saturday Evening Post, Lt. Col. Blair authorized an article about his exploits and his 
difficulty in leading the African American soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, titled not-so-
modestly “I send your Son into Battle”.  There was no question about who was the star of the 
article.  The editors of the Saturday Evening Post ran this biography of Melvin Russell Blair: 
          Among Americans who follow the profession of arms few have been so thoroughly  
          blooded in so short a span of time as Lt. Col. Melvin Russell Blair, Inf.  This Kansas son   
          of a railroad engineer remembers that from the earliest childhood he always wanted to be a  
          solider.  He tried for West Point twice and failed.  He enlisted in the Army as a private no- 
          class and won his commission when World War II came.  He immediately volunteered for  
          Merrill’s Marauders and fought through the worst of the Burma campaign.  More jungle  
          fighting followed.  When Korea popped, he again volunteered for combat and led a Negro  
          battalion there in some of the toughest holding operations.  Score to date: four slugs still in  
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          his leg, shrapnel in his side, two Distinguished Service Crosses, two Silver Stars, three  
          Purple Hearts.
440
 
      
     In actuality, Lt. Col. Blair’s article for The Saturday Evening Post was not his first foray into 
publicity with that magazine.  In the June 16, 1951, issue Blair was interviewed by correspondent 
Harold H. Martin.  In this interview Blair complained that the enemy had caused soldiers 
protecting his command-post to flee without firing a shot and that “the men fled like rabbits 
across the great open field.”  Blair explained to Martin that at the end of the engagement he 
encountered several African American soldiers sitting around a campfire singing what they 
called “the official song of the 24
th
 Infantry – the Bugout Boogie.”  The Saturday Evening Post 
then quoted Blair as he told the national magazine the lyrics for the Bugout Boogie which was 
reportedly sung to the tune of Hank Snow’s “Movin’ On” – when them Chinese mortars begins 
to thud, the old Deuce-four begin to bug.
441
  According to Mrs. John Corley, “Colonel Corley 
was furious at Blair’s article in The Saturday Evening Post” and that “the pot should not call the 
kettle black.”
442
  Colonel Corley eventually relieved Lt. Col. Blair of command after a 
particularly horrendous battle the evening of November 30, 1950.  According to Black Soldier 
White Army, Colonel Corley tried to protect Lt. Col. Blair’s career by classifying his relief of 
duty as being due to “combat fatigue” when in actuality it was for gross incompetence, or worse, 
cowardice.  During that momentous evening, as a fierce battle raged, Lt. Col. Blair made no 




     Besides his failure to command on the evening of November 30, 1950, Lt. Col. Blair had 
                                                          
440
 Melvin Russell Blair, “I send your Son into Battle,” The Saturday Evening Post, June 23, 1951, Box 2, Oral 
Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
441
 Bowers, Hammond, MacGarrigle, Black Soldier White Army, 216. 
442
 Interview with Mrs. John Corley, November 2, 1989, Box 3, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
443
 Bowers, Hammond, MacGarrigle, Black Soldier White Army, 214-216. 
221 
 
displayed behavior during his tenure with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment that called into question his 
integrity.  Colonel Owen H. Carter recalled one episode in Korea when he went out to visit three 
rifle companies in the field under the direction of Lt. Col. Blair.  Carter stated he was approached 
by one of the company commanders, Captain Pirowski – who was later KIA.  Captain Pirowski 
reported to Carter that “Blair had asked him to put him in for a decoration … should he be so 
inclined, Pirowski would be rewarded.”  Carter said Pirowski wanted to put in a formal 
complaint, but was killed before he had a chance to do so.
444
   
     Blair left the Army shortly after the Korean War and in an incident that can only be described 
as bizarre – in 1958 Blair was arrested during an attempt to commit armed robbery of $40,000 in 
proceeds of the Bing Crosby Golf Tournament in California.  Blair was ultimately sentenced to a 
term between 5-20 years in federal prison.  Even forty-five years after the Korean War, Melvin 
Blair refused to believe that his tenure with the 24
th
 was anything but exceptional.  When shown 
the interviews with other members of the 24
th
 who described his removal of command by 
Colonel Corley he stated “that the blacks had lied to make their white commander look bad – 
falsely blaming everything that happened to the battalion on him.”  Blair said “this was a black 
conspiracy!”
445
  Lt. Col. Blair was one of the white officers that had become all too familiar to 
the African American soldiers in the 24
th
 – an officer that thought only of his career and what 
would make him look good in the eyes of his superiors and who at the first sign of problems was 
quick to blame the race of his men for any failures.   
Major Richard “Black Daddy” Williams 
     Of the African American officers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, none represented the “soul” 
of the unit more than Captain (later Major) Richard Williams – known to the men admiringly as 
                                                          
444
 Interview with Colonel Owen H. Carter, July 20, 1994, Box 3, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
445
 Interview with Melvin Blair, September 5, 1995, Box 2, Oral Interview Notes BSWA, CMH. 
222 
 
“Black Daddy.”  At the outbreak of the Korean War, Oliver Dillard observed that there “weren’t 
more than 100 black officers in the entire United States Army.”
446
  They all knew one another – 
and they especially knew Captain Williams, known as a consummate professional and an officer 
who took care of his men.  Al Brooks said that Captain Williams acted like the Inspector General 
(IG) for the unit.  “If a black officer was having a problem with his white commander, he would 
go to Williams and Williams would talk to the white officer.”  Brooks said that Williams 
experienced the racist attitudes of some of the white officers but he would maintain his 
professionalism in order to help his fellow black officers.  Brooks noted that “these things ate 
him up,” but he did not complain.  According to Brooks, the grief that Williams took for his 




     Williams represented more to the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment than most officers 
because first and foremost he was an African American who understood the way the Army 
treated black soldiers.  Secondly, he was crucial for the well-being of the 24
th
 because he was an 
exemplary officer.  Stuart G. Force worked for (then) Captain Williams when he was the 
battalion S-3.  Force stated that Williams was “an excellent soldier, well-versed in military 
matters – he stood near the top of his class at the Advanced Infantry Course.”
448
  Williams would 
serve in several positions during his time with the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment from S-3 to S-2.  
Williams was also not the type of officer who lingered at the rear.  He displayed leadership on 
the battlefield as well. 
     Albert Griffin recalled one episode during which he watched “Black Daddy” Williams 
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running across a rice paddy in a soft cap screaming and cursing trying to get the troops up and 
fighting.  Griffin said the whole battalion responded.  Griffin said on another occasion he 
observed Williams on the horizon yelling “don’t you niggers know you are under attack?  Move 
out!”
449
  According to numerous African American soldiers who served with “Black Daddy” – 
there was one word that Captain Williams used more than any other to “motivate” the men.  
Willie Griffin recalled that “Black Daddy called us all motherfuckers … (usually) during a 
particularly bad time.”
450
  Griffin and others remarked that the word “motherfucker” was a word 
that for whatever reason was particularly aligned with African American soldiers and was used 
in a myriad of ways.  Not surprisingly, one of the officers who found the word particularly 
offensive was Lt. Col. Blair who many years later commented that one of his particular “pet-
peeves” was to eliminate the use of the word “motherfucker.”  Lt. Col. Blair said the word would 
be used sometimes two or three times in a sentence, and while he and Colonel Corley tried to 
“stop the utterance” they were left with “little or no success.”
451
  Williams most likely used it 
because he knew it was a word that meant something to the soldiers – it was a part of their 
collective racial identity – and it probably didn’t hurt that white officers like Lt. Col. Blair 
despised the use of the word. 
     According to the testimony of various soldiers in the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, if Major 
Williams had one fault it was that he “drank too much Japanese gin.”
452
  Major Williams’ 
drinking was serious enough that in October, 1950 he had to be evacuated for a time for 
treatment related to his liver, but there was never any sign that he allowed drinking to affect his 
ability to function as an officer.  Many of the men, who served with and under Williams, 
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believed that alcohol was a necessary tool that Williams used to deal with the problems he faced 
as a black officer in a white army.  Ultimately, Major Williams demonstrated the potential of an 
African American officer when given the opportunity and probably would have gone further in 
the ranks had he served in the Army during a post-segregationist period.  During the Korean 
War, Williams was not promoted beyond the rank of Major. 
Lieutenant General Edward (Ned) Almond 
     At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in June 1950, (then) Major General Edward M. 
Almond was the “Chief of Staff, GHQ” for General Douglas MacArthur – commander of all 
forces in the Far East.
453
  Even before Almond was handpicked by General MacArthur to lead 
the forces under the newly created Tenth (X) Corps during the invasion of Inchon, Almond cut a 
controversial swath through the senior officer ranks.  Max Hastings in his monograph The 
Korean War observed that “MacArthur liked and trusted Almond, for reasons unclear to some of 
his staff, who did not.”  The members of MacArthur’s staff said “they respected the Southerner’s 
energy and dedication, but they disliked his fierce temper and arrogance.”
454
  What was not 
mentioned by MacArthur’s staff was Almond’s intolerance towards blacks and Asians, a critical 
distinction in Almond’s style that will be the focus of the rest of this chapter. 
     As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Almond was not in the direct chain-of-
command for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, although one could make the argument that since the 
Eighth Army fell under General MacArthur’s command and Almond was the Chief of Staff he 
did have some influence on decisions that would affect the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  When 
Almond commanded the X Corps he oversaw the 9
th
 Infantry Regiment which had an African 
American Battalion within its ranks.  So why is General Almond of importance to our focus in 
                                                          
453
 Almond was promoted to Lieutenant General on February 15, 1951. 
454
 Max Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 66. 
225 
 
this study?  Almond is important for two reasons: one is because he held such a senior position 
of authority during the Korean War and held very strong opinions about African American 
soldiers, and the other is because Almond represents racist sentiments prevalent among senior 
officers in the U.S. Army at the time of the Korean War.   
     Among the senior officers during the Korean War Almond was the exception for his 
outspoken approach to race relations.  Most of the senior white officers might occasionally 
allude to their racial sentiments: Almond, on the other hand, stated his opinions verbally and on 
paper both during the war and throughout the rest of his life.  From Almond’s written 
communication with other senior Army officers, we are offered a rare glimpse into the racial 
sentiments of military leaders who let down their guard during communication with a fellow 
like-minded Southern race-obsessed sympathizer. 
Almond’s Early Military Career 
     Edward Mallory Almond was born in Luray, Virginia, on December 12, 1892 and his 
formative years were spent in segregated Virginia.  According to Almond in an interview with 
his grandson in 1974, he thought about a “military career at a very early age” despite the fact that 
his family was not a “military” family per se.
455
  Almond stated that while still in high school he 
joined a local military unit made up of classmates called the Culpeper Minutemen.  As Almond 
reached maturity and the end of high school he sought an appointment to West Point but was 
encouraged by Virginia Representative George Browning to attend the Virginia Military Institute 
(VMI) instead.   
     VMI has a long history and a strong connection to the South.  Nestled in the Shenandoah 
Valley in the shadow of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Lexington, Virginia, the school was central 
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to the Southern cause during the Civil War through the military training provided to their cadets, 
which almost universally went to war on the side of the south.  VMI was also known for its star 
artillery instructor, General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, who personally led the first batch of 
cadets to war.  After the Civil War, the school continued to provide the U.S. Army with first-rate 
officers through their alumni, which included men such as General George C. Marshall.  Almond 
started his education at VMI in 1912 and graduated 3
rd
 in his class of 65 pupils in 1915.  
Unfortunately for the young graduate, there were no vacancies for new Army officers at the time 




     As the war raging in Europe moved closer to ensnaring the United States in late 1916, the 
Army opened up new officer positions.  Almond traveled back to Virginia in order to take the 
commissioning exams, passed, and on November 30, 1916, Almond received a commission in 
the Army as a second lieutenant.  Upon commissioning, Almond was sent to Fort Leavenworth 
for three months of Officer Candidate School and then was assigned to Fort Brown in 
Brownsville, Texas, in April, 1917.  At Fort Brown Almond was assigned to the 4
th
 Infantry 
Regiment and was put into command of Company F.  During the senior officer debriefing in the 
1970s, Almond did not discuss in detail his days in Brownsville, Texas, or whether the topic of 
the Brownsville Affair of 1906 ever came up during conversation.   
     In June, 1917, the 4
th
 Infantry Regiment was moved to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, just two 
months before the African American soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment at Camp Logan in 
Houston, Texas, were pulled into a deadly riot after a race incident between Houston police 
                                                          
456
 While in Marion, Alabama, Almond also met and courted his future wife, Margaret Crook, who was a student at 
a nearby women’s college.  They married in Anniston, Alabama on August 4
th
, 1917, and despite repeated moves 
around the world during Almond’s career, the couple considered Anniston, Alabama, their home and the Almond’s 
moved back to Anniston when Almond retired from the Army. 
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officers and a soldier from the 24
th
.  While in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, the 4
th
 Infantry 
Regiment was expanded into a full division and then moved a second time in December, 1917 to 
Camp Green in North Carolina.  Had the 4
th
 remained in Gettysburg for another couple months, 
Almond might have crossed paths with another young Army officer who was sent to build Camp 
Colt outside Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1918, Captain Dwight D. Eisenhower.
457
  
     In May, 1918, the 4
th
 Infantry Division left for France.  Almond was now a Captain and was 
in charge of Company A of the 12
th
 Machine Gun Battalion.  Remarkably for someone who 
would be profuse in discussing his career and his exploits later in life, Almond provided a very 
brief synopsis of his time in France.  From his account, we know that he participated in the July 
1918 Aisne-Marne offensive and that he was wounded during an operation on the Vesle River on 
August 4, 1918.  Almond stated that he later received a Silver Star for his heroic actions just 
prior to his wounding.  Almond spent several months in a hospital in France before he was 
returned to duty with the 12th Machine Gun Battalion.  Almond again led the unit during the 
Meuse-Argonne offensive and during the occupation of the Rhineland after the Armistice in 
November 1918.  Almond returned to the United States in the fall of 1919 and resumed his 
position as Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the Marion Institute in Alabama, 
presumably while still employed by the United States Army since his next move was to Fort 
Benning, Georgia, to attend further training in an infantry course for company officers. 
     Almond’s career in the inter-war years Army was similar to other officers who would become 
prominent in World War II and the Korean War.  Almond went to several of the required 
military schools; the Command and General Staff Course in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the 
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 Almond stated during one of his interviews that he met with General Eisenhower after the close of World War II 
and said of the occasion that he had “known (Eisenhower) for many years, since we served together at Fort Benning 
in 1924.”  If this is true, this would have been during the five month window where Eisenhower was assigned to the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, just prior to his getting out of that assignment and transferring to France to 
serve with the Battle Monuments Commission under General Pershing. 
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Army War College that was at Fort McNair in 1933, the Army Air Corps Tactical School at 
Maxwell Field, Alabama in 1938-1939, and the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island in 
1939-1940.  When Almond finished at the Naval War College he was at the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel.  In January of 1941 Almond was the G-3 of IV Corps at Providence, Rhode Island, and 
on the eve of American involvement in World War II, Almond was promoted to the rank of 
colonel. 
     On paper, Almond appeared to be a perfect selection for higher command.  His knowledge of 
military tactics and theory were honed through the best schools the military had to offer, yet his 
time actually spent leading troops was primarily relegated to his time in World War I and a stint 
leading “native” troops in the Philippines in the early 1930s.
458
  As Captain Fergusson noted in 
his biographical introduction to General Almond's debriefing, “the rapid rise in rank continued 
for Colonel Almond in the spring of 1942 when he was promoted to Brigadier General and 
appointed Assistant Division Commander of the 93
rd





 Division was an African American division similar to the 92
nd
 Infantry Division.  Also 
in 1942, Almond was promoted from Assistant Division Commander of the 93
rd
 Division to 
Division Commander of the 92
nd
 Infantry Division.  Promotion from Brigadier General to Major 
General followed shortly after his appointment to lead the 92
nd
 Infantry Division.  As was the 
case with several Army officers during World War II, Almond went from a Lieutenant Colonel 
to a Major General in the short span of two years.  The Army obviously felt that Edward Almond 
was destined and ready for greater responsibility during World War II. 
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 As a newly minted Major, Almond was appointed to command a battalion of the 45
th
 Infantry at Fort McKinley 
in the Philippines where he oversaw the “native” troops of the 45
th
.  While it would at first glance appear that 
Almond might have met his future advocate General MacArthur while in the Philippines, MacArthur did not receive 
assignment to the Philippines until 1934.  In actuality, Almond most likely became acquainted with General 
MacArthur upon his return to the United States in 1933 where he was assigned to administrative duties in 





Almond the Division Commander 
     Prior to his assignment as Assistant Division Commander for the 93
rd
 Division there is no 
record of Almond having much association with African American soldiers.  If he came across 
black soldiers in one of his previous postings he made no mention of it in his interviews or 
writings.  According to Almond, he approached command of African American troops with an 
open mind and did not try to get out of the assignment.
460
  Almond stated that although there was 




 from their service in World War I, he 
attempted to research the topic himself and; “I was unable to find in any library a description of 
the type of failure, the nature of the exercise that were being criticized or the result thereof.”  




 in World 
War I, “I found lots of opinion by people who wrote off hand reports of the 92
nd
’s World War I 
exploits but nothing was definite enough,” so as a result of his research, “I decided not to make 
my mind up in any direction until I saw for my own satisfaction the capabilities of the 
components of the 92
nd
 Division and I advised my officers to do likewise.”
461
  The proclamation 
by Almond of an open mind to his assignment to lead black soldiers has a tinny ring to it in light 
of his later actions and words. 
    As was discussed in Chapter I, there were complaints about Almond’s racial insensitivity 
during the training phase with the 92
nd
 Infantry Division while it was stationed in Fort Huachuca, 
Arizona.  Almond dismissed these complaints as being nothing more than the usual complaints 
of trouble-makers and rabble-rousers.  Almond insisted that during this period he still maintained 
an open mind to the capability of the average African American.  Almond’s one complaint 
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 Captain Fergusson asked Almond; “Did you make any attempt at that time of your assignment as Commander of 
the 92
nd





during this period was that it took black soldiers longer to learn than white soldiers.  According 
to Almond, “we took longer than the average division for the training period prior to entry into 
combat because it took longer for the instructor to secure a sink-in result in any instruction that 
we offered.”  As an example, Almond cited his observation that to train black soldiers rifle 
marksmanship, it “required three to four times as much ammunition.”
462
  Almond reserved his 
harshest criticism of African Americans as soldiers for Italy when the men of the 92
nd
 Infantry 
Division faced the crucible of combat. 
     Almond stated that he and his officers personally selected the men to make up the 370
th
 
Infantry Regiment, one of three regiments in his division, to be the first unit sent over to Italy.  
Almond hoped that the by sending the best trained unit of his division into combat first they 
would set the standard for the following regiments.  The 370
th
 Combat Team arrived in Italy in 
late August 1944 and was immediately attached by IV Corps of the Fifth United States Army to 
the 1
st
 Armored Division that was along the Arno River in the Pontedera area.  Captain 
Fergusson noted that during this time the 370
th
 Combat Team “advanced about 30 miles against 
relatively light resistance,” but when confronted with determined German resistance the combat 
team “netted a gain of only 8,000 yard in 6 days and failed to seize its objectives while 
sustaining over 400 casualties.”
463
  This slow progress in the face of stiff resistance was seen by 
Almond as a failure by the 370
th
 “on the offensive.”  Considering the stalemated nature of much 
of the fighting in Italy during World War II by all units, the debacle on the beaches of Anzio for 
instance where American forces were almost pushed back into the sea, it seems rather unfair for 
Almond to criticize too harshly the actions of the 370
th
 in their first test of true combat.  Almond 
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 Ibid.  Almond did not seem to consider, at least in the case of marksmanship, that the average black recruit was 
even less likely than his white counterpart to have had any prior experience with firearms, particularly if that black 





did consider that one possible explanation for the failure by the 370
th
 was due to their “attacking 
against the high ground of the Apennine Mountain” and that the enemy was “in a stronger 
position to repel in advance.” 
     According to Almond, his concern about the fighting capability of African Americans was 
solidified during the failed offensive along the Cinquale Canal in February 1945.  The details of 
this attack are discussed in greater detail in Chapter I, but suffice it to say, from Almond’s and 
much of the senior Army command perspective; the operation was a complete failure.  Almond 
appeared to be more concerned with the outcome of this operation than any previous operation, 
in part because “it was watched with intense interest by the commander of the 15
th
 Army Group, 
General Mark Clark and the Fifth Army commander, General Truscott.”
464
  If there is one 
particular event or time period where Almond’s opinion of black soldiers was set in stone, it was 
at the end of the Cinquale Canal attack.   
     Almond claimed that after the failed offensive he personally conducted an inquiry to 
determine the cause(s) for the failure.  Almond said that “we found out that in every case, the 
excuse of the local commander (platoon, or company commander) was that they put the man in 
position and couldn’t depend on his staying there because they couldn’t see him in the dark.  
When they went to find the place they had put him in, the man wasn’t there.”
465
  Almond felt that 
African American soldiers were incapable of maintaining their position in the face of enemy 
opposition, with the implication that this was due to the race of the soldiers.  Almond accepted 
this explanation and from this point forward until his death in 1979, he believed that African 




 It is worth noting, this response from Almond came by way of a response to the following question by Captain 
Fergusson; “Sir, did you put any of the blame for this, the loss of these positions on the company grade officers, the 
officers who were actually commanding the men out there?  Did you see any failure of leadership, as well as the 
men’s unwillingness to stay on a position?”  Captain Fergusson was asking the right question; however, Almond felt 
the officers were not liable because of the soldiers, an unusual upending of the usual chain of responsibility that 
moves up the chain instead of down. Ibid. 
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Americans could not be relied on in combat because they could not control their fear.   
     Part of the explanation for Almond’s stance regarding black soldiers has to do with Almond’s 
personality.  Almond in many ways was very similar to his champion, General MacArthur; that 
is, if he perceived that someone had let him down or made him to look bad to his peers and 
superiors, he would spend the rest of his days attacking them.  In Almond’s mind, there was no 
room for failure.  His overweening egotism played out in full view of the Army and Marine 
Corps during the Korean War with Almond’s very public spat with Marine General Oliver P. 
Smith which will be discussed later in this chapter.  In the case of the men of the 92
nd
 Infantry 
Division, Almond appeared to take the unit’s problems as a personal affront after all the effort he 
put into training the black soldiers.  From his perspective, Almond has risked his career as it 
were to ensure that the 92
nd
 was given the opportunity to see combat only to find that the black 
soldiers failed him at a critical moment and when his superiors were watching over his shoulder.  
This was a betrayal of confidence in his opinion and one he never forgave.  Almond never again 
spoke about African American troops without condescension. 
     As detailed in Chapter I, after the failure of the attack at Cinquale Canal, the 92
nd
 Infantry 
Division was reorganized and received a complement of Japanese-American soldiers of the 442
nd
 
Infantry Regiment that had proven themselves as fierce fighters.  Because these new soldiers did 
not let Almond down in the attack, they were the subject of profuse praise as he recounted his 
time in Italy after the reorganization.  Almond said the 442
nd
 was such a success because of a 
“determined attitude of courage and fortitude by the Japanese soldier in the attack, defense, or 
any other military mission assigned him.”
466
  For an officer who would later pronounce that the 
Chinese in the Korean War amounted to little more than “laundry men,” to Almond the 





Japanese-American soldiers could do no harm. 
     General Almond’s success after receiving the 442
nd
 was only tempered by the tragic loss of 





fighting with the Seventh Army in France.  Almond had already lost a son-in-law, Major Thomas 




     As World War II came to a close Almond stated that his prime concern was discipline and 
venereal disease.  Almond stated “our principal objective during this period was to keep the men 
of the 92
nd
 Division, all Negro units, again, so occupied as to keep them out of personal trouble 
and diversion, until they could be moved home” and in Almond’s opinion, then removed from 
military service.
468
  Almond stated that he had reasonable success in controlling the men with the 
exception of preventing “contacts made with lewd women and AWOL experiences.”  The 
venereal rate according to Almond rose 30%, a statistic which warranted the unwanted attention 
of General Truscott who decided to send Almond over to the 10
th
 Mountain Division area so he 
could learn from their experiences in controlling the spread of VD, an assignment Almond most 
assuredly viewed as a rebuke of his leadership. 
     At the end of World War II Almond began to worry about possible ramifications of his time 
leading the 92
nd
 ID having a negative effect on his career.  As discussed in Chapter I, to head-off 
any negative criticism Almond had a report prepared to summarize the actions of the 92
nd
 ID in 
World War II.  Although the report was meant to be viewed as “lessons learned” guide for future 
handling of African American soldiers, it ultimately was more of a “CYA” for Almond and his 
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career.  Almond also attempted to veil his most ardent racial opinions in his post-action report on 
the 92
nd
 ID in order to avoid further damage to his career.  Almond explained to his subordinate 
and confidant Colonel William J. McCaffrey why tempering his views was the better part of 
valor when discussing black soldiers.  In a letter dated November 13, 1945, Almond wrote to 
McCaffrey in reference to a request McCaffrey had received about assisting with writing an 
article for the Saturday Evening Post on the 92
nd
 ID.  Almond wrote: 
          You asked me for my opinion on Saturday Evening Post article on the 92d.  I don’t know  
          how such an article would be received, but I do know that everything else that has been  
          written for publication has been misconstrued by somebody.  Furthermore, I don’t believe  
          anyone except those who have actually served as we did is in a position to understand the  
          problems presented and the solution thereto.  Even in the War Department there is such a  
          dearth of information on the subject of the employment of our special types of personnel  
          that I doubt their ability to interpret an unbiased story … All I can say is that I personally  
          wouldn’t attempt to discuss the subject for the public.
469
     
        
     The formation of a board to review the actions of a given military unit at the end of a conflict 
is not unusual or uncommon.  Many military units prepare a “unit history” to celebrate their 
achievements and to document the “lessons learned” for the use of future military commanders.  
What was unique was the caveat provided by Almond to the board members.  One of the 
questions he wanted them to address specifically was: “To consider the combat effectiveness of 
                                                          
469
 Letter from Lt. Gen Edward M. Almond to Colonel William J. McCaffrey, November 13, 1945, Box 11, Almond 
Papers, MHI.  Almond would maintain his stance on speaking out publicly about African American soldiers the rest 
of his military career.  In January 1953, around the time of his retirement, but while still acting as Commandant of 
the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Almond had several correspondences with Lee Nichols, the author 
of Breakthrough on the Color Front.  In a letter dated January 17, 1953, Nichols stressed to Almond the importance 
of his being completely forthright in his opinion of black soldiers.  Nichols wrote: “I would urge you not to ‘tone 
down’ statements of opinion, or to eliminate colorful phrases of which you are a good maker.  The reason is that in 
all and any of the material I use, I will either so mask the source – such as ‘one prominent General who commanded 
Negro troops in Italy in World War II’ or something even vaguer if you think that would identify you – or I will ask 
your permission to use it.”  Almond did not maintain his response to Nichols request for frankness in his records, but 
his response can be gleaned from another letter from Nichols on January 23, 1953.  Nichols wrote: “As you 
requested, I deleted your name from any quotes you gave me in frankness, while trying to retain something of the 
point of view.” However, the author did note “In other places where your activities were described by others ‘on the 
record’ I felt free to write as I was given the information.” Letters from Lee Nichols to Lt. Gen Edward Almond, 
January 17, 1953, and January 23, 1953, Box 132, Almond Papers, MHI.  
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negro officers and enlisted men.”
470
  Almond issued a letter of Instruction forming the board on 
June 23, 1945, and provided the board with the directive to “give special attention to the combat 
performance of men and units of the Division during the period: 18 August 1944 to 2 May 
1945.”
471
  The board was given till July 1, 1945, to complete its review. 
     Although Almond’s official report blamed some of the problems faced by the 92
nd
 ID in Italy 
on the race of the soldiers serving in the unit, it was not nearly as critical as was the personal 
assessment that Almond wrote after the board concluded its review.  Almond’s personal view as 
expressed in 1945 after reviewing the board’s conclusions was: 
A. The Negro Officer: The negro officer, in general, fails to meet minimum infantry combat 
standards.  He lacks pride, aggressiveness, and a sense of responsibility and has 
practically no command capacity above the grade of captain.  His race consciousness 
seriously affects his general efficiency.   He does not comprehend the merit system of 
promotion.  The negro officer does have utility in the artillery and the services. 
B. The Noncommissioned officer: The negro noncommissioned officer cannot be developed 
in self-confidence and consequent leadership within reasonable time for emergency 
infantry combat use.  He lacks pride, is careless and undependable, and cannot induce 
enlisted men under his command to follow him in danger – principally because he 
himself is afraid of infantry combat. 
C. The Negro Solder: The negro soldier, like the noncommissioned officer, lacks pride and 
trust in his fellow solder.  He distorts facts, is unreliable and fears the ‘unseen’ such as 
the enemy at night and enemy artillery or mortar fire.  Constant supervision fails to insure 
his care and maintenance of equipment.  His regard for health, especially contraction of 
venereal disease and foot ailments, is very low.
472
 
     Almond provided further clarification for his thoughts on African American officers, a topic 
that he was keenly interested in as his subsequent actions during the Korean War would 
demonstrate.  Almond wrote concerning African American officers: 
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 Document titled “Notes on Evaluation of the Efficiency of the Negro in Military Operations Involving Combat” 
not dated, Box 132, Almond Papers, MHI.  Although the document is not dated, based on statements made in the 
document it was mostly likely created by Almond in late 1945.  The board members consisted of: Brig. Gen. John E, 
Wood, Colonel Ray G. Sherman, Colonel James Notestein, Colonel John D. Armstrong, Colonel William J. 







A. The negro officer is a by-product of his race and as such perpetuates the same 
characteristics in the Army to a large extent that he did in civilian life.  Because of a low 
economic level he lacks pride in himself and pride of accomplishment. 
B. Servility has been bred in him for generations, therefore, he does not develop into an 
aggressive troop leader; his aggressiveness, if any, usually manifests itself in the rear 
areas or along race-conscious lines. 
C. His capacity for high command is limited by his lack of intelligence, background, and by 
his inability to criticize other negroes for fear of holding down the ‘race.’
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     From 1945 to the end of his life, Almond maintained that African Americans had no business 
as combat soldiers or officers.  His views on blacks would significantly affect his actions in the 
Korean War and how he used black units and how he evaluated black units, such as the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment.  Almond’s influence on black soldiers during the Korean War was also 
significant because of the relationship he formed with General MacArthur during the years 
between World War II and the Korean War. 
Almond and MacArthur: The Interwar Years 1945-1950 
     Almond left the 92
nd
 Infantry Division on July 5, 1945, and after taking thirty days leave he 
reported to Camp Swift, Texas, to take command of the 2
nd
 Infantry Division.  At the time the 
men of the 2
nd
 Infantry Division were being prepared for a scheduled invasion of the Japanese 
homelands in the fall of 1945.  Almond recalled “my feelings were very pleasant and I was 
anxious to command a white division in another war zone in the Pacific.”
474
  Clearly, the fact 
that the 2
nd
 ID was a white division was a motivating factor in his “pleasant” feelings.  Almond 
did not get the opportunity to lead the men of the 2
nd
 ID into combat since the war in Japan came 
to a quick close on September 2, 1945, after the dropping of atomic weapons on August 6 and 9, 
1945. 




 Interview of General Edward M. Almond by Captain Thomas G. Fergusson, Box 1, Almond Papers, MHI 
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     Instead of battle ready soldiers Almond inherited a group of weary longtime soldiers and 
recent draftees who wanted nothing more to do with the Army once the war came to a close.  For 
a general who was vociferous in his complaints of black soldier discipline problems, he was 
about to learn that white soldiers could be equally if not more unmanageable.  Part of the 
problem was that the 2
nd
 ID with the close of World War II had been designated by the War 
Department as a “Discharged Area of Separation” that meant the men about to be discharged 
from service from eight other divisions were corralled into Almond’s 2
nd
 ID pending their 
separation from service.  Almond lamented, “These men had no intention of submitting to any 
discipline, even to the proper wearing of the uniform,” and worse yet the men “went on pass 
whether approved or not” to the nearby city of Austin, Texas.
475
  Almond recounted that the 
white soldiers would go into a restaurant in Austin, eat a meal, then get up and tell the owner 
“Charge it to the US Government” before walking out without paying.  Needless to say, the 
people of Austin and, more importantly to Almond, city officials and newspaper editors of 
Austin, Texas, demanded action – and they quickly placed most of the blame on the 
commanding officer, General Edward Almond. 
     According to his own later admission, Almond was flabbergasted.  Why were the town 
officials and press blaming him instead of the soldiers committing the disorderly conduct?  
Further, Almond could not blame the actions of the soldiers on their race as he had done in Italy.  
Almond was faced with a situation that would require him to display his unique leadership style.  
Indeed, what he did next was vintage Almond.  Almond recalled: 
          I called the mayor of Austin, to tell him that I didn’t like the attitude of the press and radio  
          descriptions of me as a camp commander, he said “What can I do about it?”  And I replied,  





          “That if any more of it takes place, the troops of the 2
nd
 Division, as long as I was in  
          command, wouldn’t participate in any of the ceremonies in Austin.”  This brought him to  
          his senses, and the castigation that I had been receiving over the television and radio  
          ceased.  What I did was to block out the city of Austin and make a checkerboard and put  
          an officer and detachment with a truck or two in each of these checkerboard areas with  
          instructions that if any soldier appeared undisciplined in disorder, or out of uniform from  
          Camp Swift area, that he was to be placed in the truck with others who did likewise and  
          returned to Camp Swift immediately and confined to the Post including confinement to the  
          stockade if necessary.  This broke up the disgraceful attitude of the American soldier  
          coming home from war and acting like a renegade.
476
      
Almond, like his future boss in the Far East, General MacArthur, knew how to manipulate 
potentially awkward problems to his benefit.  If the press refused to present an image to his 
liking they would be punished.  If his troops embarrassed him they would be punished.  Almond 
clearly believed that nothing should be allowed to impair his reputation. 
     In early 1946 Almond found himself in a situation that would significantly impact his future 
military career.  Because a number of general officers were returning from theaters of war who 
had spent most of the war in overseas postings, the War Department realized that many general 
officers with less overseas time would be needed.  Almond was one of the general officers who 
had spent a relatively short time overseas during World War II – only one year.  He was given an 
option between service in Moscow as the Military Attaché or assignment to the Pacific/Far East 
Command under General MacArthur, who was then in the process of governing Japan in the 
wake of the war.  Both positions held the promise of furthering his military career. 





     While Almond debated the pros and cons, he was also approached about another opportunity, 
one outside the Army.  After consultation with General Marshall (and presumably after he turned 
down the position) the governing board at the Virginia Military Institute approached Almond to 
inquire if he would consider accepting the vacant position of Superintendent.  Almond was not 
ready to leave the Army and turned down the position.
477
  Almond decided that his best career 
move was to accept the position with Pacific/Far East Command.  For better or worse, Almond 
was casting his lot with General MacArthur – the hero of the Philippines and now the “pseudo-
Emperor of Japan.”   
     On June 6, 1946, Almond was among twelve other general officers who reported to duty with 
Pacific/Far East Command in Tokyo, Japan.  Before any of the twelve received an audience with 
General MacArthur, they had to first go through an interview with MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, 
General Paul Mueller.  For Almond, the interview with General Mueller was fortuitous since 
General Mueller knew Almond from past assignments.  General Mueller informed Almond that 
he would receive one of the staff positions at General Headquarter (GHQ) – Tokyo instead of 
one of the field commands.  In other words, Almond was selected to be one of the chosen 
officers allowed into MacArthur’s inner sanctum of power.  This kind recommendation by 
General Mueller had significant implications for Almond’s future career.  As Almond recalled 
about his early days in Tokyo, “I knew General MacArthur by sight and he knew me not at 
all.”
478
  With his assignment to GHQ this changed. 
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 Almond explained that he still felt he could progress further in the Army and that his turning down the position 
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     General Mueller informed Almond that he would become the G-1 (officer in charge of 
personnel issues) for the Far East Command.  In this position, Almond would oversee the 
transfer, promotions, and equipping of military personnel in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, and the 
Philippines.  His position also put him in charge of personnel issues for the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment, then assigned to Japan – which included the transfer of white officers into and out of 
the Regiment.  More importantly for Almond and his career, General Mueller brought Almond to 
the attention of General MacArthur.  Almond recalled that Mueller “took me immediately to 
present me to General MacArthur.”
479
  Almond must have made a good impression on the old 
warrior because in November 1946 Almond was promoted from G-1 to Deputy Chief of Staff 
over the Far East Command. 
     In the Pacific/Far East Command structure in 1946 there were two Deputy Chief of Staffs 
under Chief of Staff General Mueller.  One deputy for Japanese affairs and the other for 
American military personnel, Almond received the more prestigious position of overseeing the 
American forces in the Far East Command.  Almond was moving up the chain-of-command 
quickly in Japan, a circumstance that did not go unnoticed by the MacArthur lackeys who had 
been with the General during World War II.  The other officers who were bypassed in favor of 
Almond questioned why this outsider from the MacArthur sanctum should be elevated above 
them.  The answer was simple enough.  If Almond thought someone could further his career he 
could become the most fiercely loyal subordinate in an Army characterized more by bitter 
rivalries and a lack of loyalty among fellow officers. 
     In early 1949, General Mueller decided that he had spent enough time in the Far East and was 
ready for a position stateside.  General Mueller recommended to General MacArthur that he 





appoint Almond as his successor as Chief of Staff.  Almond was again moving quickly up the 
ranks and with his appointment as Chief of Staff he was the second most powerful officer in the 
Far East. 
     By all accounts Almond and MacArthur appeared to meld well into a unified 
commander/subordinate relationship.  Besides the careful garnishing of their reputations the two 
men held similar opinions regarding African American service members.  While discussing 
MacArthur’s unusual work schedule, Almond provided a story that provided insight into Almond 
and MacArthur’s opinion of black soldiers.  MacArthur told Almond, “You understand that I 
have unusual hours; don’t let that bother you.  Just leave a staff officer in each section and go 
home at any time you desire in the evening.”  Almond commented, “He knew, I think, by his 
association with me, that I would never do anything like that, but he gave me the opportunity.”  
Almond said that MacArthur continued, “Don’t be disturbed by my unusual hours in the office.”  
Almond recounted that he said in a frank and friendly manner which MacArthur recognized and 
smiled at, “General MacArthur nothing you could do would disturb me emotionally.”  
MacArthur intrigued asked Almond “why is that?”  Almond unloaded the punchline, “Because 
once I commanded the 92
nd
 Infantry Division.”  Almond said that MacArthur smiled at the joke 
and went on his way.  The two men realized just how alike they were. 
The Korean War 
     The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces in June 1950 changed everything for the 
Far East Command.  No longer was this a command of occupation; it was now a combatant 
command.  Almond accompanied General MacArthur within hours of the invasion and both men 
realized that the war would end poorly for the South Korean people without a massive influx of 
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support from the U.S. Army.  Almond recalled that MacArthur sat silent in a car as he was 
driven close to the front on the outskirts of Seoul, Korea.  After the ride, MacArthur commented 
to Almond and his other staffers “I’ve seen many retreating Korean soldiers during this trip, all 
with guns and ammunition at their side and all smiling and I’ve not seen a single wounded man.  
Nobody is fighting.”
480
  Almond said that General MacArthur that night in a conference call with 
General Collins of the Joint Chief of Staff made known to General Collins and to those in 
Washington that the situation was dire. 
     General Collins told General MacArthur, “You are authorized to send one regiment” Almond 
recalled that MacArthur showed no emotion and deadpanned, “that is not enough.”  General 
Collins asked how many troops MacArthur needed.  Without hesitation MacArthur declared: 
“Four divisions or the engagement in Pusan will be terminated within ten days.”  General Collins 
demurred and reported “that is impossible.”  MacArthur said, “Please tell the President that.”  




 Division were 
among those immediately sent into the fray.  Among the soldiers of the 25
th
 Division were the 
African American soldiers of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment. 
     The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment received the attention of General Almond almost immediately.  
He singled out the 24
th
 by name when describing the failure of American forces in defending the 





Infantry Divisions were shipped from Japan to Korea with little more than the shirts on their 
backs.  The lack of preparedness of the occupation forces in Japan prior to the Korean War was 
the most significant factor to their lackluster performance in Korea and this was true for both 
white and black units.  Almond stated that the plan that ultimately developed into the invasion of 





Inchon had its roots in the poor performance of American troops thrown haphazardly into 
combat.  Almond said, “We had problems with the 24
th
 Division, then the 25
th
 Division, the 
Marine brigade, and the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment (Negro).”  Speaking for both himself and 
General MacArthur, Almond continued, “We felt that the situation was going to continue to be 
very tenuous and doubtful along the line that we were trying to hold and protect along the 
Naktong River.”
481
   What was telling in Almond’s statement was that he felt the need to name 
the black 24
th
 in the same sentence that he discussed the much larger Divisions and a Marine 
Brigade.  His attention was naturally drawn to criticizing African American soldiers.  
     Almond offered harsh critiques of the actions of American forces during the early phase of 
the Korean War.  Regarding the battle of Masan-ni Almond recalled, “The 25
th
 Division, under 
General Kean, and the Marines were responsible for stopping this flank attack, but had great 
difficulty.”  Almond again made a point to note what he felt was part of the reason for the 
difficulty.  He said, “It was there that the separate regiment of the 24
th
 Infantry, had some 
discouraging combat operations which were similar of the performance of Negro troops in Italy 
during the War where we had just finished several years before.”
482
   
     General MacArthur, General Almond, and the other military planners of the Far East 
Command formulated the plan to relieve pressure on the beleaguered troops in the Pusan 
Perimeter; a plan that would result in the successful amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea, 
Almond’s career prospects moved up even further than being the Chief of Staff to one of the 
iconic military commanders of the Twentieth Century.  Almond was selected to lead the invasion 
of Inchon while still maintaining his position as Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, a dual-hat 







position unheard of in military affairs at the time.  Almond described how he found out about 
General MacArthur’s decision to have him lead the assault: 
          So I went into General MacArthur and said, “that this force was larger than a division and,  
          therefore, it should be designated as a corps.  What shall we name it?”  He said, “You  
          make the recommendation.”  I hadn’t thought very much about the name of it and so, since  
          the staff operating in the motor pool was called “Force X,” the right thing that I thought of  
          was ten.  So I said, “Why not call it the X Corps.”  Whereupon he said, “That’s a good  
          idea.  The X Corps fought in the Pacific Campaign and I will approve that.”  Then I said,  
          “General MacArthur, to have a corps you have to have a commander.  And the thing that  
          you have to do is to ask the War Department or use one of your officers here for such  
          purposes.  Who will it be?  If he could be put in charge of this plan and this development,  
          he would be more familiar with the situation that would be demanded of him.”  It didn’t  
          cross my mind that he had me in mind in anyway.  He said, “I will let you know this  
          afternoon.”  So that afternoon I went in to get the person whom he designated as corps  
           commander and I said, “I came in for the name of the person that you selected to  
          command this force for the Inchon Landing.”  And he said, “It’s you.”  And I said, “But I  
          can’t execute two jobs.  I’m the Chief of Staff.”  He said, “Well, we’ll all be home by  
          Christmas and, therefore, it is only a short operation and the Eighth Army will become the  
          controlling factor as soon as we capture the point of entry.”
483
 
     Almond’s claim that he was caught off guard upon hearing that General MacArthur selected 
him as the Tenth Corps commander is difficult to believe given Almond’s persistence in pushing 
forward his career ambitions.  Almond had never been a passive observer regarding his career, 
and it would be out of character for him to not solicit the position. 





     As X Corps commander and Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, Almond was in a position 
to have considerable influence on a whole host of military decisions in the Korean Theater, and 
that included personnel and integration issues.  Although President Truman’s Presidential Order 
9981 was two years old by the beginning of the Korean War, Almond was among senior Army 
commanders who felt that integration was unwise.  During his correspondence with the Center of 
Military History in the early 1970s, Almond explained his opinion of integration; an opinion that 
had not changed from his days as X Corps commander.  Almond wrote to Brigadier General 
James L. Collins, Chief of Military History, on April 1, 1972: 
          I do not agree that integration improves military efficiency; I believe that it weakens it.  I  
          believe that integration was and is a political solution for the composition of our military  
          forces because those responsible for the procedures either do not understand the  
          characteristics of the two human elements concerned, the white man and the Negro as  
          individuals.  The basic characteristics of Negro and White are fundamentally different and  
          these basic differences must be recognized by those responsible for integration … These  
          persons who promulgate and enforce such policies either have not the understanding of the  
          problem or they do not have the intestinal fortitude to do what they think if they do  
          understand it.  There is no question in my mind of the inherent differences in races.  This is  
          not racism – it is common sense and understanding.  Those who ignore these differences  
          merely interfere with the combat effectiveness of battle units …
484
 
     General Almond believed that integration was a mistake and he was willing to use his broad 
powers to address integration and race issues in his own favor.  According to Gail Buckley in 
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American Patriots, “Almond would act out his racism in Korea, resegregating successfully 
integrated units and refusing to approve medals for black soldiers.”
485
  Almond again provided 
insight into his thinking on race issues and the performance of black soldiers during his 
interviews with the Center of Military History.  Almond was asked by the authors of Black 
Soldier White Army how he would compare the performance of black troops in the 92
nd
 Division 
and the smaller segregated units in Korea.  Almond immediately pounced on the “segregated” 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment to make his point, ignoring other smaller segregated units under his direct 
command in X Corps.  Almond stated “The general performance of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment in 
Korea presents a striking resemblance to that of the 266
th
 Infantry, and in many ways many 






 Regiments of the 92
nd
 Division during combat operations 
in Italy; especially in offensive combat efforts.”
486
  Almond’s conclusion, which he solidified 
after the failed offensive at Cinquale Canal in Italy, was that black soldiers could not be relied on 
in combat.  There was nothing in his mind that could change his opinion. 
     The CMH historians probed further, attempting to get some acknowledgement out of Almond 
that there were aspects of integration that made sense from a military standpoint.  They asked 
Almond about the integration of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment into other white units in the fall of 
1951 and whether that didn’t make sense militarily?  Almond quipped, “I think that General 
Ridgway made a political decision.”
487
  Still not giving up on getting Almond to ease up on his 
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Infantry be removed from combat and that its members be integrated throughout the Army’s units in Korea.  General 
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ridged racial stance the CMH historians pointed out to Almond, “Many observers have reported 
that even before CINFE was ordered to integrate his forces in 1951 there was much de facto 
integration as Negro replacement troops flowed into Korea,” and they asked, “Was there an 
appreciable amount of unofficial integration in the X Corps’ combat units, and if so how would 
you assess the performance of these individuals?”  Almond’s response was a simple, “No.”  No 
further explanation was provided. 
     What the CMH historians seemed unable to grasp, what is difficult for anyone to grasp in the 
post-civil rights era, was that Almond was not ashamed of his racial views; on the contrary, he 
wore them as a badge of honor.  If Almond was anything, he was very consistent in his views 
throughout his career and into his retirement.  For some reason, perhaps to refresh Almond’s 
memory, or to try to embarrass Almond into backing away from his racial views, the CMH 
authors sent with their questionnaire a document titled “A Verbatim Transcript of Lee Nichols’ 
Notes on His Conversation with LTG Edward M. Almond, 16 January 1953.”  The interview was 
reported to have taken place at Fort Myer, Virginia, and the date indicated it was right before he 
officially retired from the Army.   
     In the interview with Nichols, Almond was unabashed about his views, declaring, “My 
approach is what is good for the Army.  Not interested in the Negro aspect – the country has to 
work that out on an overall basis.”
488
  According to Almond, he “resent(ed) bitterly having the 
Army or other services having integration forced on them for political reasons.  I know the 
Negro.”  Almond explained that it was his policy in Korea to use black soldiers as engineers and 
in truck companies, “but couldn’t depend upon them in the front line for offensive action.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
FECOM be broken up and their members integrated throughout the command.  This time the recommendation was 
approved.  Would you comment on this solution to the problem of black units?” 
488
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Ultimately what it came down to for Almond was what he perceived as the black soldiers’ fear 
and lack of patriotism.  Almond stated, “The white man – although we don’t want men killed if 
we can help it – is willing to die for patriotic reasons, the Negro is not.”  Anticipating the follow-
up question, that Almond did in fact have integrated units under his command in X Corps, 
Almond said, “(I) had the 9
th
 Infantry under me when they had them mixed.  Three regiments – 
the one that was mixed was less efficient, I employed it in a defensive line as a reserve.”  
     In most cases, General Almond would use his influence on race matters in subtle ways.  For 
instance, he could direct how and where African American units, such as the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment, would be assigned in battle.  Almond could use these units as holding forces so other 
white units could withdrawal or be reassigned; something that a number of black soldiers 
suspected was being done by General Almond and other white senior officers.  This type of 
military strategic and tactical decision can be difficult to analyze for racial overtones because 
they may appear to have a perfectly reasonable reason underlying the action.  If required to 
justify the actions General Almond could fall back on the premise that these were decisions 
based on military necessity and were not racially motivated.  If the individual questioning 
Almond’s decisions was also of the same mind-frame as Almond on the use of black soldiers, 
Almond’s military necessity argument would be accepted with a wink and a nod – just as 
Almond’s joke to MacArthur about leading the 92
nd
 Infantry Division was accepted without 
question. 
     Others who have analyzed General Almond’s command decisions have also noted that 
Almond misused internal corps assets that were racially integrated.  Shelby L. Stanton in 
reviewing the retreat by X Corps in the fall of 1950 assessed that “Almond’s lack of confidence 
in his subordinate units, which were largely racially mixed” was due to his “Southern 
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convictions about the inferiority of non-white races” and that because of his convictions this led 
Almond “to misuse corps assets on the battlefield.”
489
  While some of these actions on the part of 
General Almond are open to debate as to intention, there are several occasions where General 
Almond’s actions are obviously racially motivated. 
     In January 1951, the Second Division which included an integrated Regiment (the Ninth 
Regiment) was assigned to X Corps and General Almond.  According to the authors of Foxholes 
and Color Lines, General Almond instructed the commander of Second Division, Major General 
Clark L. Ruffner, “to halt the process (of integration) and even to reverse it where possible.”
490
  
Almond’s excuse for this action was that he was concerned for the well-being of the Ninth as a 
combat unit and that integration would somehow degrade their combat performance.  This is 
ironic, since at the same time General Almond was criticizing the performance of the 24
th
 – a 
non-integrated combat unit.  Fortunately for the Ninth, General Ruffner was not in agreement 
with Almond or his intentions and he fought the order quietly and continued desegregation.  
Almond did not hide his decision to reverse integration in the 9
th
 and explained on several 
occasions why he felt he was justified in his action. 
     In a report titled “The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army” prepared by the 
Operations Research Office of John Hopkins University, dated June 11, 1959, Almond added his 
own notes to the report, arguing with the authors conclusions.  The report concluded: “It has 
been pointed out earlier that integration has been affected in Korea as a result of the 
interpretation made by Headquarters, 8
th
 Army of SR600-629-1 except in a notable instance 
where the Corps Commander intervened.”  Almond’s typed note to this statement was “This was 
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     The authors of the John Hopkins University study attempted to not overtly name the “Corps” 
or “Corps Commander” in the report, naturally assuming that their analysis might be 
embarrassing for the Corps Commander.  The study noted, “when the Division (not named) was 
in _____ Corps there was a definite directive from the next higher Headquarters – although 
nothing was ever put in writing – to the effect that they (African American soldiers) were to be 
placed only in service units or in segregated units.”  The authors of the John Hopkins study went 
on to observe “the Division Command and Staff knew that this was contrary to Army 
Department policy and that the people responsible were sticking their necks out” and that besides 
being Army policy, integration was also “in accordance with public opinion.”
492
  Almond’s 
response to this accusation was shocking not only for its bluntness but also for his vituperation 
towards his subordinate commander.  Again, Almond displayed characteristic anger towards 
those he perceived had failed or embarrassed him. 
     Almond’s typed note read: 
          This was the X Corps that Division Commander 7
th
 Division namely, General Ferenbaugh,  
          referred to.  I had numerous conversations with him and his statement that it was Army  
          policy at the time that I issued him these instructions verbally is not a fact.  No Army  
          policy had been adopted except to send replacements to units and that most of the time  
          these replacements were Negroes and the Unit Commander was told to use them to the  
          best advantage.  I felt that having had three years experience in training and in World War  
          II in Italy that I had more information on the subject of how to employ the replacement  
          Negro than General Ferenbaugh who was a Staff Officer in an inconsequential capacity  
          during most of World War II.  For these reasons I gave him instructions based on my  
          experience and these instructions involved placing them in service units or in units that  
          were already predominantly Negroes.  I did not want to water down the capabilities of the  
          few good white troops that I had with undependable Negroes whose characteristics are  
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     General Almond also used his position to ensure that his X Corps headquarters component 
remained free of African American officers.  Korean War veteran John “Tommy” Martin 
recalled that “Almond was not keen on having black officers assigned to X Corps” but, 
strangely, “Almond had no problem with NCOs.”  Perhaps this had to do with his days with the 
92
nd
 where Almond felt a sense of paternalism towards regular black troops.  They were soldiers 
that Almond could still command and not feel threatened by, whereas a black officer was more 
of a threat to his established order. 
     The most egregious racially motivated action by General Almond occurred in February 1951.  
As David Halberstam observed in The Coldest Winter, in mid-January 1951, an African 
American captain named Forest Walker displayed exceptional leadership and courage during a 
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Almond hand signed the bottom of the document and wrote in pencil, “Note: Once the Commander of 17000 Negro 
troops for 3 years.” 
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battle around Wonju while leading men in an integrated infantry unit.  Walker “successfully led a 
bayonet and hand grenade charge against some well-dug-in North Koreans.”
494
  Walker’s 
exploits did not go unnoticed.  His battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel Butch Barberis, told 
General Ridgway about Walker’s action and General Ridgway was “visibly impressed” and 
ordered the Silver Star for Captain Walker.  However, General Almond “found out about the 
medal, stopped it, and had Walker relieved of his company command.”
495
  Almond never 
discussed this incident in his post-military years either verbally or in writing: perhaps, one might 
speculate that he realized that this incident crossed a line that even he regretted. 
  Racism Clouding Judgment of Enemy Forces 
     While the main focus of this chapter is on the racial views of General Almond and other 
officers surrounding the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment regarding African Americans, it is important to 
realize that the racial bias exhibited towards African American soldiers in Korea by white 
officers was also equally applied to Asians, both South Korean allies and North Korean and 
Chinese enemies.  This had a profoundly negative effect on military capabilities.   
     On October 30, 1950, General Almond personally went to the ROK I Corps prisoner 
compound to question several Chinese prisoners through an interpreter.  These were some of the 
first Chinese prisoners to be captured in Korea.
496
  Of the 16 Chinese prisoners at the ROK I 
Corps compound – all were former members of Chiang Kai- shek’s Chinese Nationalist Army 
and would therefore hardly be classified as “Volunteers” as General MacArthur and X Corps 
were trying to argue.  General Almond dutifully sent the report to General MacArthur in his Far 
East Command Headquarters despite his own skepticism.  According to Roy Appleman, “The 
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Far East Command took the news in stride and showed no great surprise or concern.”
497
  General 
Walker, commander of Eighth Army in Korea, commented on the news that Chinese were 
among North Korean soldiers.  Walker said that this was insignificant, for, “after all, a lot of 
Mexicans live in Texas.”
498
  This was a comment that most assuredly was supported by Almond 
and General MacArthur.   
     The prevalent attitude among all ranks of white officers in Korea was that their enemy and 
their South Korean allies were no more than “gooks.”  Max Hastings observed that “all those 
officers, those generals: they really thought that they were going to go over there (Korea) and 
stop the gooks” and there would be nothing to it.  The officers also showed a distinct lack of 
curiosity in whom their allies were and who the enemy was.  Hastings observed, “You could 
have asked any American senior officer in Korea: who commands the Korean 42
nd
 division – 
ROK or Communist – and what’s his background?  He wouldn’t have known what you were 
talking about.  A gook is a gook.  But if the Germans had been the enemy, he’d have known.”
499
  
     General Almond was no different.  Three and half days after the Chinese swept down from 
the North and smashed into United Nation forces all along the allied front.  According to Patrick 
O’Donnell, General Almond still refused to “acknowledge the full catastrophe falling on the 
American troops in North Korea.”  Almond actually had the temerity to declare “we are still 
attacking and going all the way to the Yalu.  Don’t let a bunch of Goddamn Chinese laundrymen 
stop you.”
500
  Almond had allowed his racial bias of the enemy to completely cloud his judgment 
of the battlefield reality.  By the time he recovered his senses, he nearly panicked.  According to 
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General Ridgway in his account The Korean War, finally realizing that his X Corps was 
surrounded by nine Chinese divisions just waiting to pounce on the Marines near the Chosin 
Reservoir, General Almond urged Marine General O.P. Smith to “speed his withdrawal” and 
authorized Smith to “abandon any equipment that might slow him down.”
501
  Fortunately, 
General Smith had not underappreciated the enemy and had purposely slowed down his push 
north despite General Almond’s earlier orders and so had not over-stretched his command.  
Philip D. Chinnery noted in his study that General Smith was determined to conduct “an orderly 
and honorable withdrawal” which would mean that he would bring with him “all of his vehicles 
and guns as well.”
502
  
     Unfortunately for the U.S. Army, soldiers on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir under the 
command of Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith had been placed in an untenable situation by General 
Almond’s reckless orders to push north.  On November 28
th
 General Almond flew in to Lt. Col 
Faith’s position via helicopter.  Appleman recorded that General Almond’s observation of the 
meeting with Lt. Col. Faith was that Faith seemed to be “on edge and resentful of the situation,” 
especially in light of the numerous casualties that Task Force Faith had already sustained.  In an 
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attempt to cheer up Lt. Col. Faith and the men of the Task Force, General Almond presented a 
Silver Star to Lt. Col. Faith and a Lieutenant Smalley.  Both men reportedly “ripped their Silver 
Stars off their jackets and threw them into the snow” after General Almond left, manifesting fury 
at Almond’s ignorance of their situation.  General Almond reportedly tried to tell Lt. Col. Faith 
“not to worry as the Chinese (he) saw were only the stragglers fleeing north.”
503
  Those Chinese 
“stragglers” ended up completely annihilating Task Force Faith in one of the greatest defeats of 
an American unit in the Korean War.  Lt. Col. Faith paid for General Almond’s reckless 
disregard for the enemy with his life – dying alongside the men he courageously led.  Lt. Col. 
Faith was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously for his leadership on the 
east banks of the Chosin Reservoir. 
     General Almond’s racial bias towards Asians extended to the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
troops that fought alongside American soldiers during the Korean War.  General Almond was 
distrustful of ROK troops in the same way he was distrustful of African American troops.  
During a conference between General Ridgway and General Guthrie as reported by Appleman in 







 Divisions which fell under General Almond’s command and the X Corps “were very resentful 
of the way they are treated in the Corps.”
504
  General Ridgway made sure to impress upon 
General Guthrie how valuable the ROK commands were to the greater goals of the United 
Nation forces in Korea.  Ridgway explained that “their loss of cooperation would be a serious 
and critical disaffection, and their feeling must be corrected at once.”  General Ridgway 
continued that it was the responsibility of all commanders to “foresee and eliminate causes of 
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friction and to absorb it and prevent its spread.”  To this end, General Ridgway told General 
Guthrie, “this is a heart to heart talk which I want conveyed to General Almond, and a situation I 
want promptly corrected.”
505
  What results if any became of the “heart to heart” with Almond 
about his relationship to the ROK commanders are unknown.  If General Almond’s relationships 
with other American commanders were any indication – General Almond probably continued to 
alienate his ROK force commanders. 
General Almond and his Leadership in Korea 
     While it is evident by General Almond’s own admission that he was biased against African 
American soldiers and thought very little of his Asian allies and enemies, to what extent did 
General Almond’s leadership create problems for his subordinate commands – including the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment?  General Almond eventually was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General 
– no small feat in and of itself.  And he did so by gaining the respect of men such as General 
Eisenhower – who rated Almond as “one of the half dozen ablest men in the Army.”  Other 
generals who knew Almond well held contrasting views.  One, General John Chiles, commented 
that Almond was “very proud, very intolerant … he could precipitate a crisis on a desert island 
with nobody else around.”
506
  When it came to alienating himself with fellow officers, General 
Almond lived up to his irascible reputation.  For example, Almond placed his relationship with 
Marine General O.P. Smith on a rocky footing even prior to the invasion of Inchon.  On one 
occasion General Almond explained to Smith that “this amphibious stuff is just a mechanical 
option,” and not worth worrying about.  General Smith would recall later in life that he tried to 
tell Almond “a few facts of life,” but Almond “was rather supercilious and called me son, which 
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kind of annoyed me.”
507
 
     The relationship between Almond and his Marine contingent under General Smith grew even 
more strained as the Marines fought to secure Seoul.  On September 25, 1950, General Almond 
issued an order to Smith, “you will push your attack now, to the limit of your objective … in 
order to ensure maximum destruction of enemy forces.”
508
  In reality, General Almond’s order 
was less designed to ensure the destruction of enemy forces than to meet the goal of capturing 
Seoul in time for MacArthur’s manufactured deadline of September 25, which was the three 
month anniversary of the North Korean invasion.  Patrick O’Donnell has written that it was 
around this time that the Marines under General Smith began to condescendingly refer to 
Almond as “Ned the Dread,” a reference to his egotistical “power, brusque manner, and 
sometimes arbitrary actions.”
509
  Smith himself realized that all Almond was concerned with at 
Seoul was getting his “communique” out on time.
510
  General Smith finally responded to 
Almond with the sage words, “I said I couldn’t guarantee anything – that’s up to the enemy.”
511
  
Almond throughout his time as leader of the X Corps seemed to forget that in all military 
operations the enemy always has a say.   
     As discussed earlier, the relationship became even more strained during the push north to the 
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Chosin Reservoir.  General Smith tried to get Almond to avoid the mistake that would lead to the 
destruction of Lt. Col. Faith and his Task Force.  According to Smith, “I told Almond we 
couldn’t make two big efforts, I said, either we go to the Yalu by Chosin, or by the northwest 
route (east side of Chosin), but not both.”
512
  By the time the Marines were fighting their way 
back south (with their equipment) – the relationship between Almond and Smith had become an 
outright feud.  General Ridgway, who replaced General Walker after his death in December, 
1950, realized the relationship between the Marines and General Almond was irreparable.  
According to William Bowers, upon taking command, General Ridgway acknowledged that 
“Almond’s aggressiveness verged on recklessness, and the Marines were especially insistent that 
they not serve under him in the future.”
513
  General Ridgway was not the only senior office 
disillusioned by General Almond’s battle performance.  Lieutenant Colonel G. Patrick explained 
to General Hodges in a letter July 25, 1956, discussing a project he was working on about the 
Korean War, “I would like to write an account of the Inchon landings and X Corps campaign, 
but don’t know how to do it honestly without risking a libel suit from General Almond, who we 
used to refer to as the tactical illiterate.”
514
 
     Despite his mistakes at the Chosin Reservoir, General Almond continued to lead the X Corps 
primarily because of his close association to General MacArthur.  Hastings observed, 
“MacArthur liked and trusted Almond, for reasons unclear to some of his staff, who did not.”  
According to MacArthur’s staff in Japan, “they respected the Southerner’s energy and 
dedication, but they disliked his fierce temper and arrogance.”
515
  As noted previously, 
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MacArthur was impressed enough by Almond that even after assigning General Almond to be 
the X Corps commander, he continued on paper Almond’s position as Chief of Staff, GHQ.  It 




     General Almond’s tenure as X Corps commander came to an end on July 15, 1951, when he 
was selected to be the next commandant of the Army War College.  It is perhaps ironic that the 
officer that created more tension between the Army and Marines, American forces and ROK 
forces, and white soldiers and black soldiers would be selected to lead a future generation of 
senior officers training at the War College.  General Gruenther wrote to General Almond in 
August, 1951 to congratulate him.  Gruenther wrote “I know you will do a wonderful job in 
training people who will be extremely important to the defense of the free world in this era of 
tension.”
517
  Even more surprising than Almond’s selection to lead the Army War College was 
that during his tenure he oversaw a special study about the African American 92
nd
 ID during 
World War II.  General Almond explained to General Gruenther that the study, titled “A 
Fragment of Victory” would be about the 92
nd







 (Japanese-American) Infantry Regiments.  Almond told General 
Gruenther: 
          I was prompted to initiate this project because when I assumed command of the 92
nd
  
          Division in 1942, I immediately began a search for information concerning the history of  
          Negro units in World War I so that I might profit from the experience of commanders of  
          such units during that conflict.  My search was unrewarded because there were only a few  
          meager documents.  As a result, I determined then and there that if it was ever possible, I  
          would see to it that the aspect of the employment of Negro troops in World War II with  
          which I was most familiar would be recorded for future commanders and staff officers of  
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          the Army.
518
 
     
     Thus, the general who denigrated the fighting capabilities of African American soldiers and 
felt that black officers should never be promoted beyond the rank of Captain, if that, was allowed 
to oversee the documenting of the 92
nd
 actions in World War II as a guide to future use of 
African American soldiers. 
     General Almond’s record in Korea is and has been one of controversy, primarily focused on 
his leadership surrounding the fight near Chosin Reservoir in the fall/winter of 1950.  However, 
General Almond also left an indelible mark on the use of African American soldiers during the 
first year of the Korean War.  In many respects, it was General Almond who personally 
attempted to halt and reverse any progress towards integration of black and white soldiers.  It 
was General Almond who personally intervened to block a well-deserved Silver Star medal for 
Captain Forest Walker – and then had him reassigned away from an integrated unit and placed in 
a segregated unit.  General Almond’s reputation for racial bias was well known to the majority of 
military officers and rank-and-file soldiers in 1950.  The placement of a bigoted officer in charge 
of almost half the forces in Korea was a major set-back to race relations in the early part of the 
Korean War and most certainly had to negatively affect the reputation of black units such as the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment.   
     Would the assignment of a different officer to lead X Corps have made a difference?  It is 
difficult to answer since General Almond did not differ radically in his racial views from many 
other senior officers.  However, General Almond stands out because he was very vocal about his 
opinions and prominent in his actions.  Had an officer such as General Ridgway been assigned to 
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the X Corps position at the outset of the Korean War the situation may have very well been 
different.  
     Although General Almond left the battlefields of Korea in the summer of 1951, his one man 
vendetta against the black man as a soldier was far from over.  He would use his time at the War 
College and then in retirement to continue his ultimately futile crusade to turn back the tide of 
integration in the U.S. Army.  Through his correspondence with other like-minded senior officers 
during this time, Almond provides a rare glimpse into the true racial sentiments of many other 
senior military officers of the early and mid-1950s.    
Almond’s Letter Campaign – 1950s 
     On July 27, 1953, a little over three years from the invasion by North Korea, a cease-fire was 
signed that finally brought an end to the fighting on the Korean peninsula, although both sides 
would continue to cautiously eye one another over the demilitarized zone up to the present day.  
In early 1953, Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond retired from active duty with the United 
States Army, after a career that spanned close to four decades.  Despite his departure from the 
Army, Almond maintained a wary eye on the integration of the Army in the post-Korean War 
era.  Although he was no longer in a position to counteract the integration of the Army Almond 
conducted a vigorous letter writing campaign with both active and retired senior officers in an 
effort to continue to argue his point that black soldiers had no business in combat units. 
     On June 26, 1950, Almond wrote to his friend and recently retired Army General, Mark W. 
Clark, to offer support for Clark’s public statements regarding black soldiers and black officers.  
Almond wrote, “I have no desire to enter into controversy in defense of my views or yours 
either, except I see in this article published in the Army Times, June 23, 1956, under Letter to the 
Editor, an insidious campaign to discredit all honest officers who have to do with rendering 
262 
 
efficiency reports on negroes, particularly negro officers, in the future.”
519
  Surprisingly up to 
this point, Almond had maintained a rather low-key image in print regarding his racial views.  
But just as General Clark felt it was time to speak out on what he perceived were problems 
within the Army regarding the rating of black soldiers and officers because of pressure by groups 
such as the NAACP, Almond seemed to take a cue from his old friend and began to speak out on 
race issues. 
     A Life magazine article titled “The Eagle and the Rock: The Bayonets in Arkansas affirm our 
nation’s basic foundation in the law” published on October 7, 1957, was just the catalyst that 
Almond needed to spark his ire as a proud product of the South.  The article was about President 
Eisenhower’s use of the 101
st
 Airborne in Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce the integration of a 
public school after threats of violence by the local population and the complete lack of response 
from the Governor of Arkansas to see to it that law and order was maintained.  Most Americans 
applauded the President for his resolve in the matter and the professional action by the soldiers 
from the 101
st
 sent to maintain law and order, but not Almond.  To the President of Time-Life 
Magazine, Roy E. Larson, Almond unleashed his pent-up frustration with integrationists, “I must 
pronounce it a masterpiece of a dishonest intellectual!”  Almond continued “How it is expected 
that intelligent Americans will accept such specious and half factual arguments is difficult to 
understand.  My deep indignation requires a somewhat lengthy and specific refutation of the 
many sided theme of your long, laborious and partisan editorial.”
520
 
     Besides making the preposterous argument that there was no need for integration of schools 
because “Negro schools in many Southern localities are the newest and many time the most 
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modern when compared with those for whites.” Almond also argued that the real agenda with 
integrationists was “infusing Negro blood in the white race of the nation.”  Almond lamented 
“This is the first time in recorded history of modern democracy that virile, intelligent majority of 
race or creed misguided by dishonest intellectuals and unprincipled politicians has advocated its 
mass intermingling with a race totally differing in racial characteristics and the ultimate 
destruction of the superior race by infusion into its physical structure an inferiority of moral and 
mental qualities.”
521
  It does not appear that the President of Time-Life, Roy Larson, responded 
to Almond’s letter.  If Larson had responded, would he have regretted placing Almond on Time’s 
October 23, 1950 cover?  That issue featured an article on the war titled “War in Asia” and 
featured a segment titled “Sic ‘Em, Ned,” praising the general for his command leadership – 
hence why his image graced the cover of the magazine.
522
 
     Almond provided a copy of his response to the Life magazine article in his correspondence to 
his fellow members of the General John H. Forney Historical Society, which was formed to 
preserve the memory of a Confederate general from Alabama.  Several of the society members 
were also former senior Army officers including Major General Alexander G. Paxton, who had 
also led troops in World War II and Korea.
523
  Almond also sent along his opinions of race issues 
to several officers still serving in active duty with the U.S. Army.  One of these officers was 
Colonel John H. Chiles, stationed in Spain as part of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory 




 “War in Asia,” Time, October 23, 1950.  The article was profuse in its praise for Almond, stating that “Under 
MacArthur, few commanders played a more important role than ‘Ned’ Almond in saving Korea from Red 
aggression.”  The article went on to observe that Almond “is a whip-cracking officer” and that “he never 
compromises with discipline, drives himself hard and his subordinates only a shade less hard.”  Tellingly, the article 
failed to make any mention of Almond’s views of black soldiers although it did discuss his time leading the 92
nd
 ID.  
The magazine actually went out of its way to praise the sacrifices of some of the black soldiers in the 92
nd
 ID, 
including African American Lieutenant John Fox, who called in an artillery strike on his own position in order to 
stop a German infantry attack.   
523
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Group (MAAG).   
     Colonel Chiles had formerly worked under Almond as the G-3 for X Corps in Korea before 
receiving a battlefield command position as the CO for the 23
rd





  Almond told Colonel Chiles that he was glad that Chiles shared his 
viewpoint “of the situation which not only confronts the South but the entire United States on the 
subject of integration,” and that Chiles understood that integration was “debasing the integrity of 
the white race.”
525
  Almond concluded his letter by asking the rhetorical question, why would 
anyone propose to integrate into the white race “20 million Negroes whose moral caliber and 
racial potentials are of such a low degree?”  Almond confided to Colonel Chiles, “but without 
hesitation those who do not know the Negro as you and I do, recommend without hesitation the 
absorption of this worthless element in the very body of our social economic structure, to say 
nothing of its infusion in our Armed Forces.”
526
 
     Almond’s letter writing gained momentum with the burgeoning civil-rights movement.  In 
1959, the topic that sent Almond into a frenzy of letter writing was the act by several faculty at 
Almond’s alma mater, the Virginia Military Institute, signing a petition in favor of school 
desegregation in the public school systems in Virginia.  This act was tantamount to treason to 
Edward Almond.  He sent off letters to fellow VMI alums, Lieutenant General Sumter Lowry, 
Brigadier General E.P. Conquest, Brigadier General O.B. Bucher, and Major General William 
M. Stokes, among others.  Some of the senior Army officers, such as General Bucher agreed 
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with Almond, “Any Virginian, and certainly any VMI Alumnus, who shows himself as favoring 
integration should not be associated with the institute!” roared Bucher.
527
 
     Fortunately for VMI and the involved faculty, cooler heads prevailed.  Brigadier General 
Conquest pointed out to Almond that he did not condone the faculty’s action, but “their act has 
acquired little public notice as yet, and further public action of any kind with regard to it is likely 
to make matters worse rather than better for VMI.”
528
  Conquest was seconded by C.E. 
Kilbourne who wrote Almond to tell him essentially to mind his own business.  Kilbourne 
informed Almond, “When I was Superintendent an alumnus took the liberty of writing me what I 
should do.  After the second letter I wrote him that it was my duty and not his, or words to that 
effect.  It silenced him.  My action was crude but I do not regret it.”
529
  Almond eventually 
backed off from the VMI faculty petition, but his attention was still clearly focused on fighting 
the integrationist movement. 
Almond’s Letter Campaign – 1960s 
     Leafing through the newspapers clippings and letters Almond wrote during the late 1950s into 
the early 1960s permits one literally to trace the history of the civil-rights movement.  In  a letter 
to Alabama Attorney General McDonald Gallion, in 1961, about the visit to Montgomery by the 
“Freedom Riders,”  Almond provided the top law enforcement officer for the State of Alabama 
this advice, “most of them seem to be from Yale University and I believe that their backgrounds 
and previous connections could be very profitably looked into from a standpoint of any 
communistic influence that might dictate their movements.”
530
  For good measure, that same day, 
Almond sent a telegram to Alabama Governor Patterson.  “I congratulate you and State 
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Guardsmen on the emphasis with which the Freedom Riders were escorted yesterday to the 
Mississippi State line.  It accentuated the bizarre attitude of the invaders.  Suggest you utilize 
commie connections, especially those of Peck.  Also that you develop connections of other 
freedom riders by state legal officers.”
531
 
     Other correspondence maintained in a file that Almond labeled “Integration File” contained 
newspaper clippings about the 16
th
 Street Baptist Church bombing in Birmingham that killed 
four little African American girls, an article published by the Editor of The Summit Sun in 
Summit, Mississippi, that quoted PFC Richard Barnett in his accusation that “this integration 
cancer is destroying our fine Army and our great nation,” and a newspaper article titled “States 
Rights Party Head Charges JFK Frame-Up,” among others.
532
  Almond maintained his vigil on 
every event reported in the media about the push for equality for African Americans: however, a 
report released in the summer of 1963 moved Almond to push his letter writing campaign into 
overdrive.  This was the July, 1963 release of the “President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity 
in the Armed Forces,” better known as the Gesell Report, after the committee’s chairman, 
Gerhard A. Gesell. 
     In many ways, the committee headed by Gesell was meant as a follow-up to President 
Truman’s earlier committee, referred to as the Fahy Committee, that had been established by 
Truman’s Order 9981.  The Fahy Committee disbanded in July 1950 and over the next decade 
little had been done to ensure that the gains made by the Fahy Committee remained in place, or 
to inquire whether further action was necessary to ensure that the goals of Order 9981 were met.  
President Kennedy’s goals for the Gesell Committee as noted in the memorandum dated June 24, 
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1962, were straight-forward: 
1. What measures should be taken to improve the effectiveness of current policies and 
procedures in the Armed Forces with regard to equality of treatment and opportunity for 
persons in the Armed Forces? 
2. What measures should be employed to improve equality of opportunity for members of 
the Armed Forces and their dependents in the civilian community, particularly with 





     Although the Gesell Committee’s recommendations called for, among other things, more 
accountability among promotion boards to ensure that qualified African American applicants 
received fair selection, and that base commanders attempt to ensure equal opportunities for 
African American soldiers and dependents off-base as well as on base, the recommendations as a 
whole were far from radical.  However, for Almond the recommendations appeared 
revolutionary, and he feared for the integrity of the United States Army and its leadership.  
Almond reasoned that the removal of photos in promotion board packets would lead to a higher 
percentage of “negro promotions,” which was actually one of the goals of the recommendation.  
Further, that by forcing integration in the Armed Forces this would be viewed as the U.S. 
Government attempting to force “the amalgamation of the races” and had nothing to do with the 
stated goal of securing “equal opportunity and use of skills.”  As for the recommendations 
designed to push for greater equality off-base, Almond feared that the measures would force 
commanders to use “coercive methods” to force integration on civilian communities by “threats 
and blackmail” and thus pit the military against American civilians.
534
 
     Almond wasted no time in attempting to refute the committee recommendations.  He wrote a 
lengthy statement labeled “Analysis and Comments on the Initial Report of the President’s 
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Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces.”  Almond claimed that his perspective 
should carry weight because he had an intimate knowledge of the “Negro” issue from his time 
leading the 92
nd
.  Almond wrote: 
          This whole report is reminiscent of the experiences of the undersigned when he was the  
          commander of the 92
nd
 Division and had so many problems confront him in various phases  
          of training and in combat from the period of September 1942 to August 1945.  One of the  
          most notable problems was that of promotion.  Negro advocates of rapid promotion had no  
          hesitancy in recommending that a percentage of negroes comparable to the negro  
          population strength of the United States should obtain in all promotions in the 92
nd
  
          Division.
535
  
      
     After drafting his rebuttal to the Gesell Committee recommendations, Almond then started a 
letter campaign that dwarfed all of his previous endeavors.  Almond sent his “Analysis” to 
literally every member of the House Committee on Rules.
536
  This impressive letter writing 




     A number of Almond’s military friends wrote back to offer their support.  MacArthur replied, 
“Dear Ned, Your letter of the fifth has filled me with great anxiety.  Its scholarly and wise 
conclusions are incontrovertible.  I am glad that you are so active in combating a growing 




 The list included: Kansas Congressman William H. Avery, Mississippi Congressman William M. Colmer, 
Congressman Howard W. Smith – the chairman for the House Committee on Rules, Indiana Congressman Ray J. 
Malden, New York Congressman James J. Delaney, Arkansas Congressman James W. Trimble, Texas Congressman 
Homer Thornberry, Missouri Congressman Richard Billing, Massachusetts Congressman Thomas T. O’Neill, 
Alabama Congressman Carl Eliott, Ohio Congressman Clarence J. Brown, New York Congresswoman Katherine St. 
George, California Congressman H. Allen Smith, and Illinois Congressman Elmer J. Hoffman. 
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  To his old friend and mentor, General Paul Mueller, Almond sent not only his analysis 
statement but a copy of MacArthur’s response.  Almond assured Mueller that after reviewing the 
Gesell Report “you will come to the same conclusion.”
539
 
     To his military buddies still on active duty with the Army, Almond confided that he was glad 
that he was retired from active service.  “I may be selfish but I must say that I am happy that I do 
not have to implement such orders as are emanating now from the DOD,” Almond told Colonel 
Paul Goodman in a letter on September 6, 1963.
540
  Of course, when Almond had been on active 
duty the issuance of DOD directives to integrate his troops did not seem to stop him from 
coming up with ways to thwart the directives – as was the case with X Corps during the Korean 
War. 
     In his correspondence with General Sumter Lowry, Almond provided what he defined as 
further proof of his assertion that the actions of the Gesell Report were meant to do more than 
correct inequalities in the Armed Forces, but were, indeed “directed at amalgamation of the 
races.”  Almond informed Lowry that just the previous day he had read in the Birmingham Post-
Herald  that Roy Wilkins, the Executive Director of the NAACP had proposed that legislation 
“be enacted to set aside all State bars to inter-marriages.”
541
  This was the irrefutable proof to 
Almond that the only logical outcome of integration was miscegenation. 
     Almond and many of his closest personal friends and peers from the Army, perplexed that 
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some of their colleagues were actually willing to go along with the integrationist 
recommendations made by the Gesell Committee.  “I wanted to believe that our commanders 
would be impervious to any such political interference with their command responsibilities,” 
wrote Major General Thomas A. Lane to Almond on November 13, 1963.  Lane continued, 
“After all, the judgment on all promotions is in their hands.  Unhappily it appears that senior 
commanders are embracing these ill-conceived ideas out of a false sense of loyalty to their 
superiors.  Every man comes to the day when he must stand and be counted.  Some are not doing 
it.”
542
  Almond and his peers were among the senior military officers, retired and active, that 
tried to push back against the Gesell Committee recommendations.   
     Another of Almond’s friends, Lieutenant General A.G. Paxton told reporters from the 
Greenville, Mississippi’s The Commercial Appeal that the Kennedy Administration was 
attempting to “make every other soldier a Negro,” or in other words, to bring the white soldier 
down to what Almond and Paxton perceived to be the black soldier’s level.  Paxton went further 
to equate the checks-and-balances recommended by the Gesell Report to a “political commissar 
system” similar to and just as nefarious as the Soviet models whereby the “system” would be 
“monitoring the conduct of every commander” to ensure promotions based on “racial activity 
and not efficient performances of military duty.”
543
 
     In a personal letter to Almond, Paxton explained his frustration with the integration agenda.  
“Certainly the Negro should serve his country and be given fair treatment in his assignment,” 
Paxton wrote, but then he added the caveat, “which he is capable of holding.”  Paxton agreed 
with Almond that the Kennedy Administration and some senior military officers were failing to 
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realize this mistake and as such, Paxton warned “when we sacrifice the efficiency of our armed 




     For a brief moment in the late summer of 1963, Almond and his military friends and 
associates thought that perhaps the Kennedy Administration and the integrationists had pushed 
too far.  Several congressman and Southern politicians were very vocal in their opposition to the 
Gesell Committee recommendations and with an election in just over a year, other politicians 
who remained in the shadows seemed ready to speak out.  Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman 
of Committee on Armed Services was one of the politicians who wrote to Almond with 
encouraging words.  Vinson proclaimed, “I found the Gesell Report to be most vicious in nature 
and have, of course, expressed my views to the Secretary of Defense in this regard.”  He 
continued, “I am pleased to have my own views corroborated by your excellent analysis, and I 
am grateful to you for sending it to me.”
545
  In one hand written note of encouragement, Charles 
F. Crisp, the President of the Bank of Commerce, wrote, “Dear Ned, Somehow I believe the 
ultra-liberals and niggers are over playing their hand.  If this is so maybe we will live to see 
change in government.  Ours cannot last as it is for 10 years or more.”
546
 
     Despite Almond and his friends’ optimism, 1963 did not turn out to be the year that the 
integration movement in the armed forces was defeated.  The Gesell Committee’s 
recommendations were not overruled.  Almond realized as much soon after his letter writing 
campaign when he confided in his friend Crisp that, although he sent his analysis to over 30 
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congressmen, fewer than four responded in favor by placing the analysis in the congressional 
record, and only congressman, Armistead Selden of Alabama, actually took action by offering a 
resolution to force the Kennedy Administration to remove the recommendations.
547
  Selden’s 
resolution failed to make it out of committee.  A new era was dawning on race relations and 
Almond and his fellow sympathetic military friends were on the wrong side of history. 
     Almond never did give up the fight.  In the 1970’s Almond continued his letter campaign.  In 
1971 it was the Army’s release of an educational film titled “The Black Soldier” that sparked his 
attention.  The film was designed as a teaching tool to inspire greater cooperation between white 
and black soldiers by providing a history of African American servicemen in the Army and 
refuting the “myths” related to the performance of blacks as soldiers.
548
  Almond wrote to 
General Bruce Palmer, Vice-Chief of Staff for the Army, and threatened to return his 
Distinguished Service Medal if the film was not pulled.  Almond’s threat was rebuffed by Palmer 
with the somewhat paternalistic and sarcastic response, “Needless to say, I assume that you are 
joking in discussing the return of your DSM.  Your magnificent performance, so well chronicled 
in the citation and documented in our official histories, is well known both within and outside the 
Army.”
549
  Almond kept his DSM.  Almond’s letter campaign finally came to an end on June 11, 
1979, when at the age of 86, he passed away at his home in Anniston, Alabama.  He was buried 
in Arlington Cemetery near his son Captain Edward Mallory Almond Jr. 
     At the time of his passing, Almond was remembered for his military career and achievements 
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in three wars.  His career was remarkable, but it was also overshadowed by deep-seated anger 
towards his fellow African American soldiers that defies understanding.  We may never fully 
appreciate the negative effects Almond had on race relations in the Army in World War II and in 
Korea, but his openness in discussing his racial beliefs have provided us a glimpse into how 
entrenched those beliefs were among some of the senior Army officers in the 1940s and 1950s.  
These were men, unfortunately, who allowed their biases to color military decisions that should 
have never been about black or white, but only about Army green.  
 














War Leads to Integration 
     When the Korean War started in June, 1950 the military force fielded in Korea by the United 
States was still largely segregated.  Yet by the end of the Korean War the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
had been disbanded, and African American soldiers were incorporated into white units all the 
way down to the squad and platoon level.  Three years of a war that had not been planned for by 
the Department of Defense, and a war that had rapidly expanded with the introduction of large 
numbers of Chinese troops in the winter of 1950, accomplished more for desegregation than the 
nearly two years of peace prior to the Korean War.   
     Without question the heavy demand for personnel in an ever changing and dynamic conflict 
that did not align with the pre-packaged war plans of post-World War II ultimately produced the 
strongest argument for integration of African American soldiers.  Wartime necessity called for 
the inclusion of soldiers as replacements not based on race, but on need – something that even 
ardent segregationist Army officers, such as Edward Almond and Mark Clark, could not easily 
argue against.  Johnny Butler in Unsanctioned Institutional Racism in the U.S. Army concluded 
that “Korea proved to be the Coup de grace for sanctioned institutional racism in the Army.”  
African American soldiers were pulled out of “support units, where they had been concentrated 




     While the need for replacements was great among white units, the response by military 
leaders to institute greater integration of African American soldiers into white units did not 
happen overnight.  In fact, the military seemed to turn towards integration in desperation as a 
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response to manpower shortages and the perceived discipline problems among some African 
American units – specifically, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and the all-black battalion in the 9
th
 
Infantry Regiment under Almond’s X Corps.
551
  This chapter explores the factors that pushed 
reluctant military commanders to embrace integration.  Those factors included the removal of 
quotas on the recruitment of African American soldiers and the subsequent influx of greater 
numbers of black troops, the greater attention paid to perceived discipline issues and combat 
inefficiencies of segregated units, such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, and the appointment of 
General Ridgway as 8
th
 Army Commander and subsequently Commander of the Far East 
Theater.  General Ridgway was particularly influential, because he first analyzed the inherent 
flaws in a segregated Army, and, secondly, because he had the positional authority and command 
presence to force opponents to integration, such as General Almond, to step aside for the greater 
good of the Army in Korea.  
Straggling – Integration a Response 
     As was discussed in Chapter II, while some of the problems with straggling among African 
American troops were blown out of proportion by white officers with a bias towards black 
soldiers in combat, there clearly existed a straggling problem among some African American 
units early in the war.  The authors of Black Soldier White Army pointed to a report by the 
Provost Marshall for the month of August 1950 that showed that 116 men from the 24
th
 Infantry 
had been collected at rear check-points while only 15 soldiers were collected from the 27
th
 (white 
Regiment) and 12 from the 35
th
 (white Regiment).  Similarly, the Provost Marshall noted that the 
African American 159
th
 Field Artillery Battalion had 32 stragglers collected at rear check-points 
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during August 1950 while the white 90
th
 had only 5, the white 8
th





  Clearly, the proportion of stragglers among the African American units was 
higher than was the case with white units.  From evidence presented in the CMH study, in 
response to this problem, the 25
th
 Division collected volunteers among white NCOs in the 
Division for reassignment to African American units experiencing problems with straggling.  
The volunteers were promised promotion to officer status in return for their duty with African 
American units.  As was noted in Black Soldier White Army, although the number of white 
NCOs first sent in to assist with African American units was few in number, the response by the 
25
th
 Division to integrate select white NCOs was a development “signaling the breakdown of 
segregation under the pressure of combat in Korea,” albeit on a very limited basis.
553
 
     According to the CMH study, one of the officers who realized that the solution to improved 
combat efficiency among African American soldiers might be the introduction of white troops 
was Colonel Corley, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment CO.  Corley was reported to have suggested 
early in his tenure as 24
th
 Infantry Regiment CO that “blacks as a group might hold their ground 
better if they were integrated into white units.”  However, Corley “either out of prejudice or for 
practical reasons … declined to suggest that whites, except in isolated cases, should ever be 
assigned to formerly all black units.”
554
  Corley did not act on this belief and push for further 
integration, even as he was making his observations on integrating blacks with white units “the 
Army was having so much difficulty finding trained replacements that, at the very moment when 
he was stating his reservations a number of white sergeants were serving with the 24
th
 Infantry, 
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     It should be noted, that some of the white officers and soldiers who decried the performance 
of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as a whole and had at the beginning of the war been viscerally 
opposed to integration slowly changed course during the war and eventually moved to support 
integration as a solution.  One of these converts was a young officer in the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment named Daniel Randall Beirne.  In a letter written on September 9, 1950, he observed 
that “the 24
th
 Regiment never seems to be able to hold its position and there always seems to be a 
breakthrough.”  Beirne’s response to the problem was not that African Americans be pulled from 
combat duty, as General Almond and some other white senior officers believed, but rather that 
they be integrated with white units.  Beirne reasoned that “Negroes alone are good but afraid as a 
unit they are not.”  As if to highlight his argument for integration Beirne noted that he “saw a 
Negro tank sergeant (Platoon Commander) who commanded whites.  The men under him said he 
was absolutely fearless and he held the highest respect of all.”
556
  
     Beirne’s observation that greater integration was a cure for military deficiencies among 
segregated black units was also noted by several senior officers in Korea and back in the United 
States.  Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke wrote in a letter to General Henry S. Aurand, the 
Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific, in November, 1950; “I have been told some 




 Division.  
Since these stories are all of a pattern and since I have heard them from men of all ranks from 
Corporal to Major General I feel that they are reasonably accurate.  My own personal opinion is 
that integration on a ratio of about 1:6 is the answer.”
557
  Although General Clarke’s opinion of 
the performance of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was probably skewed by the exaggerations by 
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racially biased officers, his conclusion that integration was a most helpful proposal to address the 
issue. 
     Clarke and many other military leaders pushed for integration because of a belief that African 
American soldiers needed the guidance of white soldiers in order to become effective combat 
soldiers.  The realization that segregation in and of itself placed the African American soldier in 
a difficult position from the standpoint of morale and motivation was something that the military 
leaders would not or could not understand. 
     As the Korean War continued, military leaders who had begun to question the continued 
segregation of troops as being counter-productive to combat readiness soon were using any 
failure of segregated units as an excuse to push integration even quicker.  One such situation that 
gained the attention of even General MacArthur occurred on February 13, 1951, and was detailed 





Infantry (an all-black unit) were assigned to the 2
nd
 Reconnaissance Company to act as a 
blocking unit.  Both units ended up being overwhelmed by Chinese forces between the towns of 
Chaum-ni and Kudun.  A Toronto newspaper correspondent was one of the first on the scene of 
L Company and 2
nd
 Reconnaissance Companies position after United Nation forces regained the 
lost positions.  The journalist reported that he “counted 68 bodies of US soldiers there” and that 
the soldiers “went to sleep with only one sentry and that some of the bodies were found naked 
and some lay where they had been trying to get out of their sleeping bags.  They had not dug any 
foxholes or other defense positions.”
558
  The implication of the article was that the African 
American soldiers had failed to take even the most rudimentary precautions to properly defend 
their position.  The fact that a white unit accompanying the black soldiers of L Company had 
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also failed to take precautions was not addressed, or that the lack of defense preparations was as 
much a failure in leadership as it was in the failure of the individual soldiers.
559
  Tragic situations 




 Infantry Regiment were 
predictably seen as clear signs that all-black units were not capable of effective military action, 
but since the Army could ill-afford to remove entire battalions from combat duty, the only logic 
solution left to military leaders was to integrate the black soldiers at smaller unit levels.  
The Need for Replacements – a Call for Integration 
     Senior Army military leaders reluctantly acknowledged that the continuation of segregated 
units was not the most efficient method of utilizing existing manpower.  This was a conclusion 
that took time to develop and ultimately did not reach fruition until General Matthew Ridgway 
took control of Eighth Army in Korea in December 1950 and slowly began to implement a more 
aggressive integration policy.  Perhaps not surprising was the fact that the average soldier in the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment, even prior to the Korean War, could have told the military brass that 
segregation was inherently wasteful of manpower resources.   
     One of those 24
th
 Infantry Regiment veterans who realized the futility of segregated units was 
Steve Davis, and the reason was directly tied to the Army replacement system.  Davis did not 
require an Army study to come to the conclusion that continued use of segregated units was 
absurd and wasteful of resources.  Davis saw firsthand that several African American companies 
were “continuously over strength with white units understrength because of racial policies.”  
Further, even on the same base, Davis observed some white understrength units were “much 
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more efficient, passed all of its tests, etc., while the other black units, even with two or three first 
sergeants, and troops filling the same slots, etc., continued to do poorly.”  Davis concluded “this 
was the segregated Army prevalent throughout.”
560
  Any system that assessed manpower 
resources based first on the race of a replacement instead of the replacements training, 
experience, or specialization, was bound to fail.  
     Exacerbating the problem with replacements was the fact that African American replacements 
coming to the Korean Theater of Operations were outpacing losses among African American 
units.  This created a backlog of African American replacements that could not be assigned given 
lack of openings in African American units and policies prohibiting integration of black soldiers 
into white units.  Davis said that while the Army waited on loosening restrictions on integration, 
“Korea was becoming a problem (with) large groups of blacks behind the lines almost enjoying a 
vacation while whites on the front lines were being decimated.”  According to Davis, the tragedy 
of the situation was that he had witnessed the same problem during World War II when his 
artillery battalion sat out the war back in the United States at Fort Custer, Michigan.  However, 
unlike World War II, Davis said in Korea the Army brass finally realized that due to segregation 
“the overall implication was that there were too many soldiers sitting around doing nothing.”  As 
Davis saw it, in Korea “it was simply a pragmatic solution commanders on their own volition 
had begun integrating when they went to the rear asking for volunteers and had a quite a 
response.”
561
   
     The other problem with the replacement system was that because segregated units could only 
accept black soldiers the majority of black replacements sent to Korea early in the war were 
immediately assigned to infantry units such as the 24
th
 whether they had been trained as 
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infantryman or not.  Colonel Corley was one of the white officers who immediately grasped how 
ridiculous this system was for filling the ranks of a combat unit.  Gerald Astor in The Right to 
Fight addressed the manpower issue when the author acknowledged that “part of his (Corley’s) 
problem lay in a flood of replacements” which ultimately made up “more than two-thirds of the 
regiment’s 3,663 GI enlisted” personnel.  The worst part for Colonel Corley was that the 
replacements were made up of “former truck drivers, heavy equipment operators, cooks, 
engineers, and communications specialists” and not the trained infantrymen he required.
562
  
Despite the wide assortment of non-combat trained personnel assigned to the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment in the initial months of the war, Corley and his regiment were expected to meet the 
same battlefield performance expectations as white regiments that were not handicapped to the 
extent of the 24
th
 with non-combat personnel. 
     A change in Army policy that preceded the war in Korea proved to be one of the larger 
influences on the pressure of replacement pools during the war; the removal of quotas on black 
recruitment in the Army.  Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Army had maintained 
a strict quota on the number of African American servicemen in the Army at any given time.  
Those quotas were usually meant to mirror the percentage of African Americans in the United 
States population and thus ensure the Army at least on paper had a military that resembled the 
larger American public.  The quota system allowed the Army to ensure that black soldiers never 
increased beyond what was perceived as acceptable levels while at the same time allowing the 
Army to declare to the African American community that they were allowing blacks the same 
opportunities to serve their country as any other segment of the American population. 
     In reality, during periods of demobilization, such as after World War I and World War II, the 
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quotas on African American servicemen could also be used to ensure that large numbers of black 
soldiers were removed from the service.  It is also worth noting that African Americans were the 
only minority group that was singled out for “quota” treatment.  Prominent members of the 
African American community as well as representatives from the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were aware of the myriad ways that the Army 
manipulated the quota system to advance their own race controls.  Flexing their muscles, those 
same advocates were able to use the Fahy Committee and President Truman’s Presidential Order 
9981 to push the military, and specifically the Army, into removing the quota system for 
recruitment.   
     Despite fierce opposition from senior military officers and civilian officials the quota system 
was abolished in early 1950.  Richard Dalfuime documented the dramatic results of the removal 
of quotas in Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces.  Dalfuime observed that “Negro 
enlistments had been 8.2 percent of the total in March, 1950; without the quota they shot up to 22 
percent of the total in April.”
563
  With the addition of more and more black soldiers into a 
military system still designed around segregated units, the Army had only the  choice to cram as 
many black soldiers as possible into existing African American units, whether they needed the 
manpower or not.  As Dalfuime recorded, the extra personnel resources were placed in black 
units even if the table of organization for those units could not account for the extra resources.  
When the Korean War broke out in the summer of 1950 this allocation of extra manpower to 
fully filled units was wasteful, and as Dalfuime observed, “Hard to justify when many white 
units were actually short of personnel.”
564
  The segregated system was beginning to show cracks 
at the seams.    
                                                          
563





     Although the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment only saw a limited number of white soldiers integrated 
into their ranks, other all-black units in Korea experienced a more rapid and dynamic integration.  




 Infantry, a unit made up initially of 
only African American soldiers when his company received their first non-black replacement.  
Becton recalled that the replacement was a sergeant of Hispanic origin.  Apparently his 
introduction into the 3/9 was received with some trepidation since about all that Becton recalled 
initially being said about the assignment was that the other men of the unit decided the Hispanic 
NCO was “to survive” – with the implication being that his presence would be tolerated.  Despite 
the lukewarm reception, Becton stated that apparently the Hispanic NCO was ultimately 
accepted by the black soldiers of the unit and felt comfortable enough being assigned to a black 
unit that “when offered the chance to transfer to a white battalion in the regiment, he declined, 
indicating he was well satisfied with the 3/9.”
565
 
     According to Becton, in mid-September of 1950 the 3/9 rejoined the rest of the regiment near 
the Naktong River.  Becton learned that its two white battalions had incurred very heavy 
casualties during their “first battles” and, thus, when replacements arrived, “color played no part 
of assigning them to battalions.”  Becton said that “black as well as white soldiers were 
welcomed and were integrated into the depleted white units.  Black soldiers pulled their load and 
remained with those units indefinitely.  Later, when asked if they wanted to transfer to the 3/9, 
they declined, a decision that pleased both their officers and white comrades.”
566
   
     Although Becton’s examples related to white replacements being incorporated into black 
units, the opposite also was true as the war progressed and the pool of black soldiers exceeded 
the openings in all-black units.  In some instances, officers who had previously been hostile to 
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the idea of integration, faced with growing manpower shortages, actually facilitated the transition 
of black replacements into white units, as was the case with the commanding officer of the 9
th
 
Infantry Regiment.  According to Richard Dalfuime, the commanding officer of the Ninth 
Infantry Regiment justified his reversal on integration by explaining, “We would have been 
doing ourselves a disservice to permit Negro soldiers to lie around in rear areas at the expense of 
still further weakening our white rifle companies.”
567
  Whether replacements were white soldiers 
being incorporated into all-black units or black soldiers being incorporated into white units, one 
of the persistent outcomes of this slow integration was that as men of either race fought 
alongside soldiers of a different race, racial barriers eroded.   
Combat Breaks Down Racial Barriers 
     One of the principles employed in all military basic training was that shared experiences, 
especially stressful experiences such as those simulated by military basic training, created bonds 
between the individuals and were crucial in unit cohesion.  The greater the hardship and conflict 
shared amongst a group of individuals the greater the bond.  Of all the hardships and physical 
stressors in the human experience, certainly combat was among the greatest.  Because combat 
created such strong bonds among the men who experienced it together, it should not come as a 
surprise that combat often broke down even the most strident racial biases among black and 
white soldiers. 
     The mere act of survival in a combat situation can break down barriers.  During the chaos of 
the early months of the war, a group of 80 white Army soldiers were able to overpower their 
North Korean captors when they realized that they were going to end up being killed (as many 
captives were early in the war by North Korean soldiers): they then made a mad dash towards 
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American lines still fearing that they would fall back into North Korean hands.  When they saw 
an American tank come down a road they did not pause one moment when they realized the tank 
commander was an African American soldier.  According to Philip D. Chinnery, one of the 
survivors recalled, “We saw the most beautiful big black sergeant on top of the tank, manning 
the fifty caliber machine gun.  He came down from the tank and we mobbed him, hugging him, 
shaking his hands, crying on his shoulder and thanking him.  I don’t think there was a dry eye in 
all that group.”
568
  The race of that tank commander was inconsequential to the white soldiers 
who had just avoided their own deaths. 
     Even after being captured by the enemy, the struggle for survival united American soldiers, 
both white and black, and created bonds that would remain for a lifetime.  Colonel William 
Richardson, a white junior officer who wrote Valleys of Death: A Memoir of the Korean War, 
discussed his experiences in captivity.  Richardson recounted several instances during which 
fellow African American prisoners saved his life.  During one such episode, Richardson was 
emaciated, suffering from malnutrition and dysentery and near the point of physical collapse.  
Richardson was making one of his many trips to the trench that acted as a latrine for the inmates 
of his prison camp.  Richardson lost his balance and fell into the trench.  Too weak to pull 
himself out, he began to scream for help.  Richardson recalled that, “two black prisoners on the 
other side heard me.  They crawled through the barbed wire (separating the white prisoners from 
black prisoners), grabbed me by my arms and pulled me out.”  Richardson said that if his 
rescuers had not acted, “a second later, and I would have slipped under the surface” and drowned 
in the stream of sewage.
569
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     According to Richardson, his physical condition deteriorated to the point that he had to be 
moved to the “sick camp” where prisoners were sent to die.  Few prisoners were ever heard from 
after being moved to that facility.  Richardson was placed in a room with other desperately ill 
prisoners, most of which according to Richardson seemed to have little or no desire to live.  
However, one of the sick prisoners in the room caught Richardson’s eye.  Richardson recounted 
what happened next; “After a while, I made it around the room and set up next to him.  He was a 
massive black man with a barrel chest and thick arms.  I learned that he was a boxer.  He’d been 
the heavyweight champ for the Army in Europe and later the all-Army champion.”
570
  
Richardson learned that his name was King and he had pneumonia – which had landed him in 
the “sick camp.”  
     Unlike the other occupants, King had a desire to live beyond the war.  Richardson drew 
strength from King’s strength and the two men grew close.  Richardson was the first to recover 
sufficiently to be removed from sick camp.  As the guards escorted him out, Richardson turned 
to his friend and said “King, get off your ass and get out of here.”  King responded, “Good luck, 
Rich.”  Richardson said that he didn’t think he would ever see King again, but four years later at 
Fort Dix, New Jersey, Richardson was riding along in a jeep when he saw King directing traffic 
as a military police officer.  “Pull over, I told the driver and hopped out as soon as he stopped.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
because of propaganda issues.  James Thompson, a black soldier captured during the Korean war remarked: During 
the early stages of our imprisonment, the Chinese had quartered all black POWs together, regardless of rank.  
Racism had absolutely nothing to do with it.  It had everything to do with propaganda … and we blacks knew it.”  
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Walking into the intersection, I called out King’s name. Rich? King said.  King and I had a 
reunion right in the middle of the intersection as cars looked on.  Both of us had actually made 
it.”
571
   
     As men such as Richardson and King bonded together under the harshest of circumstances the 
color barrier that had separated them previously grew less and less important.  Even the physical 
barrier that their Chinese captors attempted to emplace between the white and black soldiers was 
not sufficient to prevent a bond among Americans of both races.  Richardson and King’s story 
was also repeated in multiple ways throughout the Korean War as integration slowly moved men 
of different races into closer cooperation.  The previous fears held by some senior white Army 
officers that the integration of forces would cause a break-down in morale and the eventual 
degradation of combat effectiveness of white units did not materialize.   
     In a letter from General Joseph M. Swing to Lieutenant General Anthony McAuliffe written 
on September 10, 1951, General Swing sought to assuage General McAuliffe’s concerns about 
backlash by the press for the U.S. Army’s integration policies.  Swing wrote, “I realize that the 
press reaction you worry about is probably one which compares Army areas and might force 
untimely action in the Southern (Southern United States) Army areas … however, the concern by 
you over the press reaction to integrating these men into white units causes me to guess that your 
people may not realize the extent to which integration has already progressed – at least in the 
Sixth Army.”
572
  To highlight his point that he has not had issues with integration in Sixth Army, 
General Swing provided an example. “Indeed, in the 369
th
 Engineer Regiment, a white unit, I 
found a colored first sergeant who, according to the regimental commander, is doing a splendid 
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job without repercussion because of his color.”
573
  
     Brigadier General John H. Michaelis also went on the record to assert that as integration 
progressed the feared repercussions and “white back-lash” were not happening among his men.  
As documented in Foxholes and Color Lines, Michaelis stated in an interview in May, 1951, that 
he had approximately 250 black soldiers under his command – making up approximately 10 
percent of his unit.  “These Negroes,” he said, “were integrated down to the lowest tactical unit, 
the squad, and in this capacity have proven satisfactory.”  Further, Michaelis made a comment 
that became the title of Mershon and Schlossman’s work: “Some have been promoted, others 
have been decorated.  I mention this to point out that there is no color line in a foxhole.  
Apparently, the white soldier has no objection of serving under a Negro NCO, if the NCO has 
proven himself in battle.”
574
  According to Major Otis M. Darden, “by March 1951, nineteen 
percent of black soldiers served in integrated units,” and as much as “sixty percent of the infantry 
companies had some partial integration by May 1951.”
575
   
     Besides the strides made in Korea towards integrating Army units, another area of integration 
which only aided the rapid integration of units in Korea was the gradual removal of racial 
barriers among white and black troops in training depots in the United States.  In the training 
system of the pre-war period and post-World War II, the training of white Army recruits and 
black Army recruits were separate.  Although the activity might take place on the same military 
installation, a physical barrier was maintained between the two races, especially in their berthing 
accommodations.  The first senior officer to buck the old system of segregated training was 
Brigadier General Frank McConnell at Fort Jackson, South Carolina.  Realizing that it was a 
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waste of manpower and resources to have black recruits remain idle while they waited for a large 
enough aggregation of black soldiers to create a class, the general decided it was time to 
integrate the black soldiers with the white soldiers.  Richard Stillman reported in his account, 
Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, that several members of McConnell’s staff 
thought the general was “going off the deep end.”
576
  But General McConnell persisted and he 
recalled later, “I pulled out the Army announcement on non-segregation … It was all the 
authority I needed.  I said that if we didn’t ask permission, they couldn’t stop us.”  According to 
McConnell, he provided the verbal order to integrate recruits “and that was the end of 
segregation at Fort Jackson.”
577
     
     The growth of integration in the Army and the assessments of General Swing, General 
Michaelis, and actions of General McConnell were all positive steps in the greater movement for 
equality and desegregation, but should not leave the impression that once integration started 
there were no problems or push-back among senior Army officers.  A century of racial 
segregation in the armed forces was not going to disappear overnight and the biases of countless 
number of soldiers and officers was going to take time to change.   
     The Army knew that old ideas and biases would die hard.  To support their argument for 
integration, the Department of Defense in 1951 ordered an overall assessment of attitudes of 
white soldiers towards black soldiers.  The study, known as Project Clear, showed only a slight 
majority of those polled responded positively when asked “how would you rate U.S. Colored 
soldiers as fighters, compared with white U.S. Soldiers?”   Fifty-one percent (51%) of the white 
soldiers responded with “Just as Good,” while forty-seven percent (47%) responded “Not as 
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  However, when compared to assessments made during and just after World War II, a 
51% response of “Just as Good” was a marked improvement in attitudes among white soldiers.  
The simplest and most logical conclusion from the survey results was that integration under 
combat conditions was having a positive impact on race relations, and continued integration 
would only further the changes already beginning to show results.  Sherie Mershon and Steven 
Schlossman offered a similar assessment when they concluded, “Project Clear did not influence 
the desegregation process that was already underway in the Far East in 1951, but the research 
findings did assist Army officials in planning for worldwide desegregation of the Army and 
persuading reluctant commanders to cooperate.”
579
  To overcome the resistance of some of the 
senior Army commanders, the leaders at the Pentagon and in the Department of the Army would 
need all the tools at their disposal. 
Full Integration Still Faced Resistance 
     As noted in the last chapter, one of the most vocal opponents to integration in the Army in 
Korea was General Almond, who attempted to stop and even reverse integration among his 
subordinate units in the X Corps.  General Almond was not alone in his resistance to change and 
integration.  Another senior officer who attempted to place restrictions on integration was 
General Thomas T. Handy (European Commander during the Korean War).  Initially, General 
Handy followed the Almond model of resistance and denied there were any instructions to 
integrate black soldiers with white soldiers.  Colonel Raymond B. Ansel – in his thesis, From 
Segregation to Desegregation: Blacks in The U.S. Army 1703-1954, recounted that according to 
Dr. Eli Ginzberg of Columbia University after a visit to Europe and General Handy’s command 
                                                          
578
 Leo Bogart, Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two Original 1951 Field Reports 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1969), 67. 
579
 Mershon and Schlossman, Foxholes and Color Lines, 245. 
291 
 
in the summer of 1951, observed that if the Army wanted integration in Europe then General 
Handy was going to need a “push.”
580
  According to Ansel, “Ginzberg found that the officers 
refused to believe that the Pentagon wanted Europe to integrate.”
581
    
     After General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, made a visit in the fall of 1951 to 
Germany to meet with General Handy, General Handy realized that refusing to integrate would 
be career suicide.  General Handy decided he would integrate his forces per the orders of the 
Pentagon and General Collins, but he and his staff would also attempt to place certain restrictions 
on which African American officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) would be allowed 
to integrate into white units and which would be forced to remain segregated, or even removed 
from military service altogether.  General Handy called for “screening boards” made up of white 
officers who would evaluate black officers and NCOs on an individual basis and then decide 
which officers and NCOs would be allowed to integrate and which ones would remain in all-
back units or be separated completely from armed service.
582
   
     It was suggested to General Collins in a memorandum by his chief of staff, Colonel H.L. 
Sanders, that it would be best for General Collins to handle General Handy’s request in a 
confidential letter, “which will be known only by the fewest possible individuals here.”
583
  
Colonel Sanders was clearly concerned about the political fallout if General Handy’s request for 
“screening boards” focused solely on “weeding out” undesirable African American officers and 
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NCOs was leaked to the press.
584
  General Collins agreed with Colonel Sanders’s 
recommendation and ordered that all information regarding General Handy’s request be handled 
on a “need-to-know basis” with correspondence to be “hand-carried.”
585
   
     In a personal letter from General Collins to General Handy dated February 15, 1952, General 
Collins laid out his decision concerning “screening boards” for African American personnel.  
Collins started soothingly enough, “Your plan for the integration of White and Negro personnel 
in combat units is in general agreement with our present thinking on integration.”  Then General 
Collins addressed the main issue, “I am afraid, however, that I cannot accept your proposal to 
establish ‘screening boards’ to test and evaluate the fitness of Negro officers and certain 
noncommissioned officers for retention in combat units.”  General Collins went on to explain his 
reasoning: 
          I realize the need for assuring continued effectiveness of integrated units; however, the  
          appearance of selected Negroes before boards prior to integration will undoubtedly be the  
          source of many legitimate complaints of discrimination.  It does not appear that such  
          screening will assure effective operation of integration since the bulk of Negroes in  
          combat units will be assigned without selectivity … it is therefore believed that all Negro  
          enlisted personnel in existing combat units, regardless of grade, should be assigned  




     General Handy was representative of senior Army officers in the early 1950s who required 
constant pressure by their superiors to force their cooperation on integration.  Had General 
Collins not made a point of meeting with General Handy face-to-face to impress upon him the 
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need to comply with Pentagon directives, or taken the time to outline in detail his concerns 
through personal correspondence, the integration of Army forces in Europe might have been 
delayed for several years, or worse, General Handy might have been able to implement the 
racially biased “screening boards” which would have severely damaged relations between white 
and black officers and NCOs in Europe. 
Racial Undertones in Some Motives for Integration 
     Besides senior officers such as General Handy who sought to block integrating their 
commands, some officers who encouraged integration did so partly for ulterior motives.  
Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke was an officer who early in the Korean War looked towards 
integration of African American soldiers into white units as a response to poor performance 
among all-black units and as a solution to a growing need for replacement troops in white units.  
General Clarke was convinced that integration would improve the performance of African 
American troops and likened it to the response he received from integrating South Korean 
soldiers into U.S. Army units.  General Clarke wrote, “the experience we have had with the 
ROK’s (Republic of Korea soldiers) leads me to believe that if integrated, and under white 
officers who themselves have had proper training the negroes may make fairly good fighters.”
587
  
General Clarke noted that “In the beginning the ROK soldier was not worth a damn” but “after 
he had fought alongside our men he developed a certain pride and there was stimulated a friendly 
rivalry which greatly enhanced the fighting qualities of the ROK soldier.” 
     General Clarke was among a cadre of officers who felt that the African American soldiers in 
units such as the 24
th 
Infantry Regiment were proving themselves incapable of combat 
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effectiveness, and, thus, the reason integration had to be pushed forward was that the black 
soldier like his ROK brethren could be “worth a damn” as soldiers.
588
  General Clarke’s next 
sentences in a letter to General Henry S. Aurand struck to the heart of the racial undertones 
behind his philosophy regarding integration.  Clarke wrote: “We now have about 20,000,000 
negroes in the United States.  We simply cannot just let these people breed in security at home 
and behind the lines while our white boys are being killed.  The negroes must take their share of 
casualties.”
589
  Just as General Almond had promised the black soldiers of the 92
nd
 in Italy that 
they had received their wish to see more combat and now would also receive their share of the 
casualties, General Clarke also pushed for more rapid integration so that black soldiers would 
receive a greater share of casualties. 
     General A.C. McAuliffe viewed integration as a solution to a different problem, the problem 
of a growing population of African Americans on bases in the United States.  General McAuliffe 
wrote to Lieutenant General Joseph Swing, “We have already had complaints from the Fort 
Lewis area on the size of the Negro population.”
590
  General McAuliffe continued that “the 
whole problem is a very touchy one; the solution of which I must agree is integration.”  General 
McAuliffe was referring to complaints by military commanders and civilian authorities around 
Fort Lewis, Washington, who feared that the increasing number of African American troops 
would create social problems.  These complaints had been common for many years near bases in 
the South where African American troops were stationed, but with the ever growing number of 
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black soldiers at Fort Lewis the white community in the far northwest of the U.S. was beginning 
to become concerned as well.  By integrating black soldiers into white units, this would prevent 
the build-up of sizeable populations of black soldiers at any one military base in the States.  For 
General McAuliffe, the choice between maintaining segregation at the risk of sparking a 
potential race issue in the U.S. between large masses of black soldiers and white citizens was far 
more risky than integrating black and white soldiers.   
     General McAuliffe also shared General Clarke’s concern that segregation of soldiers by race 
was creating a backlog of qualified African American soldiers back in the United States.  He 
stated in September, 1951: “I am familiar with the present status of integration which, as you 
point out, is fairly widespread and has been accomplished without the dire results that were 
predicted by its opponents.  The important fact to me is that we have over strengths in colored 
units totaling 34,000 approximately – to me a costly and needless waste of manpower.”  General 
McAuliffe and General Clarke were both realists that knew they needed the extra manpower 
available in African American soldiers during a war that was proving to be costlier than expected 
in human lives.  Had the Korean War not happened, the response by senior white officers such as 
McAuliffe and Clarke likely would have been quite different.   
Army “Studies” Desegregation  
     The United States Army, besides being one of the nation’s main lines of defense, was first 
and foremost a government bureaucracy.  Inherent in all bureaucracies is a tendency to remain in 
a state of stasis.  Change only came at the direction of leaders intent on making the proposed 
changes and even then it was a slow and arduous process.  Also, prior to most changes going into 
effect in a major bureaucracy, such as the Army, there was inevitably a “study” into the possible 
ramifications of any and all changes.  Even though President Truman ordered desegregation in 
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1948, this did not mean the Army was going to enact the change without ample opportunities to 
“study” the effect of desegregation. 
     As discussed in chapter I, the military in the years between World War I and World War II 
had looked into issues related to the “use” of African Americans in the armed forces, but had 
only paid minimal attention to the question of integration of African American soldiers into 
white units.  For the racially skewed interwar period the idea of black and white soldiers fighting 
side-by-side was too radical to even consider.  After World War II, however, the armed forces, 
including the Army, were aware that change was on the horizon regarding desegregation.  
Countless thousands of African American soldiers had already proven themselves on the field of 
combat and the idea that African American soldiers would not make effective fighting men was 
proven false, even if it was still loudly contested by men such as General Edward Almond.  The 
next logical step was to decide when and how black soldiers would be integrated with white 
units.  As Johnny Butler observed, in the post-World War II era, prior to the onset of the Korean 
War, studies conducted by the military had already concluded that “the more contact white 
soldiers had with blacks, the more favorable was their reaction toward racial integration.”
591
 
     In a report to the Chief of Staff of the Army entitled “Evaluation of ORO-R-11 on Utilization 
of Negro Manpower in the Army” dated January 5, 1952, the report had seven key findings.  The 
principle findings were as follows: 
a. The problem is primarily one of utilizing low-level personnel. 
b. The best use of such personnel is achieved through integration with whites in 
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approximately a 15-85 ratio. 
c. The efficiency and morale of Negroes are increased through integration; while those of 
the affected whites are not impaired. 
d. Attitudes toward integration become more favorable with increasing experience of it. 
e. Good leadership is accepted as such regardless of the race of leader or follower. 
f. Operational integration is conducive to social integration. 




     This report was one of several conducted during the Korean War and reflected a synthesis of 
prior findings as well as the most recent data available at the time it was issued.  The seven 
findings would ultimately guide the Army as the rate of integration increased in Korea and at 
Army bases around the world.  The first two findings dealt with the issue of placement and ratio 
of African American soldiers to white solders, while the next group made up the core of the 
seven findings; namely, that integration improves with time and that “good leadership” is crucial 
to the process.  The last two findings dealt with the issue of “social integration,” which revolved 
around mostly “off-duty” activities such as official dances, use of swimming pools, and other 
recreational facilities.  For soldiers in Korea, the problems associated with “social integration” 
were probably the least important, since they didn’t have many opportunities for “recreation” in 
a war zone.  At bases in Japan, Europe, or the United States, however, the “social integration” 
problem was more difficult to deal with than the integration of black and white soldiers in 
combat since this issue involved the soldier’s families.  Further exacerbating the “social 
integration” issue was the location of some of the Army bases in the United States.  When bases 
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were located south of the Mason-Dixon line, the societal norms of the rigidly segregated 
southern United States further complicated integration of troops and their families.
593
 
     Lt. General A. C. McAuliffe summarized the findings of the ORO study by emphasizing two 
categories: “1) integration has been working in sufficiently varied circumstances to justify 
expansion to entire Army; 2) performance of unit in combat or garrison is not adversely affected 
when integration is carried out so that Negroes are in the minority.”
594
  General McAuliffe 
accepted the findings of the ORO that integration was not going to cause sufficient problems to 
warrant stalling any further.  However, once integration was accepted, the next problem that 
General McAuliffe referred to was the appropriate proportion of black to white soldiers.  
Obviously, General McAuliffe and other senior white officers worried that the presence of 
African American soldiers in too great of numbers would negatively affect the performance of 
units as whole.  This was a throw-back to the idea that African American soldiers in significant 
numbers did not perform as well as white soldiers and would drag the entire unit down to sub-par 
performance levels.  As noted by the ORO report, the ideal for Army integration was reportedly 
in a proportion of 15 black soldiers for every 85 white soldiers.  This proportion was further 
reduced by senior Army officers to a percentage of 10-90 black to white. 
     In a letter by Brigadier General John D. Murphy dated September 24, 1952, General Murphy 
summarized what General Collins provided as guidance on integration: 
          Collins gave us directive that Negro strength in any infantry unit must not exceed 10%.   
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          Going to have a real problem in integrating service, which started after beginning the  
          combat units, find that (we) have got to drag our feet because in some services … our  
          Negro strength will be close to 50% which is entirely too heavy.
595
 
      
     Although the concern by senior white officers was that an influx of too great of a number of 
African American soldiers would bring down the performance of a white unit, some African 
American officers agreed with limiting the percentage of black soldiers in any white unit, but for 
very different reasons.  The concern of some black officers towards integration of a large 
percentage of black soldiers into a white unit was one of overwhelming white soldiers that were 
not accustomed to fighting alongside black soldiers and perhaps unwittingly unleashing a racial 
backlash against black troops.   
     During one of the interviews conducting by the Inspector General during the Korean War, Lt. 
Col. Arthur Harris interviewed Captain Charles Ellis, a black officer in the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment about his thoughts on integration.  Captain Ellis explained what he thought the Army 
could do to improve combat performance of black soldiers and specifically, how integration of 
black soldiers in small numbers with white units would improve combat effectiveness.  Ellis 
explained: 
          If you take 20 men to a Company of whites, integrate them; let him get what he earns.  Let  
          him compete on equal terms.  It would require some time no doubt.  One of two solutions  
          is, to send well trained infantrymen into an all colored unit as replacements (which had  
          already been done by the Army on a limited basis at the time of Captain Ellis’ interview).   
          Two, integrate the colored troops within white units.  Integrate them in small proportions,  
          that way they could get accustomed to the white and the white to the Negro.  Each race has  
          its own traits.  It would be unfair to cram the traits of a white person down the throat of a  
          Negro all at one time.  Or the other way around.
596
     
      
     With the Army embracing the integration of African American soldiers into white units in 
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percentages under 10% of total strength, the next question the Army had to deal with was what to 
do with all black units such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Clearly, if the 24
th
 and other similar 
units were to be maintained, it would take significant movement of personnel into and out of the 
unit to even come close to a percentage of 10% black soldiers to white soldiers in these formerly 
segregated units.  Ironically, the fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was indelibly linked to the 
implementation of an integrated Army; either the 24
th
 would have to be dissolved or integration 
would have to be delayed. 
Fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment 
     Ever since the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment entered combat in Korea, senior military leaders in 
Korea had been calling for the deactivation of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Perhaps the most 
vocal of these individuals was General Kean, commander of the 25
th
 Division.  General Kean 
had been agitating for the deactivation of the 24
th
 as early as September, 1950.  In a letter dated 
September 9, 1950, to General Walker, Kean wrote, “It is my opinion that the 24
th
 Infantry has 
demonstrated in combat that it is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected 
of an infantry regiment.”  Further, General Kean claimed if there “are a number of individuals in 
the 24
th
 Infantry who have been and are performing their duties in a credible manner” it has been 
“completely nullified by the actions of the majority.”
597
  At the time of the letter, General Walker 
was not inclined to even consider the deactivation or removal of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  At 
that point, Walker was in need of every soldier he could get, white or black. 
     There were several other factors at play when Walker decided to ignore Kean’s 
recommendation, including an assessment of Kean’s motivations.  Although General Walker did 
not go on record about his opinion of Kean’s racial beliefs, others have suggested that Kean was 
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not a supporter of African American troops, including General Almond who thought highly of 
General Kean and his recommendation for the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment to be disbanded.  When 
interviewed in the late 1970s, General Ridgway observed that Kean’s recommendation for 
dissolution of the 24
th
 Infantry was supposedly for performance issues, but Kean was also a 
“Southerner.”
598
  The other factor that might have influenced General Walker’s decision to 
disregard Kean’s recommendation was Walker’s tenuous relationship with General MacArthur. 
     Almond recounted that during the dark days of July 1950 when the 8
th
 Army was falling back 
by leaps and bounds further and further south on the Korean peninsula and were huddled in what 
was referred to as the “Pusan Perimeter,” he and General MacArthur visited Walker at his 
command post in Taegu, Korea.  Almond said that before they even arrived at Walker’s 
command post, “it had been indicated that Walker was in the process of deciding to retire to the 
Pusan area,” further shrinking the American footprint on the peninsula.
599
  Macarthur was 
furious with General Walker and according to Almond, Macarthur retorted; “Walker, you can 
make all of the reconnaissance you want.  You can put your engineer to work if you desire in 
preparing intermediate trenches, but I will give you the order to retire from this position and 
there will be no … Dunkirk in this command.  To retire to Pusan will be unacceptable.”
600
  
Walker regained his composure after getting chewed out and went to his staff and declared: 
“This Army fights where it stands.  There will be no retirement.”   
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     What Almond did not mention in his interview was how close Walker had come to being 
relieved of command.  General Ridgway recounted in his interview in the 1970s, “I think you’ll 
find ample evidence today to support the fact that General MacArthur’s public utterance about 
his confidence in Walker, and the relationship between them, are contrary to the facts.  He did 
not have confidence in Walker.”  Further Ridgway commented, “Their relations were very 
strained at the time.  He even had considered relieving Walker of command.”
601
  In light of the 
strained relationship between General Walker and General MacArthur, even if Walker had been 
inclined to adopt General Kean’s recommendation regarding the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, it is 
doubtful that MacArthur or his staff would have paid attention to the recommendation if for no 
other reason than the source – Walker.  It was also possible that Walker sat on the 
recommendation out of spite for General MacArthur and his Chief of Staff, General Almond.  It 
was highly likely that Walker was aware of Almond’s antipathy towards African American 
troops and the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, and what better way to get even with Almond than to 
ensure that the all-black 24
th
 Infantry Regiment remained in combat.  We will never know 
exactly what General Walker’s thoughts were on this matter because, tragically, in December, 
1950, General Walker was killed in an automobile accident.  The question regarding the fate of 
the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment passed on to Walker’s replacement, General Matthew Ridgway.   
The Ridgway Factor 
     At the time General Ridgway inherited the 8
th
 Army it consisted of Republic of Korea forces, 
a host of Allied Nations units, U.S. Marines, and U.S. Army units that included the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment and other “colored” units such as the African American battalion of the 9
th
 Infantry 
Regiment under General Almond’s control.  General Ridgway inherited a demoralized military 
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that was being heavily pressed by Chinese forces and the mood from private to general was that 
the situation was dire and the will to fight had been sucked from the United Nation forces.  
General Ridgway also inherited the complaints by various white officers that black soldiers were 
not meeting the performance levels of their white counterparts in combat.  He also had on his 




     Among General J. Lawton Collins’ papers were typed notes related to the recommendations 
made by General Ridgway for integration of forces in May, 1951.  The notes stated that General 
Ridgway’s recommendations for integrating the Far East Command’s (FECOM) black soldiers 
was based on “11 months experience in Korea” that had “proved the advisability of such a 
move.”  According to the report, FECOM had 14 “Negro” units with the largest being the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment.  “The Negro units had a spotty record during the first year of fighting … 
General Kean was asking Eighth Army to remove the 24
th
 from combat and allow him to transfer 
troops of the regiment as replacements on a percentage basis to other USA units in Korea.”  The 
report stated General Kean’s reason for recommending deactivation of the 24
th
 was based on his 
opinion “that (the 24
th
) is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an 
infantry regiment.”
602
  General Ridgway, ever the gentleman and politician, described General 
Kean’s request in a much more appealing light than had Walker. 
     In his autobiography, General Ridgway discussed the request he received from General Kean 
regarding the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  General Ridgway wrote: 
          While I was still in command of the Eighth Army I had received from Major General  
          William B. Kean, then commander of the U.S. 25
th
 Division, an earnest and thoughtful  
          recommendation for the integration of white and Negro troops.  Kean had had full  
          opportunity to observed Negro troops both in peacetime, at Fort Benning, and in Korea,  
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          where the all-Negro 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was part of his command, and he felt that, both  
          from a human and a military point of view, it was wholly inefficient, not to say improper,  
          to segregate soldiers this way.
603
   
      
     General Ridgway’s plan for integration started with “full integration beginning with the 
largest all-Negro combat units, the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and the two infantry battalions, one in 
the 9
th
 and the other in the 15
th
 Infantry Regiments.”  From there General Ridgway concluded 
“that we could break up the smaller all-Negro combat units of artillery and armor and finally do 
the same with the numerous small service supply units both in Korea and Japan.”  General 
Ridgway concluded:  
          It was my conviction, as it was General Kean’s, that only in this way could we assure the  
          sort of esprit a fighting army needs, where each soldier stands proudly on his own feet,   
          knowing himself to be as good as the next fellow and better than the enemy.  Besides it  
          had always seemed to me both un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught  
          to downgrade themselves this way, as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or  
          to accept leadership themselves.
604
   
      
     The pivotal question posed by Ridgway’s comments and the discussion concerning the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment was whether he pursued integration because he was adroit enough to realize 
that deactivation of the 24
th
 had to be based on a larger integration policy and not tied to the 
performance of one unit, or whether Ridgway acknowledging the injustice and inefficiency of a 
segregated Army?  There was no question that if General Ridgway had only proposed the 
inactivation of the 24
th





 there would have been severe backlash in the African American press still actively 
followed the actions of the 24
th
 and, more often than not, printing articles that praised the unit for 
its performance as a shining example of the ability of black combat soldiers.  The weight of the 
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evidence, such as the gradual integration of units even prior to Ridgway’s command in response 
to the manpower shortage, as well as Ridgway’s own statements indicate that Ridgway’s motives 
for integration were more aligned with an understanding that segregated units were hampering 
the Army’s efforts and the time had come to embrace integration throughout all units.   
     As Mershon and Schlossman observed about General Ridgway, as was the case regarding 
many other issues facing the Army in 1951, he “assumed leadership on the issue of black troops 
and forged a single, coherent set of practices out of the various ideas and actions that local 
officers had already devised.”
605
  No longer would the Army in Korea tolerate a hodge-podge of 
integration policies or would officers like General Almond be allowed to undo the movement 
toward an integrated force.
606
  General Ridgway’s approach to desegregation was methodical and 
he took pains to make sure that General Collins and the Pentagon were aware of his actions. 
     In June, 1951, General Ridgway soothed General Collins fears, telling the Army Chief of 
Staff, “I am fully alive to the major aspects of our negro integration problem here.  We shall 
develop our plans confidentially to an appropriate advance state, withholding all action until 
receipt of your instructions.”
607
  In a follow-up letter in January, 1952, General Ridgway 
reported to General Collins: “Integration of colored personnel into the 45
th
 is well along and has 
so far functioned most satisfactorily, even among the dyed-in-wool Southern personnel.  No 
problems of any kind have been reported.”
608
  Ridgway was the type of leader who, had 
“problems” arisen, he would have personally ensured that they were dealt with. 
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     As noted earlier, a number of factors were at play moving integration forward during the 
Korean War.  Ultimately, it appears, however, that the most decisive factor was the leadership 
exhibited by General Ridgway.  Ridgway’s decisiveness was perfectly paired with his attention 
to detail.  Unlike General Almond or General MacArthur, who tended to shoot from the hip, 
Ridgway moved as a chess player, calculating ten or twenty moves ahead.  When Ridgway took 
over command of the 8
th
 Army, he made a point of immersing himself in as many details of the 
condition of his command as was possible.  He certainly would have been aware of the 
manpower needs among white units as well as the over-strength of several segregated black 
units.  He would have been aware of the combat “reputation” of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as 
well as the personal motives of some of the harshest critics of the 24
th
, including the harshest 
critic of them all, General Almond.
609
   
     Ridgway was acquainted almost immediately upon assuming command of the 8
th
 Army with 
General Kean’s position on the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, and he acknowledged as well, “I know 
the Commanding Officer of the 9
th
 Infantry was always worried about his 3
rd
 Battalion, which 
was colored.”
610
  At the same time, Ridgway had determined that African Americans were as 
capable as their white counterparts in combat.  Ridgway commented during an interview in the 
1970s that during the Korean War his opinion of the black soldiers was “there’s nothing wrong 
with him if he has the right surroundings, the right officers, the right training and the right 
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  Armed with the needs of the Army, the negative view of segregated units by 
several senior officers, and his own personal belief in the capability of African American 
soldiers, Ridgway set in place a plan that eventually led to the integration of all Army units in 
Korea. 
     General Ridgway broached the topic of integration with General Maxwell Taylor, who was 
the Army G-3 at the time.  Ridgway recalled that General Taylor responded, “Well, there 
couldn’t be a more timely occasion than to raise the issue right now.”
612
  Armed with the tacit 
support of General Taylor, General Ridgway next used a visit by Secretary of Defense George C. 
Marshall to solidify his plan to integrate.  In fact, several months prior to Marshall’s visit in 
April of 1951 General Ridgway gained even further leverage regarding the integration issue 
when he was promoted to Supreme Commander of the Far East after President Truman relieved 
General MacArthur.  
     Marshall made his visit to Korea in June, 1951.  As recounted by Howard Means and Gerald 
Astor, besides General Ridgway and Secretary Marshall there was a third witness to the 
discussion concerning integration, Ridgway’s pilot, Michael Lynch.  According to Lynch, 
Secretary Marshall initiated the conversation with Ridgway by stating, “Let’s finish this black 
thing.  Let’s integrate blacks in the fullest sense and not put them in separate units anymore.”
613
  
From his limited perspective, Lynch thought that Marshall was the one who made the first move 
to order the integration, but the correspondence between General Ridgway and General Collins, 
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among others refutes that version of events.  Although Secretary Marshall should be given the 
credit for approving the plan for integration, there was no question that it was General Ridgway 
who was the driving force behind the move to desegregate the Army in Korea.  With the backing 
of Secretary Marshall and the Pentagon, Ridgway showed his attention to detail side and used the 
occasion of the three year anniversary of President Truman signing Order 9981, July 26, 1951, to 
issue the order to desegregate forces in Korea. 
     The importance of General Ridgway’s action first as 8
th
 Army commander and then as 
Supreme Commander of the Far East should not be taken for granted.  Mershon and Schlossman 
latched on to the momentous nature of General Ridgway’s action when they observed “over the 
course of one year, General Ridgway had succeeded in securing the implementation of racial 
integration throughout one major Army command under wartime conditions.”
614
  Despite the 
years of excuses, denial, subversion, and near insubordinate action by numerous senior Army 
officers, General Ridgway persevered: at least in Korea the Army was now integrated.  
The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment Deactivated 
     When General Ridgway received permission from Secretary Marshall to integrate the Army 
in Korea, the fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was sealed.  There would be no room in the 
integrated Army for an all-black unit, even one with as much history as the 24
th
.  General 
Ridgway was sensitive to the fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and was aware that his actions on 
this matter would be closely watched.  Ironically, some of the critics of integration tried to use 
the fate of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment as a tool to stop the policy’s implementation.  Indeed, some 
opponents to integration had attempted to dissuade Ridgway on that course of action, because 
“integration would have violated the 1866 act of Congress that had designated the 24
th
 as an all-
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black unit.”  That excuse failed when it was pointed out that the 1866 law “had in fact been 
repealed during the early months of 1950.”
615
  
     Besides General Ridgway, other officers who were aware of the potential explosiveness of 
deactivating a unit such as the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment instead of just integrating the unit.  
Probably in effort to ease the announcement that the 24
th
 would be deactivated, a rumor was 
started in the Pentagon at the time that stated that the 24
th
 was being deactivated instead of 
integrated to “preserve the regiment’s legacy as an all-black unit.”
616
  Unfortunately, General 
Ridgway’s decision to deactivate the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment while not doing the same for other 
“segregated” units such as the all-black battalion in the 9
th
 Infantry Regiment gave the 
impression that the 24
th
 was singled out for deactivation because of perceived flaws in the unit, 
and, by proxy, because of perceived flaws in the men of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  General 
Ridgway chose not to deactivate all of the segregated units for one easy reason, time.  Colonel 
Ansel observed, “the integration of all units through the command, was more difficult and time-
consuming” and as a result “to speed up the process the plan to inactivate all segregated units 
was dropped; rather, it was decided simply to remove the designation ‘segregated’ and assign 
white soldiers to formerly all-black units.”
617
  
     The authors of Black Soldier White Army came to their own conclusion regarding the decision 
to deactivate the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment.  They argued that “the decision to inactivate the 24
th
 
was certainly a result of dissatisfaction with its performance, but it was also the culmination of a 
gradual change in Army policy toward segregated units that had been under way since early 
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  This conclusion in view of the integration of other “segregated” units supports the 
theory that the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was singled out based on “performance” criteria.  Of 
course, assessment of performance that was portrayed negatively was done more often than not 
by senior military officers who were clearly biased against black soldiers in general.  General 
Ridgway manifestly deserved credit for the quick and efficient implementation of integration, for 
after all, as one historian has observed, “by the end of October 1951, 75 percent of Eighth Army 
units were integrated.”  Nevertheless, his handling of the issue of deactivating or integrating the 
24
th
 Infantry Regiment was a missed opportunity.   
     In many ways the deactivation of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was as politically sensitive as the 
whole issue of integration.  Since the beginning of the Korean War, the 24
th
 was essentially the 
“face” of African American soldiers in the war.  Their successes had been hailed by the African 
American press and provided inspiration to the African American community at large.  It was not 
surprising then that when the decision was made to deactivate the 24
th
 Secretary of Defense 
George C. Marshall felt it necessary to personally write to several Senators who had expressed 
concern with the slow progress of integration in the Army.  Secretary Marshall wrote to Senator 
Herbert H. Lehman and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey: 
          For the past several months the Department of the Army has been conducting an intensive  
          study in Korea directed toward improved employment of Negro manpower, particularly in  
          combat units.  Comments and recommendation were obtained from commanders  
          concerned and the opinions of several hundred personnel, both white and Negro, were  
          compiled from written questionnaires and personal interviews.  Far East Command has  
          been directed to inactivate the Negro 24
th
 Infantry Regiment and to replace it with an  
          integrated infantry regiment.  Further, general integration has been ordered in the Eighth  
          Army in Korea and in units in Japan of both combat and service type, excepting only the  




 Infantry Divisions.  This integration will be phased over a three month period  
          with a target date of 30 September (1951) for completion.  Secretary Pace, General Collins  
          and General Ridgway are giving the above plan their full support.  They ask that you  
          consider this information confidential until a public statement is released on the subject by  
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     The Republican Party and Dwight D. Eisenhower’s campaign staff did not allow the 
deactivation of the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment to go unnoticed.  In an attempt to draw away African 
American votes during the 1952 presidential and congressional races, the Republican Party used 
the issue of the 24
th
 to attack the Democratic Party.  In a pamphlet titled “The Republican Party 
and the Negro: Facts for Party Speakers and Workers” the Republicans put out talking points 
regarding the 24
th
.  The pamphlet declared: 
          Although the famous Negro 24
th
 Infantry was the first U.S. unit to win a battle against the  
          North Korean Communist Army in 1950, this regiment was “smeared” for alleged  
          cowardice.  Later it was disbanded forever although it was one of the oldest regiments in  
          the Army (1867) with a proud tradition.  It could have been preserved as an integrated unit,  
          but the (Truman) Administration said “No.”
620
   
      
     Whether this argument had much effect in the African American community during the 
election of 1952 is doubtful.  Although the Truman Administration did oversee the deactivation 
of the 24
th
, it also implemented the Presidential Order which started the process for 
desegregation of the Armed Forces which culminated with the integration of African American 
soldiers in white units during the Korean War.  The Republican Party could only counter that 
“when the vote on elimination of segregation in the Armed Forces was taken on June 21, 1950 
(Senate), 61 per cent of the Democratic Senators opposed elimination while 87 per cent of the 
Republican Senators voted to eliminate segregation in the Armed Forces.”
621
  Final vote was 42 
for elimination of segregation and 29 against. 
     In accordance with the order to deactivate the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment, in September, 1951 the 
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 Infantry Regiment was replaced by the 14
th
 Infantry Regiment.  Colonel Joseph Baranowski 
recalled that  - with the 14
th
 moving in to replace the 24
th
 – its soldiers moved to the rear and 
began turning in their equipment.  “Those soldiers with enough points were sent to Japan or the 
United States, while those with less time in Korea went to replacement centers to be reassigned 
and integrated regardless of color into other infantry units.  On 1 October, 1951, the regiment 
was no more,” Baranowsky was to proclaim.
622
 
     Although the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment had gone through difficult times and had its share of 
problems, ultimately, given the inadequate leaders that the unit endured and the biases that senior 
commanders in the 25
th
 Division and X Corps had towards African American soldiers, the 24
th
 
Infantry Regiment had lived up to its motto as the “Fighting 24
th
” and was a credit to itself and 
the Army as a whole.  The 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was also partly responsible for the 
implementation of integration by the Army.  It was through the gradual integration of white 
NCOs into the 24
th
 that the Army first experimented with a process of integration that eventually 
led to the assigning of African American soldiers to white units.  Also, the irony was that the 
attacks made against the fighting capability of the 24
th
 spurred white senior officers who had 
previously been reluctant to advocate for integration to take up the torch for greater integration 
of all units.  The 24
th
 may have ultimately been a casualty of integration, but it was also the spark 
that lit the fuse to bring about an integrated U.S. Army. 
     Although combat necessity played a major role in the movement towards integration of black 
soldiers in white units as well as the concern by some of the senior white officers in Korea about 
the “performance” of all-black units such as the 24
th
, another one of the factors that moved 
integration forward in 1951 was General Matthew Ridgway.  One of the what if’s of history is, 
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had General Walker not been killed in a car accident in December, 1950, would the Army still 
have integrated black soldiers with white soldiers before the end of the Korean War?  Would an 
overall integration policy been in place by June/July 1951?  The conclusion offered by this study 























     At the end of the Korean War segregation of soldiers by race in the U.S. Army was a thing of 
the past.  Although there were scattered pockets, primarily of small units, in various parts of the 
United States and overseas that took several more years to fully integrate, the policy of 
segregation in the U.S. Army had been replaced by a policy of integration by the time of the 
armistice.  Racism, and more specifically, servicemen and officers who held racist beliefs still 
were found in the U.S. Army post-Korean War, and the Army would continue to fine tune their 
policies towards African American soldiers well into the 1970s and 1980s to deal with this 
problem.  In some respects, the goal of a “color-blind” Army is something that continues to be an 
elusive goal since racism is one of those unique human conditions that can be fought, but never 
truly vanquished.  Perhaps though, some historian in the future will be able to chronicle the end 
of racism not only in the armed forces, but in society as well, since our armed forces are very 
often a reflection of the society from which recruits are drawn. 
     The primary goal of this study was to chronicle when and how the U.S. Army finally broke 
down the barriers to an integrated force.  As noted in the first chapter, the road to integration 
wound through two world wars and the growth of an African American community in the United 
States that realized that a symbiotic relationship existed between the armed forces of the U.S. 
and the African American people.  Through their military service black soldiers were able to 
increasingly make the case for equality, first on the battlefield, and then during the 1950s and 
1960s in society as a whole.  Had young African American men attempted to “sit out” either 
World War I or World War II because of inequalities in society at the time, as some members of 
the black community had initially called for, then the civil rights movement very well could have 
been delayed several decades.  Instead, despite the inequalities, tens of thousands of young 
315 
 
African American men volunteered and served their country with distinction.  They served 
despite the obstacles thrown their way and by having to endure officers such as Lieutenant 
General Edward Almond who denigrated their every move.  The African American community 
also used the growth of their press and political awareness to highlight the accomplishments of 
their fighting men. 
    In sharp contrast to the efforts by the African American community to praise the ability and 
prowess of the black soldier the tradition bound officer community in the U.S. Army attempted 
to portray the black soldier as anything other than a capable warrior.  Although this attempt to 
cast a shadow on the effectiveness of black soldiers was most prevalent during World War I and 
World War II it continued to some extent during the Korean War.  It was best epitomized in the 
Army War College study of 1924 that concluded: “In the process of evolution the American 
negro has bot progressed as far as the other sub-species of the human family.”
623
  The Army and 
the majority of its white officers during this period focused on maintaining a segregated system, 
as well as an attempt to utilize African American soldiers primarily as laborers as opposed to 
combat soldiers.  When some of these officers were forced to utilize black soldiers as combat 
forces then tended to embrace the idea only as an opportunity to ensure that not just white men 
become casualties of war, as Almond famously quipped to his men in the 92
nd
 Infantry Division: 
“Your Negro newspapers, Negro politicians and white friends have insisted on you seeing 
combat and I shall see that you get combat and your share of the casualties.”
624
 
     The tide turned for integration after World War II when President Truman signed Order 9981 
in the summer of 1948.  With the stroke of his pen Truman changed the “official” policy of the 
United States government to provide “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the 
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armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”
625
  As was discussed in 
the first chapter, President Truman’s order was only the first step in what was a delicate chess 
game between the politicians and advocates of integration and the obstructionists in the civilian 
military structure and the senior officer corps.  The weight of enforcement of Truman’s order 
was left to the officially titled “President’s Committee on Equality and Opportunity in the Armed 
Service,” better known as the Fahy Committee.  It was through the arm-twisting of the Fahy 
Committee that some of the first cracks in the segregated military structure began to show.  
However, the greatest argument against continued segregation of troops came in the form of an 
invasion in the Far East and the outbreak of the Korean War. 
     The second chapter’s theme was continuation of racial conflict in Korea despite the efforts of 
President Truman and the Fahy Committee to provide equality of treatment and opportunity, 
more specifically, racial conflict between white officer and black soldier in the 24
th
 Infantry 
Regiment.  Drawing on the interviews conducted by CMH for Black Soldier White Army, instead 
of focusing on an “official history” of the 24
th
 IR – as was the case in Black Soldier White Army, 
this study wanted to explore the personal dynamics and interactions between whites and blacks 
in one of the oldest segregated units in the U.S. Army.  Through the interactions of white officer 
and black soldier one of the most significant obstacles to a segregated Army began to shine 
through – segregation itself. 
     The premise behind segregated units was the belief that African American men would fight at 
their best when placed in units populated by other black soldiers and led by white officers.  Of 
course in hindsight and through the spectrum of our current understanding this notion is absurd, 
however, at the time of the Korean War this was still held to be the “proven” and tested method 
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of placing black soldiers in combat.  In reality, as demonstrated in the second chapter, 
segregation tended to create ill will among both white officers and black soldiers.  White officers 
tended to regret their assignment to lead African American soldiers and believed that their 
assignment was everything from a punishment to a sure way of getting killed.  At the same time, 
the black soldiers responded to racists white officers with everything from straggling and civil 
disobedience to the most extreme, “fragging” of an officer.  The resistance by African American 
soldiers represented an important dynamic that was not expressed in Black Soldier White Army, 
and that was that the black soldiers of the 24th IR were not helpless victims in a segregated and 
racist Army, but rather active participants who were not afraid to push back against the system. 
     That the “system” was definitely flawed and skewed against black solders was demonstrated 
in the third chapter which explored military courts-martials, drugs, venereal disease, and medals 
during the Korean War.  Particularly relevant to this study were courts-martials and medals, 
since they are the two “ends” of the spectrum of battlefield performance for African American 
soldiers.   
     The black soldiers of the 24
th
 IR were constantly belittled by white officers for their supposed 
“failure” on the battlefield, especially during the opening months of the war.  Because of the 
reputation placed on black troops by several senior officers it was not surprising that a 
disproportionate number of African American soldiers were singled out for courts-martial trials 
for acts of “cowardice” on the battlefield.  Some of the officers who disparaged black soldiers 
had been trained under the “old-school” Army philosophy of black inferiority reflected through 
the documents churned out at the Army War College during the inter-war years, and by the time 
of the Korean War those same officers had risen to senior positions of authority.  They were not 
afraid to use those positions of authority to continue to demoralize the black fighting man, or in 
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the extreme case use the military judicial system to punish them. 
     While African American soldiers faced heightened scrutiny for misdeeds on the battlefield, 
military medals for acts of bravery were also closely examined and in some cases denied because 
of racial hostility by officers, the most egregious example being the case of Captain Forest 
Walker who was denied a Silver Star by Almond because Walker was a black officer.
626
  The 
role of medals in the Korean War demonstrated that although significant progress was made on 
race relations during the three years of the war, continued racism by individual actors, 
specifically officers, was one of the highest hurdles the U.S. Army had to overcome in order to 
fully embrace the promise of Truman’s Order 9981 and ensure “equality of treatment and 
opportunity.”  The role of officers in and around the 24
th
 Infantry Regiment was the focus of 
chapter four. 
     In examining the role of officers associated with the 24
th
 IR the biggest take away was that 
good or bad performance by a unit was often inextricably linked to leadership.  Even under the 
adverse conditions imposed on the 24
th
 IR by the institution of segregation an outstanding 
officer/leader could shape the performance of the unit and instill in the men the esprit de corps so 
essential in military organizations.  Colonel Corley was one of the better leaders to take the helm 
of the 24
th
 IR and as a result the men underneath his command were able to demonstrate their 
ability as soldiers.  It was under Corley’s tenure with the 24
th
 IR that PFC William Thompson 
sacrificed his life to protect the withdrawal of his fellow platoon mates.  Unfortunately, the 
institution of segregated units also carried its fair share of disgruntled and racist officers.  The 
racist officer coupled with a segregated unit could spell disaster.  Men such as Lieutenant 
Colonel Melvin Blair created an atmosphere where the chain-of-command could nearly 
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disintegrate and leave a unit in chaos.  Fortunately for the men of the 24
th
 IR, Blair was relieved 
of command after his inexcusable performance the night of November 30, 1950, but often the 
damage by officers such as Blair was difficult to repair. 
     One of the largest opponents to the 24
th
 IR was an officer who was not even in the immediate 
chain-of-command, Lieutenant General Edward Almond.  As chronicled in chapter four, Almond 
was the epitome of the “old-school” racist Army officer.  His record of racial antagonism 
towards black soldiers went back to World War II and his command of the 92
nd
 ID and continued 
through into the Korean War when he stood at the elbow of General Douglas MacArthur as 
chief-of-staff.  Almond had the ear of MacArthur and power well beyond his position.  Although 
he did not involve himself in the day-to-day operations of segregated units such as the 24
th
 IR, he 
exerted his considerable influence over race relations through shaping opinion and purposely 
resisting any attempts by the Army to integrate during the war.  Almond was one of the most 
outspoken critics of the 24
th
 IR and other black units.  Ironically, it was the vociferous 
complaints of poor performance by men such as Almond and Major General William Kean that 
helped the transition from segregation to integration.        
     Despite the imposition of a segregated system even when black troops were successful on the 
battlefield those successes were often overlooked or ridiculed in order to maintain the illusion of 
black inferiority.  One of the most common complaints by white officers of black troops was the 
supposed tendency among black soldiers to “straggle” and melt away from the front, sometimes 
without their weapons.  Some of the early efforts to integrate units came about as an attempt to 
stem the tide of straggling among black units and proponents of “limited” integration including 
men such as Colonel Corley.  Corley felt that white NCOs could be successfully incorporated 
into black units to offer additional direction and leadership.  Although the units were still 
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primarily made up of black enlisted personnel, the addition of white NCOs was a first step 
towards the larger goal of integration. 
     The largest obstacle to continued segregation of units in the Korean War was manpower.  As 
discussed in chapter five, the growing need for replacements in white units due to casualties 
meant that Army officers were more open to assigning black replacements to white units.  White 
units attempted to carry the fight to the enemy with their ranks depleted while several all-black 
units such as the 24
th
 IR were bloated with more replacements than they knew how to handle.  
Combat necessity, the most demanding of all military criteria, required that officers take a step 
back from traditional allocation of manpower resources, particularly as it pertained to African 
American soldiers.  The manpower crisis coupled with the continued complaints of black unit 
inferiority caused the Army to push integration further in the first six months of the Korean War 
than it had moved in the first two years after Truman’s Order 9981.   
     It was after the first six months of the Korean War, even while the manpower crisis and 
complaints about the failures of the 24
th
 IR and other segregated black units swirled in Korea, 
that a forceful leader emerged after the accidental death of General Walker, that leader was 
General Matthew Ridgway.  General Ridgway was one of those larger than life individuals that 
proponents of “great men/women” history love to highlight.  Besides turning around the morale 
of the 8
th
 Army in general, and reversing the defeatist mentality of United Nation forces, 
Ridgway also utilized his position of authority to once and for all settle the issue of segregation 
versus integration for servicemen in Korea.  After laying the groundwork to get his superiors at 
the Pentagon to back his position, on the three year anniversary of Truman’s Order 9981, 
Ridgway announced that it was the policy of the U.S. Army in Korea that soldiers would no 
longer be segregated according to their race. 
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     Ridgway’s order was one of the defining moments not only of the Korean War, but the 
struggle by the African American community to garner their first truly decisive victory in the 
battle for civil rights.  The United States Army, along with their sister services, had once and for 
all decided that the color of an individual’s skin would make no difference on where that 
individual was assigned.  Although the 24
th
 IR was deactivated as a result of Ridgway’s order, it 
was the sacrifices of the men of the 24 IR along with other segregated units in the Korean War 
that helped pave the way for the end of segregation. 
     The performance of the 24
th
 IR, although badly maligned by certain segments of the military 
hierarchy, was truly a testament to the dedication and perseverance of the average African 
American soldier.  The soldiers of the 24
th
 IR and other segregated units in Korea continued to 
fight and stand-up for their rights against overwhelming odds and they deserve the lion share of 
credit for bringing an end to segregation in the U.S. Army.     
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